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7Med denna samling artiklar vill vi uppmärksamma och uttrycka vår 
tacksamhet gentemot vår kollega och vän professor Åke Sander. Ge-
nom sin omfattande och allsidiga forskning är jubilaren överlag svår 
att avgränsa och han är därför besvärlig att placera in i några enkla 
kategorier, genres eller akademiska fack. Medan vissa ser en spretighet 
och yvighet i detta förhållningssätt är det enligt oss snarast ett uttryck 
för både nyfikenhet och en öppenhet inför vetenskapens möjligheter 
och begränsningar. Detta karaktärsdrag har tagit Sander till så varie-
rande områden som filosofi – speciellt inom fenomenologins område 
– migrationsforskning, beteendevetenskap och fältforskning. Hans ny-
fikenhet startade i en förundran inför den fenomenologiska forskning 
som framför allt har förknippats med den tyske filosofen Edmund E. 
Husserl (1859–1938). Åke disputerade 1988 inom området praktisk 
filosofi på avhandlingen En tro – en livsvärld: en fenomenologisk un-
dersökning av religiös erfarenhet, religiöst medvetande och deras roller 
i livsvärldskonstitutionen. Vid tidpunkten för disputationen fanns en 
koppling mellan den unga religionsvetenskapliga institutionen och den 
något äldre filosofiska institutionen. Vid den förstnämnda institutionen 
blev Åke sedermera lektor i tros- och livsåskådningsvetenskap för att 
sedan bli professor i religionsbeteendevetenskap. För oss redaktörer, 
samt för flera av bidragsgivarna i denna festskrift (med undantag för 
Carl Martin Allwood och Ingemar Karlsson), var det vid den religions-
vetenskapliga institutionen som vi kom att stifta bekantskap med Åkes 
innovativa och i vissa fall provocerande synsätt på både forskning och 
undervisning. Ja, till och med på livet i stort! 
ingång
8Från början av 1980-talet och fram till dags dato har en viktig del 
av Åkes forskning kommit att handla om migration, integration och 
kultur möten samt religiösa förändringsprocesser; inte minst med in-
riktning mot islam och muslimer i Sverige och Europa. Tillsammans 
med internationella forskare som till exempel Stefano Allievi, Jørgen 
S.  Nielsen, P. S. van Koningsveld, John Rex, Jan Hjärnø och Jochen 
Blaschke kom Åke att lägga grunden för det som idag betraktas som 
studiet av islam och muslimer i Europa. Inom detta forskningsområde 
har Åke publicerat ett flertal klassiska texter som kan anses vara pion-
järstudier. I relation till dessa och likande områden byggde Åke upp 
forskningscentret Kulturkontakt och Internationell Migration (KIM) 
vid Göteborgs universitet. Förutom att lägga en grund till studiet av is-
lam och muslimer kom detta institut, och inte minst dess föreståndare, 
att bidra med en solid forskning inom området för etnicitet och migra-
tion (det som sedan har kommit att få namnet IMER-forskning). Vid 
sidan av den akademiska forskningen kom KIM också att bli en viktig 
mötespunkt mellan akademin och praktiker som arbetade med frågor 
som rörde kulturmöten, integration, mångfald och diskriminering. 
Flera av de rapporter som publicerades vid KIM kan sägas motsvara 
det som vi idag kallar för uppdragsforskning eller samverkan med det 
omgivande samhället (tredje uppgiften). 
Även inom området religionsbeteendevetenskap – det vill säga reli-
gionspsykologi och religionssociologi – har Åkes mångfacetterade 
vetenskapliga intresse kommit till uttryck. För oss som under många 
år har deltagit i olika akademiska sammanhang med jubilaren – först 
som studenter, sedan som doktorander och sedermera kollegor – står 
det klart att vissa mönster återkommer som ofta handlar om att sätta 
vetenskapens gränser på prov. En i grunden prövande, vetenskapsteore-
tisk förankrad attityd till lärande, utbildning och forskning har präglat 
Åkes gärning inom akademin. Det har också inneburit att han inte har 
svurit sig till en religionsbeteendevetenskaplig teoribildning eller me-
tod, utan istället uppvisar en genuin öppenhet inför såväl fältbaserade 
undersökningar, kvantitativa enkätstudier, biologiskt förankrad kog-
nitionsvetenskap och psykoanalys samt globaliseringsteorier och den 
religiösa erfarenhetens psykologi. Det finns emellertid en vurm för en 
mer empiriskt förankrad forskning, där Åke allt som oftast betonar 
vikten av fältstudier, människors erfarenheter och livsberättelser. Hans 
engagemang i det vetenskapliga arbetet utmärks av en många gånger 
medryckande framåtrörelse, vilket också är tydligt i undervisnings-
situationer där det yttersta målet sällan tycks vara att studenterna ska 
kunna ”rätt” saker utan istället aktiveras och rustas för att själva kun-
na forska, argumentera och analysera. Inte sällan sker detta genom att 
9utmana och provocera vanemässigt tänkande, för att på så vis osäkra 
tillvaron och skapa utrymme för att ompröva invanda mönster. 
Den som har rest med Åke har ofta fått utstå både prövningar och 
roliga stunder. Förutom en nyfikenhet som ofta kommer till uttryck i 
både vetgiriga och vassa synpunkter på konferensbidrag eller forskare 
som inte har lyckats att förklara hur de tänker eller hur de har gått 
tillväga har han en stor social kompetens. Kontakter knyts lätt med 
andra människor och samtidigt som vissa kan bli stötta av hårda men 
välmenande synpunkter när det gäller forskning, blir andra nyfikna och 
fascinerade över Åkes berättelser om strapatsrika resor i Indien och an-
dra världsdelar. Vem kan inte låta bli att fångas när någon berättar om 
hur man bilar till Afghanistan genom Iran eller hur man grillade orm 
till middag i Sudan eller hur nyplockad och solmogen mango smakar i 
Afrika. Efter dessa exotiska utsvävningar kan han på samma lättsamma 
sätt berätta hur han har spelat golf i Sverige eller hur sen han har varit 
med att lägga i båten inför sommaren. På resor framkommer också hur 
många kontakter och vänner Åke har runt om i världen. För oss inne-
bär dessa kontakter ett stort ansvar och vi har ett arv att förvalta om vi 
skall kunna leva upp till jubilarens tempo och förväntningar. 
Åke har länge visat ett stort intresse för Indien och inte minst för 
Varanasi, som i stort sett inrymmer alla världens religioner och är en 
av hinduernas heligaste städer. I Varanasi knöts kontakter med Banaras 
Hindu University (BHU), som grundades 1916, och under 2000-talet 
reste han dit med studenter för att utföra fältarbete, besöka tempel och 
närvara på skräddasydda föreläsningar med BHU. I boken India on my 
mind, som redigerades tillsammans med kollegan Daniel Andersson, 
samlades texter från studenter som hade deltagit på resorna. I denna 
bok ger studenterna uttryck för sin förundran (och ibland förvirring), 
men uppvisade även en stor fascination för det stora landet i Sydasien. I 
mötet med en urgammal, men högst levande, religion fick de sätta sina 
akademiska kunskaper på prov. 
Åke har ofta framhållit att en religionsvetare bör lära sig att verklig-
heten är mycket mer mångfasetterad än vad böckerna ger sken av och 
att studier av religion engagerar alla sinnen. Studiet av levande religion 
kräver såväl närvaro och praktiska färdigheter som en djup förståelse 
av den religiösa utövaren. Indiens enorma religiösa mångfald visade 
sig i ett sådant avseende vara ett tacksamt område för religionsveten-
skapliga studier. Gradvis fick engagemanget för Indien en fastare form. 
Institutionen för litteratur, idéhistoria och religion vid Göteborgs uni-
versitet kunde utöka sin närvaro genom medel från International Of-
fice, vilket gjorde det möjligt att underteckna ett avtal om ett student-, 
lärar- och forskarutbyte med Banaras Hindu University i 2008. Genom 
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stöd från STINT kunde han dessutom medverka till att knyta kontak-
ter med Jadavpur University i Kolkata och aktivt bidra till att utveckla 
religionsvetenskap i Indien, som idag befinner sig i en uppbyggnadsfas. 
På senare tid har även kontakten med Pondicherry University i Syd-
indien förstärkts genom återkommande studiebesök och fältarbete. 
Genom åren har Åke varit involverad i ett stort antal konferenser och 
han har föreläst och undervisat vid ett antal indiska universitet, vilket 
har stärkt kontakten med svenska universitet vad gäller studiet av re-
ligion. En del av samarbetet har bestått i att bjuda in indiska forskare 
till Göteborgs universitet. Åke är uppskattad i Indien för sina teoretiska 
och praktiska kunskaper om religionsvetenskap och religionssociologi. 
Dessutom är han omtyckt bland sina indiska kollegor för sin vänskap, 
anspråkslöshet, gästfrihet, samarbetsvilja, entusiasm och generositet. 
Flera av bidragen i denna antologi är författade av kollegor som är 
verk samma i Indien. 
Avslutningsvis kan det vara motiverat att säga något om varför vi 
inte har valt att lyfta fram fler av Åkes publikationer i denna korta 
inledning. Det är helt enkelt för svårt att välja vilka som skall inklu-
deras. Endast på Institutionen för litteratur, idéhistoria och religions 
hemsida återfinns 90 publikationer och för den som söker på Libris 
blir listan ännu längre. Om någon har tvivlat på jubilarens betydelse 
vittnar hans publikationslista på en omfattande och mångsidig akade-
misk karriär som få kommer i närheten av. För oss som försöker att gå 
– eller rättare sagt snubbla – i hans fotspår har mycket att leva upp till 
när det  gäller forskning, publicering, internationalisering och kontakter 
med det omgivande samhället. För att lyckas med detta måste vi precis 
som Åke undvika att gå i en för tidig akademisk pension och hålla oss 
alerta och nyfikna på både det omgivande samhället och på det som 
vi så kärleksfullt kallar vetenskap. Med dessa avslutande ord önskar 
vi en produktiv och givande tid som pensionär, men också att du Åke 
fortsätter att komma till oss och ställa kritiska, krångliga och i vissa fall 
provocerande men alltid tankeväckande frågor.   
Daniel Enstedt, Göran Larsson & Ferdinando Sardella
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I have over the last five years been critically engaging with the idea 
of contemporaneity of religion – its structures of organization and its 
authority, the integrative and disintegrative functions, the enactments 
in the name of religion and the seeming “threat” that some of these 
enactments posit to the project of modernity. In narrating the history of 
modern institutions, we mark the separation of religion from state and 
science, as crucial steps to our liberation from bigotry and super stition. 
The limits that we assign to religion in modern society, the  serious 
alarm that transgression of those limits are met with, and all these even 
when they posit the task as one of moving away from it – either in 
seeking or in partializing, particularizing and incidentalizing it.
For more than two decades now, theorists of modernity have grap-
pled with the resurgence of religion and the contemporary salience of 
politico-religious movements, along with their cognate processes, secu-
larization and modernization, across the world.1 The exposition of the 
fallacies of linear-deterministic narratives of the secularization theory, 
ineluctably anchored in the separation of state and church and the 
private-public divide, foreground the dynamic nature of the publicness 
of religious imagery and values that not only universalizes European 
experiences but also the definitions of religion that are employed in 
studying colonial and post-colonial societies and their policies. Yet, 
another spate of studies interrogate the monolithic understanding of 
secularism, and the variation of forms that this separation of state and 
religion may take, thus providing a picture of secularism that better 
fits the actual practices of secular states.2 Much of this theorizing 
Sudha Sitharaman
Elephant in the Mirror
Religion in Contemporary India
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has emphasized that secularism involves less a separation of religion 
and politics, but rather, how religion is made an object of the state’s 
regulatory capacities of intervention thereby fashioning religious life 
and sensibility to fit the presuppositions and ongoing requirements 
of liberal governance.3 These newer approaches have thus effected a 
separation between secularism’s normative standards and the analytic 
categories used to understand them, bringing back to focus the ques-
tions of sovereig nty of the state and the indeterminacy of its secularity. 
Despite explorations in a few cases, we have not exhausted the pos-
sibilities of learning from how processes of secularization and the 
project of secularism may actually unfold in a multi-religious society, 
for instance India, and its unique understanding of secular neutrality 
and notions of equidistance from all religions. The myriad juxtaposing 
of state and religion in contemporary India and the secularities that 
it bequeaths may offer us a foothold to deepen our understanding 
of the relationship between secularism and secularization. Here too, 
secularism is invariably conceived of in relation to the state, whether 
in terms of a separation from or management of religion. If we begin 
problematizing the idea that secularism and secularization is invariant 
in its different forms and differing contexts, along with the significance 
of religion across societies, it becomes clear that notions of governmen-
tality of the state tie closely to the idea of secularism.4 The temporal 
variations in the idea of the state, particularly over the last decades of 
the twentieth century compels us to recalibrate the emphasis on the 
state, as a source of governmentality, in terms of an active remolding 
of religious thought and practice.5 With globalization, the middle 
classes seem susceptible to consumerism, refashioning the state that 
once was a considerable source/appeal for self-definition, which is now 
conjoined with the market as yet another source of self-fashioning and 
self-expression. 
In this retrospective, selective version, the intent is not to present a 
presentist account, but rather to explore how we could move forward 
picking up questions that pop-up on the way. So what I will do here 
is to take you through the work I engage with, in snapshot form, and 
leaving out the details all along, persuading you to see some coherence. 
I place before you four “moments of rupture”, if I may say, specifically 
chosen for their sheer ordinariness, to help us reflect on the broad 
range and diversity of theoretical and empirical work on the subject of 
Religious Studies in contemporary India. Building on incidents, which 
are located in a certain posturing that “secularism is stance taken about 
religion”, may serve as a useful context for raising and discussing some 
of the questions in understanding religion/the secular in contemporary 
13
India. This essay then is a place to yet again articulate a position, ges-
turing towards the question of the subject that might help us configure 
our work on religion. 
Secularisation and the Establishment of 
Dharmika Parishats in Karnataka
This shall be our first case study, which I believe helps us raise some 
interesting questions on issues of governmentality of the state. Here, 
I examine certain amendments in the Karnataka Hindu Religious 
Institutions and Charitable Endowments (Amendment) Act, 2011, 
henceforth Endowments (Amendment) Act, 2011.6 The stated objective 
of the amendment to the Endowments Act 2011, among others, is to 
protect the “hereditary rights of archakas (temple priests who perform 
rituals in temples)” and the “trustees of the temples”.7 The case is in-
structive for it provides an interesting opportunity for us to think about 
innovative solutions to problems in religion that are driven by secular, 
welfarist state policy.
In April 2012, the Karnataka Forum of Temple Archakas and 
Agamakaras8 submitted a memorandum demanding that there should 
be no “reservation” in the selection of the archakas in temples and 
that the retirement age for the priests should be done away with. They 
were expressing their displeasure with certain amendments in the 
Endowments (Amendment) Act, 2011 that was passed by the Bharatiya 
Janata Party (hereafter BJP) government then in power in the South 
Indian state of Karnataka. The archakas’ forum condemned the amend-
ments and declared that limiting the retirement age of archakas to 
sixty-five years was illogical, as one’s “ability” to be involved in the 
divine “ripens” with age and experience; therefore, such a move by the 
government is “baseless”, “irrational”, and “unscientific” to say the 
least. Additionally, they also questioned “the practice of appointing 
archakas based on the certificates awarded by universities” as against 
hereditary rights – where archakas and temple servants are trained in 
the traditions of agama-veda – as being against the Hindu “dharma 
shastras”. They also expressed derision over converting temples or 
religious places on the lines of government offices and bringing “temple 
priests” under “service rules” and “reservation procedures” like in 
regular jobs. Those who avail of reservations, they said, are generally 
undisciplined in their “food habits”; and additionally, they may not be 
of the “right-living”, so as to be able to follow the “practices”. The 
memorandum submitted by the archakas’ forum addresses several 
issues concerning the practices in temples and their administration, as 
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different experiences rooted in part in traditions other than those to 
which the secular inspired reforms belong. Thus, compelling the state 
to engage in a reconsideration of what is essential to Hindu religion 
and what is not; especially those that are not in congruence with the 
claims of the secular state.
The debate on the dharmika parishat (religious council)9 foregrounds 
two aspects: firstly, the centrality of the legal institution of the state in 
directing and shaping the process of secularisation in modern societies 
and the legitimacy and limits of such constraints in modern democra-
cies; and secondly, the assertion of religious beliefs in law making and 
governance by politically mobilised religious groups. The demands 
raise complex questions about the neutrality of the state in matters 
of religion.
What is intriguing is that the amendments came from the BJP, 
a party that claims to be “truly” secular for it purports to believe in 
principles of equality and rejects the special protection given to the 
minorities as appeasement, and thus chooses meticulously to describe 
its adversaries as pseudo-secular. Thus, secularism is the banner under 
which the BJP propagates a vision of “Hindu Rashtra” along with 
other Hindu organisations with which they share a similar vision of 
nation-building. The notion of a Hindu Rashtra is not being modelled 
on the principles of agama-veda or dharma shastras as the archakas’ 
forum wants it to be. However, in its current attempts to reform Hindu 
temples and Hinduism, the state exhibits an extraordinary secular pos-
turing. For here, the secular state has not simply cordoned off religion 
from its regulatory ambitions but has sought to remake it through 
the agency of the law. Clearly, when viewed from the perspective of 
reforming Hinduism, the BJP reveals itself in its civilising and discipli-
nary aspects; a perspective that immunises religion from politics in the 
context of the nation state. For the “traditionalists”, the cultivation of 
moral subjectivity was never constructed simply through legal codes; 
it was cultivated through a range of disciplinary practices embedded 
in their traditions such as agamas, vedas and dharma shastras that 
has been referred to. The language of the secular state addresses the 
citizen rather than the faithful, and therefore is in danger of easily being 
assimi lated into an identitarian view that vitiates the religious character 
of Hinduism, rendering it a political ideology. 
The state has the power and authority to decide what should count 
as essentially religious and what scope it can have in social life. It is 
through this principle that, crucially, secularism has been established 
historically. And it is this same principle that is presumed in secular 
practice today. This does not mean that the state can decide on matters 
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of religious doctrine, but that it can decide what about doctrine is 
essentially a religious matter. In consequence, secularisation is not a 
rejection of religion, but a plea for a particular kind of religion. Even 
as the secular state retains its power to regulate religious subjectivities 
and practices and remains committed to the principle of neutrality, 
it has to counterbalance it with conflicting demands of the religious 
minori ties and majorities, who appeal to the state to curtail and/
or extend their and others’ ability to practice their religion. Does the 
adoption of secularism lead to the process of secularization in society? 
Or is it the other way round? Is there a way of speaking about the 
“religious” in forms other than as a vestige of the pre-modern times or 
in terms of fundamentalism?
Baba-Datta Imbroglio: Failure of Categories
In a wild and beautiful location, set midway up the Baba Budhan hills in 
the Chikmagalur district of Karnataka, stands a cave shrine, popularly 
known as Baba Budhan Dargah.10 The cave shrine is not a mortuary 
shrine but a hermitage, a place of saintly visitation and mystical 
meditation. Devotees throng this place every year, as they believe that 
dargahs are portals through which they can invoke the deceased saint’s 
blessing and intercession. The cave houses an altar or seat, which is 
believed to be the chillah11 (altar or seat of the deity) of Dada Hayath 
Meer Qalandar, while many see it as the peetha (i.e. seat of religious 
reverence) of Swamy Dattatreya. Further, others believe that Dada 
 Hayath Meer Qalandar and Swamy Dattatreya are two forms of the 
same divinity. Dattatreya, as described in the Hindu Puranas, is the 
three-headed representation of Brahma, Vishnu and Maheshwara and 
is accompanied by four dogs. Dada, as the legend has it, was a close as-
sociate of Prophet Mohammed, who travelled to India to preach Islam. 
Syed Shah Jamaluddin Maghribi – popularly called Baba Budhan, a 
native of Baghdad – came to Chikmagalur in the 16th century via Yemen 
and continued this spiritual lineage. It is his successors who are now 
the sajjadah nashins12 of the shrine. For centuries, both Muslims and 
non-Muslims have venerated the saints at this shrine. It is considered by 
many as a symbol of communal harmony and syncretism.
The dargah, a “multi-religious” centre with a complex array of identi-
ties, has today become a domain of mutually exclusive categories of 
self-identification, of exclusion and tensions among groups in the Baba 
Budhan shrine.13 The Guru Dattatreya Peetha Samvardhana Samiti 
(Committee for the Development of Datta Peetha, hereafter Samiti), an 
outfit floated by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (World Hindu Council or 
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VHP) along with Bajrang Dal, has vowed to liberate the shrine from 
what they claim to be “Muslim control” and re-establish Hindu entitle-
ments to the peetha. Since the late 1980s, they have been organising a 
Datta Jayanthi in the month of December claiming that the chillah of 
Dada Hayat Meer Qalandar is actually a peetha of Lord Dattatreya. 
They demand that agamic14 forms of wor ship be introduced in place of 
those in practice, and that a Hindu archaka be appointed in place of the 
mujawar (Muslim priestly attendant), who now performs the rituals 
in the shrine. Contestation over the proprietorial status of the shrine 
and the daily/periodic religious observances and practices (whether 
Hindu or Islamic) has been unresolved for more than sixty years now, 
requiring state and judicial intervention. The other party to the dispute 
is the Indian state which attempted to bring the dargah under the Waqf 
Board (the institution that governs Muslim endowed properties) thus 
considering it a Muslim place of worship. Interestingly, the Muslim 
custodians of the dargah supported the Muzrai Department’s15 stand 
arguing against the Waqf board’s claims on the grounds that the dargah 
was not exclusively a Muslim shrine, since both Hindus and Muslims 
venerated it. Karnataka Komu Souharda Vedike (Forum for Communal 
Harmony) filed a Public Interest Litigation urging that the “secular” 
character of the shrine be retained, the practice of celebrating Urs16 be 
continued and exclusive Hindu rituals and Datta Jayanti celebrations 
be stalled. The secularists cry foul over the ways by which the state has 
ended up privileging majoritarian religious norms calling into question 
the professed liberal secular ethic of religious neutrality. 
The Baba Budhan imbroglio helps us to re-consider our understand-
ings of normative secularism. In places of common worship, formal 
categorizations of the state prevent deeper understanding of the poly-
semanticity of the shrine’s practices, or even the imaginations of their 
worshippers. The state remains blind to its own normative framing 
of what constitutes “inclusion” by ignoring the fact that a particular 
religious group’s demand for inclusion or recognition itself requires 
that such a group is able to recognize itself, and articulate this self-
recognition, within the terms of liberal national discourse. Would the 
solution to this imbroglio lie merely in making the principle of religious 
neutrality more resilient in practice in a manner that all religions be 
allowed equal space and voice on par with the majority? How do we 
understand “new” religious practices that come into being at different 
historical times? Should explanations lie in history or belief/faith? What 
is it that makes practices “religious” and not political (secular)? How 
does one distinguish faith from non-faith? Is secularism then the most 
effective political solution for warding off religious strife? 
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Varying Thresholds of Life
It is believed that Dada Hayat Mir Qalandar (hereafter Dada) had 
two disciples – Baba Fakruddin of Pennagonda (Andhra Pradesh) and 
Baba Hyder Saftar Rahamathulla of Mulbagal (Karnataka), whom he 
supposedly sent to preach Islam. Their two shrines are part of Dada’s 
wilayat17 and sacred geography and are considered murid (disciple or 
liter ally the committed one). In 2010, when I was doing my fieldwork 
in Chikmagalur, I encountered Mr. Firoz Khan who had spared no 
effort to save the shrine in Baba Budhan hills in the various courts of 
law. And, on one occasion, when we (Khan saab and I) were looking 
into the archaeological records to ascertain the historical date of 
Dada,18 we ran into an inscription which placed Dada in the year 1005 
AD (according to the Archaeological Report of Mysore). With naïve 
credulity, I asked Khan saab, “how can Dada be a Pir (spiritual master) 
to somebody who came 500 years later?” Khan saab replied, “madam, 
why not?… if Dada who lived 1 005 years ago can help me heal kidney 
stones … why can’t he be Pir to his murids (disciples) … the two Babas 
who lived 500 years ago?” I was a little disconcerted by the narrative 
because it had all simply been a story to me, one that I had never really 
reflected upon.
My conversations with the devotees at the Urs also revealed that 
most people regard Dada to be intimately and integrally involved in 
their lives calling into question our notions of time and history. As 
days passed, I was exposed to the stories of devotees’ experiences and 
dreams: comprising of unexpected encounters, magical coincidences 
and networks of meaning and community. I realized that a distant 
memory of an encounter with the saint had transformed and become 
part of the collective memory of Dada. The inherently social character 
of humans reveals itself in memory, even when it is seemingly the most 
personal recollection. An intimate landscape of personal devotion 
remade through public form, for devotees now visit the dargah and 
keep their vows in fulfillment of their wishes. As Asad (2003) writes, 
the unilinear and homogenous time of modern history, in spite of it 
being essential to thinking and acting critically, is only one kind of time 
people imagine, respond to, and use. Modern history clearly links time 
past to time present, and orients its narratives to the future.19 But, as 
Reinhart Koselleck points out, present experience is also a re-encounter 
with what was once imagined as the future.20 
The political solution that secularism proffers lies in this particular 
idea of history that it prescribes, which is not the way people live their 
lives. How then must we understand spirits and deities as cohabitants 
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with the living? How do we understand Dada’s capacity to harm and 
bless? Following Gilles Deleuze, could we understand them as “varying 
thresholds of life” (both human and nonhuman)? If so, how do we 
conceptualize relationships of power between these thresholds? Could 
the explorations of meaning from the perspective of faith possibly offer 
a different understanding? Is there a possibility of critique from within 
faith? In modern society, where knowledge is rooted in a-religious ways 
of life and a-religious science, religious belief (the inner state of mind) 
is a precondition rather than an inference that is built through practices 
and discourses on the mystical virtues of shrines as also on the lives 
and miracles of saints etc., in other words, based on the knowledge of 
social institutions and practices. The question to ask therefore is the 
following: is belief then an inner state of mind or a constituting activity 
in the world?
Sacred and Secular Epistemologies
In early April 2012 the Department of Sociology at Pondicherry 
University decided to reorganize and update the syllabus of the 
Masters’ Programme. Like all Central Universities in India, the depart-
ment had decided to introduce hard and soft-core papers. Being a new 
addition to the department and having a specialization in Sociology of 
Religion, it was not considered unusual for me to introduce a paper on 
Religion and Society. However, a dilemma arose as to what should be 
taught in this paper? Or, what should students of Sociology interested 
in working in/of religion read for their course work? The syllabus had 
to have a framework that would view “religion” from an ethnographic 
and historical perspective rather than from a theological one.21
Since, I wanted to begin by problematizing the idea of “religion”, 
often used to refer to particular aspects of India’s cultural traditions, 
and the “resurgence” of the religions and religious movements in con-
temporary times, both of which called forth for a fresh appraisal of the 
theories of Sociology of Religion, I thought it appropriate to include a 
unit on the Satya Sai Baba movement and another on Sri Aurobindo, for 
the reason that we were located in Pondicherry. In addition, I wanted 
to explore the relationship between global religious movements and 
modernity, as also how devotion is constructed in various urban milieus 
among the middle classes. And so, as part of the sugges ted readings that 
were offered, I intro duced a unit on New Religious Movements (NRMs) 
and on the body of discourse surrounding contemporary interest in 
self-spiritualism (represented for instance by Mata Amritanandamayi, 
Sri Sri Ravishankar and others) as opposed to organized religion, 
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self-spiritualism seeks to heal, handle and magically transform mo-
dernity and its crises (e.g. consumerism) and which also manifests an 
autonomy of the self and the internalization of religion or humanistic 
expression. The suggested readings were from known Sociologists 
whose published works had appeared in peer reviewed journals.
The Board of Studies that included professors of Social Sciences from 
premier institutions of higher education were opposed to such a move. 
The Board questioned: how could one teach the students about false 
cults, charlatans and masqueraders? Should a student of Sociology of 
Religion engage in the hermeneutics of suspicion or what Lawrence 
Babb (1983: 116) calls “the anthropology of credibility” rather than 
trying to prove what “really” happened or trying to excavate some 
“true” presence?22 I countered: don’t we discuss anything appalling in 
the classrooms? Aren’t we theorizing about discriminatory caste prac-
tices? What is caste? How does it work? If caste is anachronistic, how 
does one understand the tenacity of caste in modernity? Their responses 
confirmed my hypothesis about the secular moorings of our own 
disciplines. For knowledge production (through academic research) 
and reproduction (through education) are both part of the process 
of co-constructing religion (alongside state constructions of religion, 
popular constructions of religion and official religious constructions 
of religion), and this incident is an indicator of how knowledge about 
religion is framed in the Indian academia, particularly its pedagogy. 
To argue further, how would a historian engage with, for example, 
the mystical experiences of Ramakrishna Paramahamsa?23 More im-
portantly, can we bring together the sacred and secular epistemologies 
in comprehending the world around us? I make this suggestion in full 
awareness that the secular arose in conjunction to the sacred and re-
quired its negation as a valid form of knowledge for social or scientific 
enquiry. In the secular culture of the academy today, the realm of the 
sacred is acceptable as Philosophy, as Theology, as a subject proper of 
Anthropology, History, Sociology, and as the fecund muse of poetry and 
art. In short, the sacred is deemed as a source of inspiration or an object 
of study. It is not, however, seen as offering a conceptual framework 
that can contribute to an understanding of things other than itself. The 
larger issue is not whether one believes that Paramahamsa is “real” 
or fraudulent but whether the study of such movements say anything 
about the dilemmas of modernity’s categories and the constraints of 
disciplinary rubrics.24 There are religious movements today that have 
their roots in India (Aurobindo, Rajneesh, Mahesh Yogi et al.). They 
are, depending on the context, spatially dispersed and international or 
global in the sense that they are based on cultural practices and ideas 
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that have traveled from one location to another and have also been 
translated. They are transnational, trans-religious, universalizing (be-
cause they seek to go beyond one national or religious community or at 
the least, point to some universals), and post-colonial since their growth 
has occurred in post-independence India and elsewhere. They have 
also been implicated in colonial histories and their effects and seek to 
invent other memories and spatialities. Apart from these, there are also 
wellness programmes such as Crystal Therapy, Reiki, which with their 
claims of ensuring the personal well-being of their followers through 
specialized programmes (meditation, satsang25, yoga, ayurvedic lifestyle 
approaches) and products (herbal and natural) are in keeping with the 
idea of modernity. Moreover, I thought it would be interesting to look 
at how, for instance, the idea of “well-being” has been transformed 
from a socially rooted concept to a more individualized notion through 
institutional means, that is something saleable. This delineates how 
well-being that was earlier a part of the everyday ritual activity has now 
assumed a packaged and customized new avatar or embodiment in the 
present, keeping pace with the changing lifestyles of the people. How 
may we then understand emerging urban religiosity? The Hindu Right 
has certainly been reductionist in its understanding of Hinduism, but 
we still need to recognize that there is more to religiosity-in-the-urban 
than the construction of communal identities. Are religious sensibilities, 
except perhaps in the form of violence, fundamentalism etc., external to 
the creation of urban modernity?
By way of conclusion
What I place before you through the particular events enunciated 
above are the divergent and multiple habitations of religion in mo-
dernity and contemporary India. Each of these “moments of rupture” 
have been organized and structured in a secular context and there is 
a possibility that each contains an “excess” that is not captured in its 
historical meaning. I arrived at this conclusion through a squint-eyed 
engagement with the historical embeddedness of religions in modern 
forms of power, constituting a structuring condition for action and 
moral agency. Could the exploration of meanings from the perspective 
of faith possibly bring us closer to understanding that excess? To begin 
with, how does one respond to the semantic choice between faith and 
religion to refer to a complex field that may encompass rituals, ethics, 
aesthetics, pedagogies, forms of life, community, ideology, culture, the 
quotidian, the spiritual and the material? Are “faith” and “religion” 
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two terms with the same referents? If not, then to which practice or 
discourse might we attribute the cause for divergent meanings: to the 
“secular”/”political” treatment of religion that defines “lived practices” 
in contrast to religion as institution, to traditions that claim to exceed 
the western concept of religion, or to embodied ethics of form? Does 
the answer lie in “unpacking” the very concept of faith itself despite 
the moot question: what is faith? The unpacking of faith may lead us 
to review concepts such as “politics”, “power”, “rupture”, “crises”, 
“event”, “organization”, “ethics”, “transcendence” and “immanence”. 
Would such an “unpacking” help us to see beyond the dualisms gene-
rated by different disciplines and work towards categories, methods 
and theories that engage with the history of the disciplinary formations 
and their inscriptions within modernity? Would that help to engage 
with the creative and unexpected modernity of religious movements 
and their locations within contemporary capitalism, transnational pro-
cesses and urbanization? The opposition between organized religion 
and self-spirituality, fundamentalism and secularism, false cults and 
true religion, or knowledge and faith is symptomatic of a particular 
vision of modernity. 
Indeed, even in the present, the coherence is not self-evident. 
Therefore, even as I map the contours of the contemporaneity of reli-
gion, I continue to struggle to find some clarity and coherence in what 
I am doing now. If asked to bring it all into some coherence, what I 
have been struggling to articulate about all through is the question of 
the “subject” of religion today.26 There are two framing protocols in 
operation here: a) subject-making is not an interiorised task here and b) 
the subject arises only in being made legible within a discursive regime, 
and it is only in this relationality that subjectification can be under-
stood. The “subject” here being a subject of investigation (knowing) 
as well as the question of what the coordinates of the subject-position 
of religion are (being). The former has been moving towards a certain 
“crystallizing” into an interrogation of scholarship on what constitutes 
religion and the secular as concepts historically embedded in modern 
forms of power that have brought together sensibilities, knowledge and 
behaviors in a new and distinct way. The direction the latter appears to 
take is in seeking to position religion as a normative ideal interpellating 
persons and groups, and/or as part of modern political logics, even 
while remaining precarious, and thus being open to re-formations that 
could at once be destabilizing and reproducing. 
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Introduction
This chapter aims at reviewing one of the earliest and latest works 
of Åke Sander relating to the theory and method of phenomenology. 
The first text is Sander’s doctoral dissertation from 1988 whose title in 
Swedish can be rendered as One Faith – One Lifeworld: A Phenomeno-
logical Investigation of Religious Experience, Religious Conscious-
ness and Their Roles in the Shaping of Life-worlds.1 It consists of an 
in-depth analysis of what constitutes religious experience and how to 
study it and is influenced by his studies in Philosophy as well as Faith 
and Reason at the University of Gothenburg in the 1980s. It is an inter-
esting review of important aspects of the theoretical foundation of the 
History of Religion in the 20th century, at a time when the study of reli-
gion in Sweden critically questioned its theological roots. The analysis 
carried out will then be compared to a recent article published in 2015 
named “Phenomenological Reduction and Yogic Meditation: Com-
monalities and Divergences” in which Sander returns to foundational 
aspects of phenomenology but this time with a strong basis in Indian 
philosophy and thought.2 The chapter ends by highlighting Sander’s 
work towards a comparative approach exemplified by his exploration 
of Edmund Husserl’s theory of phenomenology and Pata¯ñjali’s Yoga 
Su¯tras. This review chapter is of relevance not only for the field of phi-
losophy of religion, but also for the sociology and history of religion, as 
well as for the history of science. 
Ferdinando Sardella
Phenomenology and Yoga  
in Åke Sander’s Early  
and Late Works
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Religious experience and the making  
of life-worlds
One Faith – One Life-world is a comprehensive and ambitious philo-
sophical and theoretical work divided in four parts. The introduction di-
scusses Sander’s position within the philosophy of religion and his ideas 
about the relevance of studying religious experience. The second part 
presents and discusses the characteristics and structure of religious ex-
perience based to a large degree on the works of Mircea Eliade, William 
Jones, Rudolf Otto and Joachim Wach. In the third part Sander develops 
a phenomenological framework for an effective analysis of religious ex-
perience by examining the theoretical framework developed by Edmund 
Husserl, Aaron Gurwitsch and Alfred Schütz. In Part Four Sander pre-
sents a phenomenological analysis of the material presented in Part Two 
with the help of tools developed in Part Three. His conclusion is that 
typical religiosity is not primarily constituted by theoretical propositions 
and a set of beliefs but is based on a set of skills, a position that will be 
further developed in his article on Phenomenology and Yoga. Religiosity 
according to Sander is thus constituted by a certain mode of perception, a 
pattern of experiencing and seeing the world (a life-world), which by ne-
cessity leads to new forms of awareness, belonging and above all, action. 
In Sander’s view, the twentieth century (at least up to 1988) has been 
strongly influenced by ideals of logical positivism and “related philo-
sophical movements”.3 This turn towards “objective” approaches has 
led to an emphasis on studying texts, objective religious behaviour, and 
accumulation of archaeological and historical facts about the origins 
and development of world religions. Taking a different approach, Sand-
er aims at studying the behaviour of religious virtuosi whose life and 
experiences for millennia have inspired the founding of new religions. 
This stance is supported by among others William James, according 
to whom “personal religion” is primary, while churches and theologies 
are secondary, outgrown from the original experiences of outstanding 
religious leaders.4 
According to Sander, most religions are at heart pre-theoretical, be-
cause they in their early phases deal with direct experiences of a non-
empirical kind that only later are systematized in theologies, social 
structures, and rituals for the benefit of those who lack access to them. 
Sander contends that it is on the basis of “religious experiences and their 
internalization” that persons that had mystical experiences become reli-
gious, rather than due to epistemological or ontological knowledge. 
The religious person after a transformative religious experience 
adopts a “pattern of interpretation” (tolkningsmönster) that allows her 
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to structure, order and map the world according to a specific “mental 
code”. The pattern of interpretation influences her perception of the 
world as well as a large number of her cognitive processes. The acquisi-
tion of this pattern occurs not through theoretical studies alone, but 
more importantly through practice, and leads to the acquisition of per-
sonal realization and virtue, a perspective that Sander compares to Ar-
istoteles’ “practical wisdom” (phronesis). Through the medium of her 
faith in peculiar religious experiences and this code of interpretation a 
religious person is able to constitute a life-world, a specific sphere of 
meaning that shape actions, perceptions and thoughts. 
Transcendence
A key aspect of religious experience is the relation between the reli-
gious person and transcendence, variously defined. Sander distinguishes 
between several ways to understand the alleged experience of tran-
scendence. One is named consciousness transcendence (medvetand-
etranscendens) (T1) and refers to anything that is beyond the awareness 
of the subject. The immanent in this case is the subject’s experience. 
This instance can be further divided in two subcategories: the inten-
tion and purpose behind an act (T1.1) and the genuine experience of 
performing the act (T1.2). A second level is sensory transcendence (sin-
nestranscendens) (T2), which refers to all that is transcendent to the 
subject’s ordinary sense perception. Within this category it is important 
to distinguish between: a) what is empirically transcendent in relation 
to ordinary sense perception due to the sensory limitations of the sub-
ject at a particular time (T2.1); and b) what is in principle not possible 
to perceive through the senses (T2.2) since the source is beyond the 
range of human senses and sensory tools. A third category is experience 
transcendence (erfarenhetstranscendens) (T3). According to Sander 
much of the strength and attraction of religious experience is that it 
gives access to a deeper, more cohesive and truthful reality. Those who 
had these experiences speak of entering the deepest recesses of being 
and the root of existence through an “inner eye”, and access a dimen-
sion of existence that humans are generally unaware of.5 In the accounts 
of many religious experiences, the subject tells that she witnessed the 
cradle of life itself, hidden in the deepest recesses of life.6 Experience 
transcendence is understood here as an inner experience beyond ordi-
nary, sensory awareness. A fourth category is semantic transcendence 
(semantisk transcendens) (T4). It has two distinct subcategories: one 
that includes phenomena that cannot be semantically expressed due to 
lack of appropriate terms in a particular language domain (T4.1). The 
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other consists of what in principle cannot be communicated through 
symbols since it is ineffable, such as in the case of a religious experience 
of the divine (T4.2). The fifth and last category is metaphysical tran-
scendence (metafysisk transcendens) (T5). Transcendence refers in this 
case to that which is beyond the external world. This category has also 
two subcategories. The first one is what is generally discussed in theol-
ogy and philosophy of religion, i.e. a space or territory located beyond 
the kind of physical cosmos explored by the natural sciences (T5.1). In 
this sense, transcendence refers to multiple worlds such as the Christian 
concept of God’s abode. The second subcategory (T5.2) is linked to the 
world of everyday experience, generally understood as the “paramount 
reality” of everyday life (vardagsvärlden). Transcendence here refers to 
alternate modes of consciousness, such as in the world of fantasy and 
imagination, the world of dreams, or the worlds of the schizophrenic 
and mentally ill. T5.2 is not based on a theory of multiple worlds like 
T5, but explores alternative patterns of experience within ordinary life-
worlds. This subcategory includes accounts of experiences of God, if 
God is understood as immanent to the life-world.7 
The Encounter with the Holy
Sander proceeds from this detailed analysis of transcendence to a de-
tailed study of the “Holy” and the work of Rudolf Otto, a well-known 
theologian that has also contributed to the History of Religion. Accor-
ding to Otto, the encounter with the Holy prompts the experience of 
“mysterium tremendum et fascinans” (tremendous and fascinating 
mystery), which is divided into three stages: a) the moment of the ter-
rible; b) the moment of the overpowering (majesty); and c) the moment 
of energetic vitality.8 The tremendous is a power that is “rastlos und 
restlos, drängenden … bezwingenden, lebendingen” (tireless and com-
plete, urging … overpowering, full of life).9 
The Holy, however, is also fascinans (fascinating), which in religious 
language is indicated by words such as love and grace. This fascination 
is in opposition to the alienation and fear of the tremendous, and leads 
to the idea of liberation, rebirth or salvation. The key role of liberation 
is reinforced by phenomenologists such as Gerardus van der Leeuw for 
whom (arguably) “religion is always directed towards salvation … in 
this respect all religion, with no exception, is the religion of deliver-
ance”.10 This statement, however, may be a bit too exclusive. Liberation 
in religious language may not only refer to an otherworldly dimension, 
but also to the idea of an experience of liberation in the here and now. 
For Otto tremendum and fascinans are central ingredients of a typical, 
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deep religious experience, which also reflects his characteristic Abra-
hamitic perspective.11 The Holy is for Otto nonetheless Janus-faced: 
overwhelming, threatening, annihilating, unreachable, but also inti-
mate, attractive, healing, liberating. 
The Holy, according to this analysis, is also experienced as ens real-
issimus, a supreme, absolute reality that is richer and more complete 
than the ordinary world. It has in itself supreme value and is the basis 
of the value of anything else. The meeting with this complete whole is 
understood as transforming on several levels, and is an inclusive, inti-
mate experience in which the subject feels to be an object of the Holy’s 
concern and attention (angådd).12
The extraordinary experience of the Holy, according to Sander, how-
ever carried through, may result in a disconnection with reality and 
possibly the subject’s alienation from those who live in an ordinary life-
world. The subject may experience a “mental cataclysm” and “a new 
power in the mind”, which reveals to her the true being and existential 
reality of humanity and the world.13 Through this experience, the sub-
ject integrates, structures and organises all experiences in an absolute, 
united and cohesive life-world, a “holy cosmos”.14 In the words of Peter 
Berger and Thomas Luckmann, this new experiential world becomes
integrated in an all-embracing frame of reference, which now con-
stitutes a universe in the literal sense of the word because all human 
experience can now be conceived of as taking place within it.15
An intensive religious experience is in Sander’s interpretation life trans-
forming, and the subject of that experience feels compelled to live in a 
new world characterized by structure and order beyond external and 
internal chaos and fragmentation. This new reordering of reality be-
comes an axis that can function as a guide in life and which, accord-
ing to Durkheim is stronger than the desire for physical happiness and 
satisfaction.16 The fear to lose that axis is so great that the subject rather 
seeks death than live without it.17 Religious experience thus compels 
the subject to undergo a process of “alternation”, a term suggested 
by Berger and Luckmann.18 In this transformative process, in Sander’s 
words, the subject reviews her previous life and if the religious experi-
ence is sufficiently intense, a firm need for conversion emerges. 
The Ways of Conversion
Conversion is brought about by a radical restructuring of the subject’s 
interpretation of reality and her ways of feeling, thinking, and acting. A 
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subject can also be converted to political ideologies such as nationalism 
and communism and undergo similar stages of transformation. Sander 
considers though here only conversions born of religious experience. 
Under the influence of extreme religious experiences the religious 
specialist feels that mundane life is meaningless, fragmented and with-
out value, filled with vanity and driven by the cravings of an untamed 
ego. A number of religious disciplines enable then the subject to move 
beyond the liminal stage between unfulfilled religious life and ordinary 
life. One example is the path of yoga and meditation of India’s classical 
religions, which will be discussed below. What motivates the religious 
specialist is a strong craving for union with an absolute truth and an 
ultimate concept of the real. 
According to Sander’s presentation of conversion, salvation and re-
birth in religious terms refer to the transformation of a religious sub-
ject from an old to a new persona, and the transfer from an old to a 
new life-world.19 For Sander, this sort of “salvation” implies a creative 
change of personality and inner consciousness. It is through this trans-
formation that the religious subject begins to see the cosmos as ordered 
and structured. The mundane world is now seen as corrupting, inimical 
and alien to the pure, authentic and free inner being of the subject. 
As a result of religious experiences, religious specialists have argu-
ably tended to resent the ordinary life-world of their domain. This is 
corroborated, according to Sander, by the fact that many such virtuosi 
have throughout history isolated themselves from society.
Religious experience may be rather brief, but acts nonetheless as an 
“ontological shock” leading in some cases to existential crises, particu-
larly in the case of those with no religious background. The subject 
wishes now to navigate the ordinary world in a way that accounts for 
her religious experience and legitimates it. According to Sander, one 
way to conceptualise the dilemma of parallel life-worlds is through the 
theory of multiple realities, which was developed by William James, 
Alfred Schütz and Aron Gurwitsch. Schütz and Gurwitsch in particular 
have developed their theoretical frames from Husserl’s theory of phe-
nomenology, which in the following will first receive attention.
The Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl
According to Sander, Husserl’s main project is to put consciousness 
(medvetande) at the centre. Husserl’s phenomenology is a reflexive ac-
tivity that problematizes the natural and unreflective attitude towards 
the world by suspending any claim to objective existence of our objects 
of experience (epoché).20 This does not imply that the phenomenolo-
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gist denies or doubts the existence of an objective world, but it means 
that she suspends any judgement about its real existence. What is left 
is awareness of the world, a reality that Husserl calls transcendental to 
consciousness itself. The world is “reduced” to phenomena in the flow 
of consciousness, which are constituted and framed by the intentions 
and purposes generated by the flow of consciousness itself. The reduc-
tion does not imply that objects are erased or abstracted from ordinary 
experience, but that the experience of the object itself is understood 
as the phenomenon, which takes place within the realm of conscious-
ness. Sander, however, argues that Husserl’s phenomenology is not just 
a theory, but a practical skill to be learnt, a position that he explores in 
more detail in the article from 2015 discussed below. 
Phenomenology implies to step back as an agent and become a re-
flexive observer to such a degree that social activities, personal interests, 
engagements and motivations do not longer affect the consciousness of 
the observer.21 Each act or perception is then understood as preceded 
by a meaning (noema), which comes between perception itself and the 
perceived reference object. Every act according to Husserl is constituted 
and correlated with a meaning or specific conscious content. This con-
tent is an idea and does not belong to the physical world nor the object 
observed. 
Ordinary perceptions most often presuppose a direct connection be-
tween perception and concrete objects such as a house, a wall or a tree. 
The meaning applied to these perceptions, which creates a cohesive 
and structured representation of the reference object within the con-
sciousness of the observer is though omitted. Husserl’s phenomenology 
explores the process of perception as a tripartite structure, whose full 
interpretation has been a subject of debate among phenomenological 
commentators: a) the object of reference, b) the correlation of the ob-
ject to an intentional meaning (noema), and c) an intentional act with 
the object constituted by the noema. It is the meaning of the act itself, 
the middle part, which is the phenomenon. In ordinary dealings the 
subject simply assumes epistemological objectivism. Perception and the 
objects of perception are seen as directly linked in an objective way, and 
the world as ordered and structured more or less in the way we perceive 
it. The phenomenological reduction gives the subject the possibility to 
discover the role of consciousness in the process of perception.22 In the 
words of Gurwitsch:
Phenomenology is then characterized as a systematic study and 
theory of subjectivity for the sake of an ultimate clarification and 
elucidation of objects of any description whatsoever. Such clari-
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fication is attempted by means of descriptive analysis of the appear-
ances of objects through acts of consciousness.23
Multiple Realities
The epistemology of conscious acts allows an exploration of the var-
ious worlds of meaning that the subject creates and lives in, i.e. her 
life-worlds. According to Schütz, these worlds can be understood by 
analysing the multiple levels in which reflexive experience takes place. 
First is the level a person experiences when she is not reflecting over 
herself, but spontaneously acts within her life-world. These experiences 
are “taken for granted”. The next level consists of self-reflexive experi-
ences. When the self reflects over herself she distinguishes between mul-
tiple types of experience such as the physical experiences of the body, 
the consciousness of the mind, the experiences acquired while playing 
different roles (mother, wife, student, politician) and the critical dis-
tancing from such roles. Other levels are awareness of one’s own acts 
of consciousness, awareness of emotions, awareness of the process of 
decision making, and awareness of choices that the subject makes in 
the course of meaningful acts in line with personal values and relevan-
cies.24 According to William James, multiple realities in our conscious 
experience, and particularly those that go beyond our ordinary aware-
ness, should in fact be accepted as legitimate aspects of everyday life. 
Regarding those alternate states of consciousness James writes:
our normal waking consciousness, rational consciousness as we 
call it, is but one special type of consciousness, whilst all about it, 
parted from it by the filmiest of screens, there lie potential forms of 
consciousness entirely different. We may go through life without 
suspecting their existence; but apply the requisite stimulus, and at a 
touch they are there in all their completeness, definite types of men-
tality which probably somewhere have their field of application and 
adaptation. No account of the universe in its totality can be final 
which leaves these other forms of consciousness quite disregarded. 
How to regard them is the question, – for they are so discontinuous 
with ordinary consciousness. Yet they may determine attitudes 
though they cannot furnish formulas, and open a region though 
they fail to give a map. At any rate, they forbid a premature closing 
of our accounts with reality.25
According to Schütz, however, empirical data that deviates from the 
finite province of meaning of the subject and the environment in which 
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she lives tend to be suspended. Schütz argues that those informational 
contents are neglected and “do not stand any longer within the focus of 
our attentional interest in life”.26 The experience of everyday life thus 
tends to suspend any doubt that the interpretation of the world, other 
people and things within a specific provincial domain of meaning are 
true, while information that is not relevant or contradictory to that do-
main is brushed away.27 For example, the idea that the subject is only 
conscious and active during the course of a lifetime is to a large de-
gree alien to Indian thought. According to this analysis, an Indian yogi 
holding the view of an eternal self may regard the idea of death of the 
conscious self as a form of ignorance born of the epistemological reduc-
tions of a particular cognitive province and thus discard it. The reverse, 
of course, may also be the case. 
From Schütz’s analysis of multiple realities, Sander derives the con-
cept of “multiple selves”. The complete self is formed by a number of 
integrated and reciprocally communicating sub-selves that are linked 
to key areas of life and action. Each sub-self consists of a homogenized, 
organized and structured section of a person’s total consciousness, mass 
of knowledge and experience.28 These levels of personal being, however, 
are ultimately integrated in the religious experience of love.
Phenomenology and Yoga
The detailed investigation of phenomenology in Sander’s doctoral dis-
sertation is the basis for the article “Phenomenological Reduction and 
Yogic Meditation: Commonalities and Divergences” published in the 
Journal of East-West Thought. The article builds on the extensive ana-
lysis of Husserl’s phenomenology carried out in One Faith – One Life-
World and goes beyond a typical Judeo-Christian domain to explore in 
detail the life-world of religious specialists in India. 
Sander observes that many Western philosophers for a long time have 
spoken about an alleged difference between “Western rational think-
ing” and “Eastern, irrational, mystical-metaphysical brooding”.29 He 
abstains from a direct comparison between Western and Eastern philo-
sophy, but suggests instead the existence of a “striking resemblance” 
between Husserl’s epoché on one hand and the methods advocated by 
Patañjali, the author of the renowned Yoga Su¯tras, on the other. The 
bracketing or suspension of judgement of Husserl’s phenomenology 
(epoché) is a skill according to Sander and not only a theoretical un-
derstanding about the nature and function of consciousness. As already 
pointed out, Husserl aims at purging consciousness (often referred to as 
“mind” in Western philosophy) from those subjective layers of meaning 
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that generate a schism between the experiencing subject and “the things 
in themselves (die Sachen selbst)”.30 
The problem of yoga begins with a parallel issue. The human condi-
tion is seen as determined and influenced by a number of internal and 
external determinants that need to be overcome in order to achieve an 
unconditioned, non-temporal state of conscious existence. According to 
Sander, Indian thinkers discovered that it was relatively easy to grasp 
external determinants such as biographic impressions, or cultural and 
social patterns, but it was much harder to understand 
the structure and organization (va¯sana¯) of the normally uncon-
scious, deeply rooted properties of one’s mind (needs, dispositions, 
motivations, impulses, etc.) (sam˙ska¯ras) and then methodically 
[transcend] them.31
The yoga system described by Patañjali according to Sander clearly ad-
dresses one of the aims of phenomenology, i.e. how to reach a state 
where the subject and the object become united in the consciousness 
of the observer in an experience free from prejudice and judgement. 
The problem is how the subject can learn to perceive an object directly 
through unmediated intuition.32 Husserl’s phenomenology says little 
about how to acquire this skill, if according to Sander, one compares it 
with the techniques outlined in the yoga system of Patañjali. Patañjali’s 
eight stages of yoga place great emphasis in teaching a discipline that 
elevates the subject to alternate levels of perception and consciousness 
through meditation and concentration. At the last stage (sama¯dhi) the 
practitioner, after eliminating the determinants in her consciousness, 
reaches a complete union with the object of meditation and thus com-
plete absorption. 
Sander concludes that phenomenology and yoga fundamentally dif-
fer in their aims, despite the similarities: in the first case the aim is the 
creation of a scientific theory designed to be the basis of science; in 
the other it is uprooting the cause of suffering and opening the realm 
of transcendental awareness for the a¯tman, the eternal self, achieved 
through a conscious union with the personal (or impersonal) Potency 
underlying the cosmos (brahman). 
Concluding words
This overview has allowed access to some of Sander’s ideas about phe-
nomenology and yoga. The greater part of Sander’s analysis of pheno-
menology has been formulated in Swedish in the 1980s and have so far 
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been inaccessible to an international audience. This selective overview 
has hopefully amended the lacuna to some degree, and for this purpose 
Sander’s study of phenomenology has received more attention. It is im-
portant though to keep in mind that this review is by necessity selective 
and only to a limited degree is capable to reflect the amount of detail, 
precision and complexity that is visible in Sander’s writings. 
Sander has argued that phenomenology allows to study and under-
stand the construction and perpetuation of social and cultural patterns 
on the basis of an intricate study of the multiple layers of human con-
sciousness. This theoretical and methodological approach has proven 
to be particularly fruitful in the study of religious experiences, which 
more “objective” approaches would necessarily miss. 
In the article “Phenomenological Reduction” Sander draws parallels 
beyond what appears to be a Judeo-Christian frame of reference. The 
encounter and, to a degree, comparison with Indian philosophy cast 
new light on the possible practical limitations of Husserl’s phenomenol-
ogy. This study is consciously carried out on a liminal territory between 
two diverse, albeit not entirely alien, “life-worlds”: the “Eastern” and 
the “Western”.
A future development for a comparative philosophical dialogue may 
be the inclusion of the philosophical school of Veda¯nta, the idealist phi-
losophy of India per excellence. Several schools of Veda¯nta discuss in 
detail the absolute reality of transcendental consciousness and the “pro-
vincial” reality of the world of everyday experience, as well as their rela-
tion. They also discuss various levels of perception and knowledge, and 
their epistemology of illusion (maya) is quite sophisticated; the study of 
religious love, which is carried out in terms of the yoga of bhakti (de-
votion, sharing), is also highly developed. A comparison between phe-
nomenology and Veda¯nta, their respective epistemologies and their ideas 
about the structure of consciousness seems to be a natural step forward.
One challenge for a Husserlian phenomenological approach is that 
a radical use of the epoché may lead to absolute idealism, i.e. the idea 
that reality is simply the product of the subject’s consciousness. This 
is an issue that the philosophy of Sa¯m˙khya, the foundation of the phi-
losophy of Yoga, averted by positing the existence of Nature (prakr
˙
ti) 
as eternally real beyond the subjective experience of the non-material 
self (purus
˙
a).
Sander’s analysis of Husserl’s phenomenology and Patañjali’s Yoga 
Su¯tras is intriguing and does not lack in depth and insight. Phenom-
enology had a great impact during the 20th century for the theory and 
method of the study of religion, and its merits and limitations have 
been addressed in various fields of research such as the History of 
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Religions.33 As a method, phenomenology still retains its value and is 
important for areas of research that require a deep understanding of 
multiple realities, intentionality, and multi-layered human agency in the 
social, political and cultural life-worlds of the 21st century.
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Religion begins with a tremendous dissatisfaction with the present 
state of things, with our lives, and a hatred, an intense hatred, for 
this patching up of life, an unbounded disgust for fraud and lies. He 
alone can be religious who dares say, as the mighty Buddha once said 
under the Bodhi Tree, when this idea of practicality appeared before 
him and he saw that it was nonsense, and yet could not find a way 
out. When the temptation came to him to give up his search for the 
truth, to go back to the world and live the old life of fraud, calling 
things by wrong names, telling lies to oneself and to everybody, he, 
the giant, conquered it and said, ”Death is better than a vegetating 
ignorant life; it is better to die on the battlefield than to live a life of 
defeat.” This is the basis of religion. When a man takes this stand he 
is on his way to find the truth, he is on the way to God. That deter-
mination must be the first impulse towards becoming religious. 
 Swami Vivekananda
It would be an onerous task to trace the times religion first flourished 
in India. To keep it brief, it has often been contended that explorations 
of religion in India are as old as the history of India itself. This is up-
held by the fact that a legion of Indian thinkers dating back to ancient 
and medieval times centred most of their accounts and writings around 
religious traditions such as ”Hinduism” – the latter being vibrantly 
de lineated in the sacred Upanishads, the Puranas, the Vedantas, the 
Bhagavad Gita, the Ramayana, the Mahabharata, and the like.
The expositions generally expressed in the aforesaid sacred texts 
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under lined the ideas of ethics, values and laws. In that connection, 
scholars came to the realization that religion, or “dharma” as they re-
ferred it to, should be beaconed by some laws and rules that would in 
turn provide for a systematic life-pattern and the required principles 
for all individuals in society. It was widely postulated that the large 
mass of people would abide by standing orders only if these were au-
thorized in religious texts – and hence, slowly and subsequently, these 
testaments emerged as major sources of adherence to and maintenance 
of a disciplined, harmonious and peaceful life, flavoured with optimum 
happiness derived from a rich lifestyle, both materially and spiritually. 
The theorem continued and was even considered by social law makers 
up to the 19th century.
In discussing Hinduism, the majority religion of Indian culture, cer-
tain lineaments must be brought to light. Hindu society has aimed at 
building up a broad-based, integrated society in which the individual’s 
spiritual, psychical and physical well-being is well looked after. This 
can be attributed to the certitude that the organizers of ancient Hindu 
society possessed wisdom, knowledge, experience of human values, and 
formulated principles and disciplines that could efficaciously look after 
both the individual and society. Although the caste system remained in 
place, being for many years the pivot on which the whole community 
life revolved, it was “dharma” (righteousness) that gained paramount 
significance in lending social relations a deeper meaning, thereby mor-
alizing the social behaviour of the Hindus.
Coming to the dominant social institutions of the time, it must be 
stated here that most were patrilineally structured, following the innu-
endos in the Vedas, the Dharma-shastras, the Buddhist and Jain texts, 
as well as the law-digests. Mention should also be made of the Bhaga-
vad Gita, which is a historical and textual marvel in many ways. In 
just 700 (in some lesser known versions 745 or 750) shlokas (song, or 
a category of verse line), the book offers deep philosophical insights 
which can stimulate the followers of any philosophical school, be-
sides showing practical ways of going about life for people of every 
temperament. Its teachings are lofty, rational, unbiased and quite free 
from sectarianism and bigotry. The teachings are believed to have come 
through the lips of Krishna, who is thought to be an incarnation of the 
Supreme God, hence the name Bhagavad Gita, i.e. the Song of the Lord. 
If one studies the text attentively, what is explicitly stated is that God 
is present within all of us, yet He transcends all forms and limitations, 
pervades the universe, and is beyond time. He is also able to express 
Himself in a form that suits the people of a particular time in a way 
that their problems can be addressed, thereby enabling them to relate 
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to those teachings and find answers to the questions that haunt them. 
The sacred Gita, thus, educes such an appeal that it can even endear an 
atheist to lay his hands upon it, provided he is capable of going beyond 
the mere words of the text and get to the underlying principles that it 
testifies.
Due to the fact that the Gita succinctly deals with important ques-
tions of human existence as well as enumerates the ways to salvation, 
it is the most revered book of the Hindus. Besides, it is also considered 
to be the gist of all Upanishads, and by some it is regarded even as a 
separate Upanishad standing on its own. However, since all good things 
must come with a price, the Gita too has not been spared from harsh 
scrutiny. It received a lot of flaks, but its author(s) unflinchingly ac-
cepted them, improved some of its statements, and even synthesized 
and included them. The Gita accepts the karma-kanda (the ritual-based 
part) of the Vedas and improves the idea by introducing the idea of 
nishkama karma, that is, desireless actions done for the good of the 
world. It accepts the jnana kanda (the knowledge-based part) of the 
Vedas, but combines it with action and devotion in what may be de-
scribed as a proto “Practical Vedanta”. It accepts the Samkhya idea of 
the duality of matter and consciousness in the manifested creation, but 
also stresses the Vedantic idea of an all-pervading reality beyond them. 
Another interesting notability of the Gita lies in its positive declara-
tion of the worship of God in any form. This is concreted by its at-
tempt to explain the idea of incarnation or divine descent along with 
the nature of Shrimad Bhagavan (Krishna), which it does in a very 
unique manner. What is equally interesting to note is that the Gita 
authorizes anyone, irrespective of sex, caste and religion to obtain an 
understanding of it through reading its enchanting verses. Such and 
many other enthralling facets of the Gita prodded a host of eminent 
thinkers such as Shankaracharya, Ramanuja, Madhavacharya, Swami 
Vivekananda, Tilak, Auro bindo, Mahatma Gandhi, Radhakrishnan 
and Swami Chinmayananda to compose commentaries and essays on 
it. It has thus become evident how sweeping the magnetism of the Gita 
has historically been.
However, the Gita is not the only text of the Hindus that bear tes-
timony to the Indian society of ancient times. The two epics, i.e. the 
Ramayana and the Mahabharata, also fittingly narrate about the same. 
While the former portrays the hero Rama as both an Avatar and an 
incarnation of the Almighty, the latter delves into the deepest insight of 
the soul of the Indian people. Furthermore, the Dharma-shastras (the 
law books) hold equal and immense sociological importance because of 
their concern and implications on the social living of the Indians. 
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It would be erroneous to assume that Hindu texts are the only ones 
that have single-handedly presented an image of Indian society; the 
 sacred texts of the Buddhists and Jains equitably hold great sociologi-
cal weight in that regard. The Pali Canon gives a fair idea of the social 
structure of the Buddhist period. A review of these texts acquaints one 
with the pattern of family-living, as well as the roles played by fami-
ly members, both in a normative and deviational form. The Jain text 
Nayadhammakatha offers a similar contribution; it provides materi-
als on patterns of family, inter-personal relationships of the members 
and the social network existing between the family of orientation (in 
which one is born) and the family of procreation (one which is created 
after marriage).
It can thus be asserted that the Bhagavad Gita, the Hindu epics, the 
Dharma-shastras, the Buddhist and Jain texts, and even the Puranas 
(which are widely referred to as “the Veda of the common people”) 
have furnished a comprehensive range of materials that are collec-
tively encyclopaedic in scope. However, it was the tenets of the Gita 
that greatly influenced Swami Vivekananda (1863–1902), the modern 
reformer of Vedanta philosophy. 
By nature, Vivekananda was a follower of the path of knowledge, 
with a strong belief in Advaita Vedanta since his early years. He was the 
chief disciple and apostle of Ramakrishna Paramahansa (1836–1886) 
and his affinity for Vedanta was combined with a burning love for 
and urge to serve humanity – something that he strived for all his life. 
He was a prince of knowledge and selfless service, exactly as Krishna 
wanted Arjuna to be (as found in the Gita). As such, the exegesis of 
Rama krishna as “modern day Krishna” with his teachings “Shiva jnane 
jeeva seva” (service to all creatures as God) and “Jato mat tato path” 
(different opinions are different paths to the same goal) cannot be en-
tirely denied. Vivekananda, on the other hand, has been thought of as 
a “modern day Arjuna”, although he went far beyond the image al-
luded for him and became more like a personification of the teachings 
of the Gita.
Going backwards in time, one can find Raghunandana, a social theo-
rist of North India of the 16th century, who was a fellow devotee of 
Chaitanya Mahaprabhu (1485–1533). Raghunandana exercised an all-
round influence on society, disseminating the principles espoused by his 
Guru. He later became an inspiration to Raja Ram Mohan Roy (1773–
1833), one of the most seminal figures in the development of modern 
social sciences in India. Roy’s Brahmo Samaj was largely interwoven 
with the tenets of Hinduism. He used this platform to fight against er-
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ror, falsehood and credulous naïveté. He stood for rationality against 
blind superstition, logic against blind faith and science against dogma. 
He questioned the very validity of every (unprogressive) institution in 
the Hindu social structure, and instead advocated the adoption of new 
Western knowledge, if India was to secure a place in the community of 
modern nations. Ram Mohan also established the Atmiya sabha (So-
ciety of Friends), a forum for free discussions and exchange of ideas 
on religious, political and social issues. In his sociology of religion, 
he asserted his progressive ideas in opposition to Christian mission-
ary ones and virtually laid the foundation for a comparative method 
in the study of social behaviour and practices. Caste with its structures 
and strictures was questioned by him, whereby he surmised that the 
caste system had no sanctions in the Shastras (religious texts), and that 
achievement instead of ascription should be used to gauge the inferior-
ity or the superiority of men. By attempting to reform and modernize 
what he perceived to be a credulous and dogma-stricken Indian society, 
Ram Mohan Roy heralded a functionalist and pragmatic approach to 
the concept of religion – a pursuit incipiently associated with the emi-
nent French sociologist David Émile Durkheim. 
Apart from the efforts of Vivekananda, Ram Mohan Roy and oth-
ers, the process of evangelization deserves a special mention too; the 
advent of the evangelical Christian missionaries was also an important 
phenomenon in the social life of India. During the period from 1793 to 
1833, many missionary societies were active in Bengal, for example the 
Baptist Missionary Society, the London Missionary Society, the Society 
for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge, the Society for the Propa-
gation of the Gospel, The Church of Scotland, the British and Foreign 
Bible Society among others. All of these played a significant role in 
spreading and advocating reforms of Hindu society. However, it was 
the Dharma Sabha in Calcutta (now Kolkata), which by 1830 stood 
as a strict defence force of traditional Hindu patterns of life and living, 
that vindicated what was perceived as the characteristic “essence” of 
customary Indian society.
All this suggests that the field of sociology of Hindu religion is not 
uncharted by Indian intellectuals. But the only lacuna remains in its 
faux pas of not being presented in an organized, systematic manner. 
The time has come to work on this trajectory with a new kind of con-
sciousness and methodical commitment. The need of the hour rests in 
the folds of Indian society, which needs to expand its horizons about 
the epistemological, ontological, and methodological study of religion, 
thus enriching the subject in all of its dimensions.1
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1 The following sources have been consulted for this chapter: Anil Chandra 
Ghosh and Jagadish Chandra Ghosh: Srimad Bhagavad Gita (big edition) 
(Kolkata, 2014); Jayadayal Goyandka: Tattva vivechani, Srimad Bhagavad 
Gita (Gorakhpur, 2012); Benoy Kumar Sarkar: The Positive Background of 
Hindu Sociology: Introduction to Hindu Positivism (Kolkata, 1985); Swami 
Jagadishwar Ananda: Srimad Bhagavad Gita (in Bengali) (Kolkata, 2013); 
Swami Vivekananda: Bhagavad Gita as Viewed by Swami Vivekananda (Kol-
kata, 2009) and The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, Vol. 1, 3, 9 
(Kolkata, 1947).
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The Ombudsman institution has been closely associated with democ-
racy, democratic development, governance and public administration. It 
is viewed as an easy mechanism of grievance redressal in the hands of 
common people against the power, discretion of the government and the 
bureaucracy that operationalize them. With the adoption of welfare phi-
losophy by many countries in the post World War II period, governments 
took upon themselves the burden of taking care of the citizenry. It in-
creased the functions of governments, which led to increase in numerous 
types of citizens’ grievances against the government and its functionaries. 
In the words of Bernard Frank, they range from simple clerical error to 
oppression such as: injustice, failure to carry out legislative intent, unrea-
sonable delay, administrative error, abuse of discretion, lack of courtesy, 
clerical error, oppression, oversight, negligence, inadequate investigation, 
unfair policy, partiality, failure to communicate, rudeness, maladminis-
tration, unfairness, unreasonableness, arbitrariness, arrogance, ineffi-
ciency, violation of law or regulation, abuse of authority, discrimination, 
errors, mistakes, carelessness, disagreement with discretionary decisions, 
improper motivation, irrelevant consideration, inadequate or obscure 
explanation, to all other acts that are frequently inflicted upon the gov-
erned by those who govern, intentionally or unintentionally.1
Ombudsman for the Common Man
In the above listed situation of grievances, redressal is often discrimina-
tory. Justifying the need of the desirability of having an ombudsman 
Rajani Ranjan Jha
Ombudsman in  
a Non-Western Context
A Study of India’s Federal Ombudsman Enactment
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for England, Lord Shawcross rightly wrote in the preface to the Whyatt 
Report:
 the man of substance can deal with these situations. He is near 
to the establishment; he enjoys the status or possesses the influ-
ence which will ensure him the ear of those in authority. He can 
 afford to pursue such legal remedies … as may be available. But 
too often the little man, the ordinary humble citizen, is incapable 
of  asserting himself.2
In fact, it is the common man who is most in need of protection against 
such disadvantages. If left uncared, disregard of people’s feelings may 
result into grievous consequences. Dissatisfaction may lead to aliena-
tion and finally may take the form of revolt against the system, which 
obviously no government wants. The governments, therefore, cannot 
afford to disregard the feelings of their citizens. It is, therefore, impe-
rative for a civilized human society to set up stable, effective and trust-
worthy institutions to serve the people in various ways and in a timely 
manner. 
Ombudsman against Injustices
It is not only the stability aspect of the system that should be taken 
into account in the state-citizen relationship but also other considera-
tions emanating from the very application of democratic polity. In the 
democratic world of today the relationship between the rulers and the 
ruled is not a static phenomenon like the previous forms of govern-
ments, but a changing one.3 Those who are in the capacity of governors 
today become governed tomorrow due to the very nature of democratic 
 polity. Therefore, those who are the holders of power today must also 
be careful that official lapses, omissions, injustices if tolerated today 
may oppress them tomorrow when they will not be in power. The rulers 
and the ruled, thus, equally benefit from the mechanism(s) that corrects 
governmental mistakes and help prevent their recurrence.4
The main problem before the modern administrative system is how 
to provide the citizen with an institution within the democratic frame-
work which enjoys his confidence and to which he can have easy access 
for the redress of his grievances. It was equally important that such a 
system should be cheap, easily accessible, quick, impartial, objective, 
independent and held in high esteem. 
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Ombudsman: Origin and Development 
It is basically to meet this need that many countries in recent decades 
have adopted the institution of Ombudsman. The institution had its 
origin in the Swedish constitution of 1809, as an effective mechanism 
for handling the grievances of the public against administrative im-
propriety and insensitivity.5 Appointed as an officer of Parliament, the 
Swedish Ombudsman was officially known as Justitio Ombudsman 
(Commissioner of Justice). Later, it was adopted by many countries and 
in recent years more and more countries are opting for this institution 
on their own, also because it has been recommended by international 
institutions such as the UN, the World Bank, the International Mon-
etary Fund, the Asian Development Bank etc. as a means of ensuring 
good governance and better service delivery to the citizens. However, 
to go back to the roots, the word Ombud is a Swedish word which 
refers to a person who acts as a spokesman or representative of another 
person.6 In Swedish public law, however, Ombudsman means an ap-
pointee of the Parliament of Sweden for the supervision of the adminis-
tration. In Norway and Denmark it generally means a person who has 
a public duty imposed on him/her which he/she must discharge. The 
English translation for Ombudsman is Parliamentary Commissioner 
for Administration – a term used for the Ombudsman in England. But, 
it is in the Swedish sense that the word Ombudsman is generally used 
and understood all over the globe. In the United States the term has 
been somewhat loosely used and any complaint handling mechanism 
has been given the name of Ombudsman. As a result, one finds Om-
budsman institutions functioning both at public and private levels in 
the United States such as Ombudsman for Navy, Consumer Protection, 
Local Government, Business, Environment Protection etc.7 This trend 
got more currency in the development of the Ombudsman institution in 
other parts of the world in later years. 
What is an Ombudsman?
The unrestricted use of the term “Ombudsman” posed the possibility 
of the very idea behind the establishment of this institution getting di-
luted or lost. This concern was seriously taken note of by many persons/
scholars intimately associated with the development of the Ombudsman 
system. Prominent among such persons have been Professor Donald 
C. Rowat of Carleton University, Ottawa and Bernard Frank, For-
mer Chairman of the International Ombudsman Institute. Rowat has 
rightly cautioned that if the unrestricted use of the term “Ombudsman” 
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was  allowed to continue because of its growing popularity, “the Om-
budsman idea may become its worst enemy”.8 Efforts were thereafter 
initiated to define the term “Ombudsman”. The committee of the Inter-
national Bar Association resolved in 1974 that the term “Ombudsman” 
should mean only grievance handling mechanism and defined it as 
an office provided for by the constitution or by action of the legisla-
ture or parliament and headed by an independent, high-level public 
official who is responsible to the legislature or parliament, who 
receives complaints from aggrieved persons against government 
agencies, officials, and employees or who acts on his own motion, 
and who has the power to investigate, recommend corrective ac-
tion, and issue reports.9
Later, Gerald E. Caiden et al. in the International Handbook of the 
Ombudsman, Vol I. Evolution and Present Function, (1983) defined 
“Ombudsman” broadly as: 
The Ombudsman is an independent and non-partisan officer (or 
committee of officers …) often provided for in the Constitution, 
who supervises the administration. He deals with specific com-
plaints from the public against administrative injustice and mal-
administration. He has the power to investigate, report upon, and 
make recommendations about individual cases and administrative 
procedures.  
 He is not a judge or a tribunal, and he has no power to make 
orders or to reverse administrative action. He seeks solution to 
problems by a process of investigation and conciliation. His author-
ity and influence derive from the fact he is appointed by and reports 
to one of the principal organs of state, usually either the parliament 
or the chief executive. 10
On the basis of the above definitions key elements and salient features of 
the Ombudsman system can be understood and will be presented below.
Key Elements and Salient Features 
Ombudsman is a high public official appointed by either the Parliament 
or the Chief Executive. The office of the Ombudsman is provided for 
in the constitution of the country concerned or it is the result of the 
legislation passed by the national Parliament or state legislature, as the 
case may be. His status is kept at a higher level usually equivalent to the 
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Chief Justice of the highest court of the country. As a high public official 
his security of tenure is guaranteed. He cannot be easily removed from 
his office. Normally, the removal is done by the legislature after deter-
mination of a cause supported by two-thirds majority of the House. 
A person appointed as the Ombudsman is generally a non-controver-
sial person who by his own merit commands public confidence and is 
held in high esteem. The success of the Ombudsman institution largely 
depends upon the personal qualities and public image of the incumbent. 
Extended Arm of Legislature 
Ever since its origin in Sweden the office has been so closely associa-
ted with the legislature that it has been called the “extended arm of 
legislature.” Not only the Ombudsman is appointed for supervising and 
controlling the administration but also for protecting the rights of the 
citizens. The Ombudsman gets his/her strength from the legislature. He 
is the representative of the people’s representative. In this sense, he may 
be said to represent the democratic element in society. In many countri-
es during the appointment of the Ombudsman the Leader of the Oppo-
sition is also consulted. This process of consulting the opposition lends 
credence to the Ombudsman as it emerges from the choice of both the 
government and the opposition. His annual report, which the Ombuds-
man is obliged to present, is placed on the table of the House and may 
occasion debate and discussion. Some countries have the provision of 
Select Committees of the House on Ombudsman to coordinate the ac-
tivities of the Ombudsman. Thus, everywhere there is a close linkage 
between the Ombudsman and the Parliament/Legislature. 
Independence
Even though an appointee of Parliament, the Ombudsman is totally 
independent from it. That the Ombudsman is independent from the 
Executive administration hardly needs any reiteration. In fact, one may 
put it as such that the most striking element of the office of the Om-
budsman is its independence. The very appropriate remark of Bernard 
Frank that “the Ombudsman must be free from any control by any 
other officer and, if he is subject to supervision, then whatever he may 
be he is not an Ombudsman” beautifully brings out the seminal im-
portance of independence in the whole concept and operationalization 
of the Ombudsman system. Additionally, the Ombudsman should not 
only be independent in terms of legal position of his office but he must 
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also appear to be so to the general people. The people in general should 
have confidence in the independence of the Ombudsman.11
Objectivity and Impartiality 
The whole idea of Ombudsmanship is based on the principle of impar-
tial investigation by an office which is not a part of the administration 
and who has no interest in being protective of any act and omission 
or commission on the part of the administrative functionaries. The 
Ombudsman office is in fact based on the premise that an objective, 
impartial investigation from an outside independent agency who is not 
involved in decision making will not only bring out the objective state 
of affairs but will lead to the improvement of public administration. 
For the Ombudsman, therefore, to operate with objectivity and fairness 
is very important.
Easy Accessibility
An Ombudsman is a grievance redressal body against the functioning 
of the complex, dingy, serpentine corridors of bureaucracy and govern-
ment. Therefore, the Ombudsman must be easily accessible by the gene-
ral public especially the poor, marginalized, disadvantaged sections of 
society, who are most in need of his help. Approaching the Ombudsman 
is not only easy but inexpensive as well so that anybody can approach 
him. In most countries of the world the Ombudsman can be reached by 
personal visits, letter, phone (in many cases toll free numbers), fax and 
internet. 
Power to get Information
Ombudsman is empowered to call for information from any quarter 
and has the right to inspect all government documents and files ex-
cepting those relating to national security. Even in the case of papers 
relating to national security the British system introduced an ingenious 
provision under which the Ombudsman himself can see all documents 
but shall not disclose any matter whose disclosure may be dangerous to 
the safety of the state.12 
Suo Moto Power
The Ombudsman, unlike the court and many such institutions, has the 
authority to act on his own motion or initiate investigation without 
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any reference from any complainant. He may start investigation on the 
basis of newspaper reports, radio, television etc. But this special power 
is not available to some Ombudsmen such as those instituted by the 
British and the French. 
Ombudsman and Court of Law
One very clear thing is that the Ombudsman is different from a court of 
law. No counsels are required before the Ombudsman, plus the proce-
dure of approaching the Ombudsman is user-friendly, simple, easy, and 
available virtually at no cost to the complainant. Unlike the court it is 
quick, non-taxing and free from botheration. Many matters of malad-
ministration, which cannot be raised before a court of law are the favo-
rite areas of the functioning of the Ombudsman. Once a complaint is 
filed before Ombudsman he, in fact, is the moving spirit. That the Om-
budsman is different from a court of law must be clear to the general 
public especially in those developing societies that have a colonial past. 
People fight shy of or are afraid of approaching a court of law because 
of their not-so-happy experiences or bad reputation of the functioning 
of courts during colonial rule. 
Ombudsman for the Public Sector 
In its classical sense, the Ombudsman’s activities are related only to the 
public sector. The Ombudsman has the authority to receive complaints 
against the functioning of government departments and agencies and to 
thoroughly investigate them. On finding a wrong done to the complai-
nant he also has the authority not only to criticize the agency involved 
but also to suggest corrective action so that the grievance of the com-
plainant is redressed.
Ombudsman as a Mediator 
Finding fault with the agency complained against is not the main role 
of the Ombudsman. His job sometimes is also to find a solution for the 
already harassed complainant in cooperation with the bureaucracy. For 
effectively playing this role of a mediator between the problems of the 
complainant and the bureaucracy, what is required on the part of the 
Ombudsman is the social capital of confidence building among the bu-
reaucrats regarding his intention and role of improving public services 
and not being an agency moving about to punish the erring officials.
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Recommendatory Institution 
The institution of Ombudsman is a recommending body. It does not 
have any enforcement and binding power of executing its decisions 
except in the two Scandinavian countries of Sweden and Finland. His 
power in most other countries is only of persuasion, mediation and 
conciliation that makes him more acceptable to the administration. In 
this context Guy Powles rightly says: “to give him such (enforcement 
power) would be to depart from the peculiar and valuable characteris-
tics of this institution”.13
Independent of Government 
The Ombudsman is not a part of the governmental machinery and is 
independent of its creators – the Executive and the Legislature. His is 
a high powered office, which humanizes the concept of administration 
by looking into the grievances of the ordinary people free of cost, ob-
jectively and quickly. He, thus, creates confidence among the common 
man in the government and administration. He functions as the ray of 
hope for those who have been otherwise harassed and exhausted at the 
hands of a faceless bureaucracy. 
ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 
Some scholars have tried to trace the origin of Ombudsman in ancient 
civilizations such as in the medieval periods etc. but as a watchdog of 
public administration in the modern age it definitely traces its origin to 
the Swedish Constitution of 1809. After Sweden, Finland established its 
Ombudsman office in 1919. 
Danish Ombudsman: Distinctiveness Begins 
It was, however, with the establishment of the Ombudsman office in 
Denmark (1955) that the real spread and uniqueness of the Ombuds-
man system started taking shape. The Danish model was distinct from 
the Swedish one at least on three accounts. Firstly, whereas the Swed-
ish Ombudsman was a prosecutor of erring civil servants, the Danish 
one was an investigator of maladministration. Secondly, the Danish 
Ombudsman’s report was in the nature of a recommendation, whereas 
the Swedish one formed the basis of legal action against erring officials 
including the courts. Thirdly, whereas the Danish model apart from re-
dressal of individual grievances provided guidance for administrative 
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improvement, the Swedish model was based on the punishment of the 
individual concerned.14 This, in the opinion of Jan-Erik Lane substan-
tially transformed the role of the Ombudsman from a disciplinary body 
to an institution exercising influence. The Norwegian Ombudsman 
(1962) was more or less based on the Danish model. Till now, the Om-
budsman was confined to the Scandinavian soil. 
New Zealand’s Ombudsman: Inspires Many
In 1962 New Zealand, a Commonwealth country, adopted the office of 
Ombudsman known as the Parliamentary Commissioner for Adminis-
tration. Out of the two terminologies, The Parliamentary Commission-
er and Ombudsman, the public more frequently used and recognized 
the office as Ombudsman.15 The New Zealander model of Ombudsman 
influenced the Australian, Indian (first established in 1971 at provincial 
level) and Pakistani Ombudsman system. 
Today no continent is bereft of the office of the Ombudsman. Differ-
ent countries and continents have opted for different models of the Om-
budsman system but some of the main elements remain the same. We 
have Ombudsman in the form of commission in many countries, there 
are also Ombudsmen for human rights and supra national Ombuds-
men such as the European Ombudsman. We have also an Ombudsman 
in international bodies such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Health Organization. 
The foregoing description suggests that the presence of an Ombuds-
man has a prophylactic effect on administration because it humanizes 
the concept of administration. It stands for fairness, objectivity and 
accountability in administration. The Ombudsman serves as the hope 
of the poor man to get justice and fair treatment easily and virtually 
at no cost. But the Ombudsman has no enforcement power. He has 
the strength of persuasion, conciliation, mediation, and his own trans-
parency and integrity. The Ombudsman enjoys the trust of the com-
plainant and also of the person complained against. If he does not, the 
Ombudsman’s authority will be eroded and credibility damaged. 
With this background, the chapter in the following pages describes 
how and why in the non-Western context of India the enactment of the 
federal Ombudsman legislation was not only inordinately delayed, but 
required special efforts on the part of a 82 year old Gandhian: Anna 
Hazare.
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India: Interest in the Ombudsman
India became independent in August 1947. Increasing corruption in In-
dian public life attracted occasional public attention during the early 
1950s. It was, however, in 1959 that the then Chairman of the Univer-
sity Grants Commission and a former Finance Minister of India, C.  D. 
Deshmukh, speaking at a public meeting in Madras raised the issue 
of high level corruption in India and called for the establishment of a 
high-level, impartial, standing judicial tribunal to investigate and report 
on complaints, and added that if such a tribunal were set up “I shall 
be happy to make a beginning by lodging half a dozen reports my-
self”.16 The confirmation that corruption in public life was increasing 
came from one of the Congress Presidents who is reported to have said 
that congressmen who were paupers before Independence had become 
millionaires.17 Hurling of charges against some of the Ministers of the 
Government of India became almost a daily affair and ad hoc enquiries 
had to be instituted in one or two cases. Apparently, it looked impos-
sible to any longer brush off the demands for some kind of high level 
permanent enquiring body.18
At about the same time as the atmosphere in Indian political life was 
surcharged with talks of corruption against Ministers and some of the 
top ranking civil servants, a report by the Justice, the British Section 
of the International Commission of Jurists, was published in Britain 
containing a strong case for the Ombudsman institution. This had an 
impact in India because through the report the interest in the institution 
of Ombudsman was aroused.19 Probably, however, there were other 
reasons as well. The demand for an Ombudsman was born of a sincere 
desire to improve the standard of Indian administration by providing 
an institution where people could freely register their grievances against 
malfunctionings of the administrative apparatus. Significantly, no such 
office had so far been created in the country. Moreover, the demand 
could also stem from the desire to be on par with the contemporary 
standards of combating corruption and maladministration.20 The Om-
budsman idea now started gaining favor from many quarters in India. 
In fact, various institutions, committees, commissions, organizations, 
scholars, eminent jurists and people from various walks of life started 
recommending the institution. 
The question of having an Ombudsman for India was for the first 
time raised in Parliament on April 3, 1963 by L. M. Singhvi, an eminent 
jurist, while participating in a debate in the Lok Sabha (Lower House) 
on demands for Grants of the Ministry of Law.21 The then Law Minis-
ter A. K. Sen while giving a non-committal reply to Singhvi’s proposal, 
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underlined all the same the importance of making a serious study as 
to how the institution of Ombudsman could effectively work in the 
federal set up of India.22
The H. C. Mathur Committee, constituted by the State Government 
of Rajasthan to suggest administrative reforms, in its report in Septem-
ber 1963 recommended the appointment of an Ombudsman, or a Com-
missioner to enquire into complaints against high officials, including 
Ministers of the State. 23 Sometime later while addressing the All India 
Congress Committee at Jaipur on November 3, 1963 Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru stated that he was seized seriously by the problem of 
combating corruption in administration. What he said then is important 
to be mentioned in the present context. He stated that the office of the 
Ombudsman fascinated him since the office had the overall authority to 
deal with charges even against the Prime Minister and commanded eve-
ryone’s respect and confidence. Nevertheless, he felt that in a big country 
such as India the system might not provide the right solution.24 It ap-
pears that this remark by Nehru dampened the interest of the Union 
Government for the Ombudsman institution for the time being.
Meanwhile a Parliamentary Committee on the Prevention of Cor-
ruption headed by K. Santhanam was constituted in 1962 “to review 
the problem of corruption and make suggestions”.25 On the recommen-
dations of this committee submitted in March 1964, the Government 
of India established the Office of the Vigilance Commissioner at the 
Central level to deal expeditiously with cases of corruption in Central 
and All India Services. However, this office was not empowered to deal 
with cases of corruption against public men, i.e. persons belonging to 
the political class. Pressure was also mounting on the Government in-
side the Parliament for establishing in India an office analogous to the 
Ombudsman. It is learnt that by April 1965 there was almost unanim-
ity in the Lok Sabha regarding the desirability of such institution in In-
dia.26 Yet no action was taken. Later, the high powered Administrative 
Reforms Commission (ARC) under the chairmanship of Morarji Desai 
constituted by the Government of India recommended the appointment 
of two special authorities designated as the Lokpal and the Lokayukta 
to look into cases of grievances and corruption against public men and 
public servants in India.27 A draft bill – The Lokpal Bill (1966) was 
submitted by the Chairman of the Commission on October 20, 1966 
for the consideration of the Government.28 The Lokpal and Lokayuk-
tas Bill (1968) based mainly on the pattern suggested by the ARC was 
introduced in the Parliament, but could not be passed due to a split in 
the ruling Congress Party and the subsequent dissolution of the House. 
In its final report also the ARC in 1970 again emphasized the need of 
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setting up these offices. The Government of India accepted the recom-
mendations, and the bill that was passed by the previous Lok Sabha 
was reintroduced in the fifth Lok Sabha with an identical title, i.e. 
“Lokpal and Lokayuktas, Bill 1971” on August 11, 1971. This Bill was 
not passed even though the Government had a massive majority in Par-
liament. The Government could find time to pass other laws and even 
substantive amendments to the Constitution (the 42nd Amendment), 
but could not manage to pass this much publicized and long awaited 
Bill, which lapsed again with the dissolution of the Lok Sabha in Janu-
ary 1977. It is worthwhile to remember that it was during the period of 
this Lok Sabha that Jayaprakash Narayan started his mass movement 
on the issue of corruption in the country which led to the imposition of 
internal emergency in the country in June 1975 and finally the defeat of 
the ruling Congress party in the Parliamentary elections in 1977.
In his first broadcast to the nation after the formation of the first 
non-Congress Central Ministry in 1977, which largely accepted him as 
its mentor, Jayprakash Narayan said that his first expectation from the 
Government was that it would enact the Lokpal Bill to eradicate cor-
ruption from public life.29 But this bill was also not passed.
Political Class and Lokpal Legislation
It is important to note that, whereas the Ombudsman institution has 
developed in most of the Western democracies primarily as a grievance 
redressal mechanism, in the Indian context it was viewed from the very 
beginning as a corruption fighting agency. The very idea that the Lok-
pal would be a check not only on high level ministerial and bureau-
cratic corruption but also on what is termed as “ministerial autonomy” 
and discretion used many times by the holders of power without any 
valid ground turned almost the entire political class as enemy no. 1 of 
the Lokpal project. The inclusion of Members of Parliament within the 
jurisdiction of Lokpal made the passage of the Bill very difficult as later 
events showed. Otherwise, how can one explain the non-enactment of 
a series of the Lokpal Bills introduced in Parliament in 1968, 1971, 
1977, 1985, 1989, 1996, 1998, 2001 and 2011 – a period during which 
different political parties formed the government at federal level?30
When the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) Government under 
Dr. Manmohan Singh came to power in 2004 the Prime Minister had 
strongly supported the idea of establishing a Lokpal institution which 
could look into cases of corruption even against the Prime Minister. But 
no action was taken during the entire period of UPA I (2004-09) in this 
direction. 
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UPA II and the Challenges of Corruption
The UPA II Government came to power again under Manmohan Singh 
in 2009. After some time, corruption emerged as the major cause of pu-
blic anger and frustration involving politicians, civil servants and law 
enforcement agencies. Why does corruption bother both the common 
man and the sensible people of India? Put briefly, because it is anti-
developmental. It not only blocks the channels of service delivery but it 
compromises the quality of service delivery also, it causes huge loss to 
the public exchequer, creates an unfavorable climate for foreign inves-
tors and increases the cost of government subsidized services. It works 
against the poor because most of the cases of prevalence of corrup-
tion are noticed in areas related to such programs, which are meant for 
improving the lot of the poor and the marginalized sections of society 
e.g. programs relating to poverty alleviation such as Mahatma Gandhi 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MNREGS), remo-
ving illiteracy (Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan), improving public health (Na-
tional Rural Health Mission) etc. Welfare programs in tribal areas are 
the worst affected. The situation has much worsened since late  Rajiv 
Gandhi’s often quoted remark made some 30 years ago that out of 100 
only 15 paisa reached the beneficiary. The nexus between politicians, 
bureaucrats and criminals, which the Vohra Committee had deeply 
studied and reflected upon, have truly started parallel govern ments in 
many parts of our country. Corruption makes our system porous and 
weakens our efforts towards national integration and compromises 
our fight against international terrorism. It weakens our democracy by 
slowing down the pace of economic development and the fruits of de-
velopment, which do not reach the poor, thus creating a distrust in the 
very apparatus and institutions of democracy. People are losing faith 
in democracy and a significant number of people resort to extra-con-
stitutional means in the form of the spreading wings of Naxalism and 
Maoism in many parts of the country. In short, no area of our public 
life is unaffected by corruption. 
Many studies undertaken by the World Bank and others have shown 
how much ordinary Indians have to pay as a bribe in order to get day 
to day public services, which are their entitlement. This hampers the 
growth to full potential of the Indian economy in the competitive world 
of globalized economy.
 During the UPA II regime many scams like the 2G Spectrum scam 
(2008), Commonwealth Games scam (2010), Adarsh Society scam 
(2012), Chopper scam (2012), Tatra truck scam (2012) and Coalgate 
scam (2012) etc. had surfaced and there was no visible end in sight.31 
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The Government appeared to have moved into an indecision mode. The 
onset of the process of globalization which was euphorically depicted as 
the rising ambition of the middle class after 2008 turned into “transition 
to an age of anxiety”. 32 Added to it was a change in the nature of the 
Indian State from a welfare state to a minimalist facilitator state. The 
number of middle class population has considerably increased and it is 
roughly estimated to 400 million. The vision of a shining India captured 
their imagination. Many among the young had grown up in the globali-
zation phase of the Indian economy and their vision and expectation 
from the government was determined by the vision of a corruption-free, 
clean, smart, functional and accountable political system. The reality on 
the ground, however, was almost the opposite. Corruption was going on 
unbridled giving the signal that the institutional arrangements of dealing 
with corruption had not only failed, but there was no answer in sight 
to this malady afflicting Indian society and polity. People in general had 
lost faith in the investigation carried out by the Central Bureau of Inves-
tigation (CBI) – the main investigating wing of the Central Government. 
The “ethical deficit” of the government and governance had multiplied. 
Despite occasional rhetoric, the political class was not interested in tack-
ling corruption. This was the general impression. The belief was gain-
ing ground that the hydra-headed monster of corruption could not be 
tamed through the institutional arrangements then in place. 
Anna Movement for Lokpal
It was with this background of desperation among the general public 
on the issue of corruption that Kishan Baburao Hazare, better known 
as Anna Hazare, announced his decision to undertake a fast till death 
for instituting what he and his team termed “Jan Lokpal” (People’s 
Ombudsman). The idea was to pressure and force the Central Govern-
ment to institute the strong Lokpal institution that had remained elu-
sive for more than five decades.
Government after Government since the early 1960s, as stated earlier, 
had failed to take any concrete action against corruption and institute 
the office of the Ombudsman. Anna Hazare had retired from the army 
after miraculously surviving an attack during the India-Pakistan war 
of 1965, and had settled in his village Ralegaon Siddhi in the district 
of Ahmed Nagar in Maharashtra. He started living an ascetic life in a 
temple outside the village, which he renovated out of his own pension 
savings and inaugurated welfare schemes for the villagers. Very soon, 
Anna became a synonym for public spiritedness, honesty, simplicity and 
self-sacrifice for the good of the community. Anna not only developed 
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his village as a model village, but also started new projects related to 
forestry, water conservation etc., which became a model of implementa-
tion in other villages for the Maharashtrian government. Clad in spot-
less white dhoti, kurta and Gandhi cap, writes Mukul Sharma, Anna 
Hazare evokes an image of reverence and respect “characterized by 
culture, tradition and religion, including much persuasion and notably 
some coercion”.33 When Anna announced that he would spearhead the 
movement against corruption for the institution of Lokpal, he had be-
hind the well-known background of a person with a clean image, who 
had vowed “to dedicate his life in the service of the humanity”, with no 
personal involvement in politics and no family. He had first engaged 
the Maharashtrian government on the issue of corruption by launching 
Bhrastachar Virodhi Jan Andolan (The People’s Movement against Cor-
ruption) in 1991. In 2005 six Cabinet Ministers of the Nationalist Con-
gress Party resigned after an eight day hunger strike by Hazare.34 People 
saw in him some glimpses of Gandhi and one of his oft quoted remarks 
was “as long as there is life in my body, I will keep protesting”. As a 
result, when Anna started his movement he became, to quote Tushar 
Gandhi: “an icon of the desperation being felt by the people in India”. 
No wonder the political class became nervous, squirming.35
Team Anna and its Methodology
The Ombudsman movement of Anna Hazare was supported by an emi-
nent group of distinguished, highly motivated and well known citizens, 
who had made their name and fame in various fields of activities and 
had now joined hands with Anna as they considered it a call of the 
nation. This group included Arvind Kejriwal, who had a technical engi-
neering background and a reputation for having quitted government 
service for the service of the common man, he is a Ramon Magsaysay 
Awardee for courageous service to the people and now Chief Minis-
ter of Delhi; another Magsaysay Awardee supporting Anna was Aruna 
Roy, a social activist and founder of the Mazdoor Kishan Shakti Sang-
athan (MKSS), who contributed significantly to the passing of India’s 
Right to Information law; K. S. Hegde, former Supreme Court Judge 
and Lokayukta (State level Ombudsman) of Karnataka, known for his 
tough stand against corruption; Shanti Bhushan and Prashant Bhus-
hanand, a duo-team of lawyers, father and son; Kiran Bedi, a retired 
Indian Police officer: all lended active support to Anna’s movement 
and the Ombudsman movement. This inspired the young middle class 
and others throughout the country to also lend their support to the 
movement. 
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Beside the traditional methods of sit-in non-violent dharna and can-
dle light marches carried out in many parts of the country, the organ-
izers of the movement also freely employed modern gadgets and social 
media such as Twitter, Facebook, websites, which are frequently used 
by educated young people of today’s India. The media’s support for 
the movement was truly 24/7. Anna’s fast until death movement for 
Ombudsman was constantly advertised to the public through electronic 
media. The press also extensively covered the movement. 
Supporters of the Movement
The Anna Hazare Movement was said to have attracted only the edu-
cated urban middle class, who were aspiring for a shining India, an 
India of 2020 APJ Abdul Kalam’s vision; an India in which corruption 
was a thing of the past and the political class was held in check by 
overseeing mechanisms such as the Lokpal. However, the “democratic 
element” of the movement, Mohanty points out, “caught the imagina-
tion of a vast number of common people who not only were present in 
Delhi’s Ramlila Maidan but also thronged solidarity rallies in big and 
small towns all over India.”36 
Concluding Observations
Initially when Anna Hazare started his movement he did not have the 
support of major political parties. The Government and political par-
ties in Parliament saw it as a fight between the people and the authority 
of the Parliament. But when they understood the size of the “massive 
popular will” supporting Anna’s initiative, the Government and poli-
tical parties in Parliament had a second thought. Anna was raising an 
issue, which had been the demand of the nation for the past five deca-
des but the political parties had simply refused to formulate it into an 
effective law. In this context, the movement’s demand that in a libe-
ral representative democracy, the ultimate sovereign – the people or a 
group of people – has the right to mobilize public opinion and place its 
views directly before the Government/Parliament for policy formation, 
caught the imagination of the people. His emphasis on the power of 
the people was remarkably important as the same message was echoed 
by Jayaprakash Narayan during his movement in 1974-76, which led 
to the routing of the Congress Party in the parliamentary elections in 
1977. In this case also, Parliamentary elections were close. In a state 
of almost nervousness the Government took the “unusual step” of in-
viting Anna’s representatives for talks on the nature and modalities of 
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the Lokpal Bill – a procedure that perhaps happened for the first time 
in the Parliamentary history of independent India. Pranab Mukherjee 
(now the President of India) was entrusted by the Prime Minister to 
head a group of Ministers to negotiate with the anti-corruption cam-
paigner. A “sense of the House Motion” was also moved by Pranab 
Mukherjee reflecting the desire of the nation and the House in favor of 
the Ombudsman institution. Finally, the Lokpal Bill (2013) – though 
not entirely to the satisfaction of Anna and his team – was passed by 
the Parliament and became the Act I of 2014 after getting the assent of 
the President of India. 
The thrust of the movement was to use the institutional tools of de-
mocracy and force the government into acting in accordance with the 
will of the people.37 It was the first time in independent India that a 
movement forced the Government to pass a legislation, in this instance 
for instituting the Office of the Lokpal. This showed that social move-
ments cannot be brushed away, if they have the support of the masses. 
This movement in fact opened a new dimension of democratic life in 
India, “which we shall have to address” 38 remarked Pranab Mukherjee 
in his capacity as President of India, while delivering the Intelligence 
Bureau Endowment Lecture in Mumbai on December 19, 2013.
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A country with a 5000-year old history in continuity and contrasts, 
a civilization united by its diversities and distinctiveness, keeping 
live experiences of the richness of culture/s, the glory of the past, the 
turbulences and triumphs, nevertheless keeping all together leading 
the march in the cybernetic sphere, while preserving the landmarks of 
each era, the achievements of each age, the legacy of the regime – all 
those tied together in its vast geography that was created, re-created, 
maintained, continued and passed on from one generation to another 
on the long passage of time – thus evolved India’s heritagescapes.  
 Anonymous
1. Background: Context and Concern
In the Indian tradition, heritage is called “dharohara”, which is a com-
bination of two words, i.e. dhara¯ (“mother earth, Prithvi/Lord Vishnu 
who holds”), and ihara (“endeavour of identity through time”). The 
word also carries the meaning of “bearing” and “preserving” the sur-
face of the earth. Prithvi is also called dhara, dhri, dharti, dhrithri, 
meaning that which holds everything.1 This is a way to explain it, i.e. 
in terms of “root” (“shrota”) and “identity” (“asmita¯”). The word also 
signifies a framework of continuity, of interconnectedness and a person-
ality of culture; in terms of space it combines microspace, site (stha¯n), 
extended space, habitat (parya¯va¯sa, extended as “dwellingness”) and 
regional projection, territory (parikshetra), and ultimately the link to 
the terrestrial and the cosmos (brahma¯nda). Additionally, it also con-
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notes tangible, intangible and visual attributes. In other contexts the 
word “dharohara” also refers to a spatial-functional symbol that links 
“locality” and “universality”, consisting of four hierarchically covering 
layers, viz. stha¯n (site), parikshetra (defined territory), sima¯nta (border 
transition), and brahma¯nda (cosmos). 
All in all the word “dharohara” thus connotes a wide and expanded 
frame, therefore it is better translated as “heritagescapes” (mostly in 
plural) and should be explained in the purview of “heritage ecology” 
in relation to “deep-spiritual geography”.2 It possesses the “spirit” of 
spirituality and interconnectedness that have roots in past given messag-
es, existence in present experiences, and envisioning the future, what is 
called “sana¯tana” (Essenceness-Beingness-Becomingness) that in the pas-
sage of time and space represents eternity. This works in a unified total-
ity for psychological well-being or for soul and spiritual healing.3 It is to 
be noted that the Sanskrit word “sana¯tana” denotes that which always 
is and has neither beginning nor end, i.e. that which is eternal. This may 
be compared to the philosophy of sustainability that carries the seeds of 
“existence-maintenance-continuity” (sandhrita and/or samposhita). 
The word “dharohara” is used differently in various regions of India 
and in contexts such as ascendancy, continuity of tradition, property 
rights, monuments, etc. It stands for wholeness, but also “holiness” (re-
ferring to sacred attachment and site of divine feeling).4 However, one 
should keep in mind that in Indian thought lifeways have always been 
prescribed under the purview of dharma. Dharma denotes “the natural 
way” for all kinds of objects and realities. For example, the dharma 
of the wind is to blow, the dharma of water is to flow, the dharma 
of honey is sweetness, so the dharma of a human being is to save the 
dharohara and sustainably transfer it to the coming generations. This 
is sana¯tana dharma – the Eternal Natural Way of “existence-mainte-
nance-continuity”. In Eurocentric philosophy, however, such ideas are 
often projected and propagated as “static, despotic, and irrelevant to 
world history”.5
2. Scale of the UNESCO World Heritage  
Sites and the Indian scenario
Out of 1031 heritage sites in the world (as in September 2015; cf. Table 
1), 32 heritage sites (Cultural 26, Natural 6) from India are included 
in the World Heritage List (cf. Table 2, Fig. 1). However, the Indian go-
vernment has declared 150 places as national heritage sites on the basis 
of the criteria adopted by the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI). 
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Table 1. UNESCO World Heritage Properties, September 2015.
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Africa 37 48 4 89 9 33
Arab States 4 73 2 79 8 18
Asia-Pacific 59 168 11 238 23 35
Europe & North America  
(including Israel, Russia) 61 420 10 491 48 50
Latin America & Caribbean 36 93 5 134 13 27
TOTAL 197 802 32 1031 100 163 
Source: UNESCO WHL, 2015 updated.6
 
In India, the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI), the Indian National 
Trust for Art, Culture and Heritage (INTACH) and Indian Heritage So-
ciety (HIS) are the prime organisations responsible for protection, con-
servation and preservation of heritage sites. It is claimed that the ASI has 
not been maintaining traditional conservation practices and was excee-
ding its brief by setting up unnecessary structures, and that the compre-
hensive heritage environmental plan has not been taken into account. 
In its projects, INTACH emphasises that India’s living culture is be-
ing compromised somewhere on the way between India’s historical 
continuity and India’s acceptance of modernity. Planning strategies 
should therefore follow a middle path, maintaining the harmony of 
deeply implanted cultures while at the same time taking into account 
future urban development. The use of terms such as “area conserva-
tion”, “heritage zoning” and “heritage ecology” reflect this approach. 
Table 2. India: Heritage Properties as in the UNESCO World Heritage List, 
September 2015. 
Se. Category No. Heritage Properties (Year of inscription)
  Cultural Heritage
1. Forts, palaces, Tombs 7 Agra Fort (1983), Fatehpur Sikri (1986), 
Humayun’s Tomb, Delhi (1993), Qutb Minar 
complex, Delhi (1993), Red Fort Complex 
(2007), Taj Mahal (1983), the Seven Hill 
Forts of Rajasthan (2013)
2. Monuments 5 Hampi (1986), Mahabalipuram (1984), Pat-
tadakal (1987), Khajuraho (1986), Rani ki 
Vav (The Queen’s Stepwell) at Patan (2014)
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3. Caves, ancient murals 3 The Ajanta Caves (1983), The Elephanta 
Caves (1987), The Ellora Caves (1983) 
4. Buddhist monuments 2 Sanchi (1989), The Mahabodhi Temple Com-
plex at Bodh Gaya (2002) 
5. Ancient temples 2 Great Chola Temples: Gangaikonda, 
Airateshvara, Brihadeshvara (1987), Sun 
Temple at Konârak (1984) 
6. Archaeological 
 landscape
2 Champaner-Pavagarh Park (2004), Rock 
Shelters of Bhimbetka (2003) 
7. Mountain railways
(counted as one group)
3 Darjeeling (1999), Nilgiri Mountain Railway 
(2005), Kalka-Shimla (2008) 
8. Churches 1 Churches and Convents in Goa (1986) 
9. British architecture 1 Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus (formerly Vic-
toria Terminus) (2004) 
Total 26
  Natural Heritage Sites
1. Natural parks 4 Kaziranga (1985), Keoladeo (1985), 
Nanda Devi and Valley of Flowers (1988), 
Sundarbans (1987) 
2. Sanctuaries 2 Manas Wildlife Sanctuary (1985), Great Him-
alayan National Park at Kulu, H.P. (2014) 
TOTAL 32
Source: ASI Reports and other documents collected by the authors.
7
3. India’s Hindu Religious World  
Heritage Sites
Hinduism in India is simultaneously and inseparably cultural and religi-
ous, tangible and intangible, historical and present. As a result, Hindus 
in India possess colourful heritagescapes, a combination of mystical-re-
ligious sacredscapes and ancient monuments, all drawn from a varie ty 
of literature and traditions. The 2015 UNESCO World Heritage Sites 
lists 1031 properties, 32 of which are in India (cf. Table. 1). Eight of 
these 32 sites are associated with Hinduism and their main characteris-
tics in terms of history, culture and relation to well-known deities are 
given in Table 3. 
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Table 3. India: WHL Hindu Religious Heritage Sites (8) and their Characteristics.
Se.
Name of  
WHS; year  
of  inscription 
Period, dynasty; 
major God
Main temples, and important 
 monuments
1. Chola temples; 
3 main granite 
temples (1987, 
2004)
Chola dynasty, 
10th–11th centu-
ries, king Rajendra 
I; Shiva
Brihadishvara, Gangaikondachola-
puram, Darasuram, and Airavatesvara 
temple, Shiva as Kankal Murti, Peru-
vudaiyar Koyil.
2. Hampi monu-
ments and 
 temple com-
plexes (1986)
Vijayanagara 
empire, 14th–17th 
centuries; Rama, 
Krishna, Shiva, 
Vishnu
Hazara Rama Temple complex – 
stories from the Ramayana, Krishna 
Temple complex (by king Krishna-
devaraya), Virupaksha complex, the 
 Vittala Temple Complex (7th century)
3. Mahabalipu-
ram/ Mamal-
lapuram; mono-
lithic granite 
sculptures 
(1984)
Pallava-kings, ca 
7th century; mono-
lithic sculptures, 
the Ganga river, 
the five Pandavas 
(from the epic 
Mahabharata) 
Sculptures of rock-cut caves, mono-
lithic temples or five Rathas hewn out 
of a large boulder, bas-reliefs in the 
open air, and structural temples – five 
Pandavas (Yudishthira, Bhima, Arjuna, 
Nakula and Sahadeva), and wife 
Draupadi; the Shore temple (Shiva); 
Thirukadalmallai temple (Vishnu), 
Varaha rock-cut temple (Vishnu)
4. Pattadakal 
(1987)
Chalukya  dynasty, 
7th–8th centuries; 
Shiva and Jain
9 Shiva Temples, and 1 Jain Temple; 
interfacing sculptures of North and 
South India; Shiva temples of Viru-
pakha, Mallikarjuna, Kashivishwana-
tha, Sangameshvara, Chandrashekhara, 
Galaganatha, Kadasiddhesvara, Jam-
bulingeswara and Kadasiddheshvara. 
5. Khajuraho; an 
area of 22 tem-
ples (1986)
Chandela  dynasty, 
9th–11th centuries; 
Shiva, Vishnu, 
Goddess, 
Temples of Chaturbhuj (Vishnu), Devi 
Jagambi (Goddess), Duladeo (Shiva), 
Javari (Vishnu), Kandariya Mahadev 
(Shiva), Lakshmana (Shiva), Varaha 
(Vishnu)
6. Sun temple, 
Konark (1984)
Ganga dynasty 
king Narasimhade-
va I, 13th century; 
Sun god
Sun temple with huge chariot drawn 
by seven spirited horses on twelve 
pairs of exquisitely decorated wheels. 
7. Elephanta 
Caves (1987)
Chalukyas and 
Rashtrakutas, 
5th–8th cen turies; 
Shiva
Shiva in his various forms, Shiva- 
Parvati Ardhanarishvara (androgen)
8. Kailahsanatha 
Temple, Ellora 
Caves (1983)
Rashtrakuta dynas-
ty king Krishna I, 
8th century; Shiva, 
also Buddhist and 
Jain images
The caves are world-known for 
rock-cut temples containing elaborate 
carvings on the walls; mount Kailasha 
and Shiva is a megalith carved out of 
one single rock. 
Sources: compiled from ASI Reports, and other illustrating documents.
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Fig. 1. India: Unesco World Heritage sites, September 2015.
Hindu religious World Heritage Sites may further be categorized, gen-
erally speaking, according to their association with major deities and 
their various representations or avatars. Consequently, though monis-
tic/monotheistic, Hindu religion appears polytheistic. One god often 
dominates a sacred territory based on cosmic principles, and other 
auxiliary or associated gods have supporting functions. In fact, many 
Hindus focus on one “god” at the time according to what Max Mül-
ler termed “kathenotheism”;9 this is why Hindus are often viewed as 
Panchadevapujaka (simultaneous worshippers of five gods) since they 
sequentially worship the images of the archetypical five categorical 
divinities, i.e. Shiva (god of dissolution/re-creation), Surya (sun-god), 
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Ganesha (elephant-headed god), Devi (mother goddess), and Vishnu 
(god of sustenance and life) (cf. Table 3). Here follow a short descrip-
tion of these deities:
(i) Shiva, one key divinity of the Hindu pantheon, known as the cosmic 
dancer and god of dissolution-recreation. Five of the eight WHS are pre-
dominantly associated with Shiva. The image of three heads (trimurti, 
in Elephanta cave, no. 7) are said to represent three essential aspects of 
Shiva: creation, protection, and dissolution. The temple of Brihadish-
vara (Chola, at Thanjavur) is built on granite and sandstone slabs, and 
is surrounded by life-size images of eight deities protecting the temple; 
their placement conforms to axial and symmetrical rules of geometry. 
Virupakha (Hampi) symbolizes the god of progeny who controls the ri-
ver Pampa/Tungabhadra. The nine Shiva temples at Pattadakal portrait 
various forms and narratives related to Shiva. Ardhanarishvara (Elep-
hanta) represents the sublimate form of Shiva, who controls the two 
forces of self and Nature, i.e. male (purusha) and female (prakriti). Shiva 
is also here represented as a cosmic dancer (Nataraja), the lord of yoga, 
and killer of a demon. The Kailasanatha Temple (Ellora) incorporates 
Mount Kailasha (his resort) and Shiva and is possibly the world’s largest 
monolithic structure. It is carved out of one single basalt rock-cut with 
four parts, i.e. the body of the temple, the entrance gate, a Nandi (Shiva’s 
carrier) shrine and a group of five shrines surrounding the courtyard.  
(ii) Shiva and Vishnu (the god of sustenance) together or side-by-side is 
the other prevailing depiction in the religious WHS. The territory of Ma-
habalipuram displays both images, i.e. that of Shiva (Shore temple), and 
Vishnu-Varaha (the boar-form of Vishnu, the rock-cut temple, and the 
Thirukadalmallai temple). The giant open-air reliefs such as the famous 
“Descent of the Ganga”, and other sculptures depicting stories from the 
Mahabharata (e.g. Pancha Rathas, the five chariots) show the close re-
lationship between Shaivism and Vaishnavism in Hinduism. Similarly, 
the religious heritage buildings at Khajuraho represent a combination 
of three religious groups, viz. Shaivism, Vaishnavism and Shaktism 
(goddess worship). Of the twenty-two temples in Khajuraho seven are 
dedicated to Shiva, seven to Vishnu, four to Devi (the goddess), one to 
the Sun-god, and the remaining three to Jain Tirthankaras. Only Ma-
tangeshvara among these shrines is functionally active in terms of rituals 
and festivities. The location of these temples is linked to a perspective 
of cosmic geometry. According to tradition, in order to comprehend the 
deeper spiritual connections found in these temples it is required to have 
a strong understanding of how the human and the divine interact.10
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(iii) Surya, the Sun-god, is represented in most Hindu temples as an 
auxiliary image. At Konark, however, there is a 13th century temple 
of Surya riding on a chariot with seven spirited horses and twelve 
pairs of exquisitely decorated wheels, representing the 7 days and 12 
months, respectively. Since the images were removed long ago from the 
main temple, the sanctuary is no longer regarded as a holy place or a 
functional temple. In the northeast corner of the Konark compound 
a modem building houses the old doorway arch showing the planets 
of Hindu cosmology, i.e. Sun, Moon, Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, 
and Saturn in personified form. They are seated cross-legged on lotuses, 
each carrying in the left hand a water pot and in the right a rosary.11
(iv) Vishnu, god of sustenance, has also the form as Krishna. As patron 
deity, Vishnu is represented in four places on the WHS Tentative List. At 
Srirangapattanam, Vishnu is reclining on a snake bed with his two wives 
on one side, Sridevi (goddess of wealth) and Bhudevi (mother Earth), 
as well as Brahma (“the cosmic creator”). The surrounding shrines in-
clude images of Narsimha (a “Man-Lion” form), child Krishna, Srinivas, 
Hanuman (the “monkey deity”) and Garuda (the “eagle-man” carrier 
of Vishnu). The temple complex of Ranganathasvamy at Srirangam is 
one of the largest religious complexes in the world and contains a large 
temple dedicated to Vishnu, representing his many forms such as Nar-
simha, Rama, Hayagriva, Krishna, and Dhanvantari. The sacred com-
pound has 21 gopurams (towers), 39 pavilions, 50 shrines, the Ayiram 
kaal mandapam (a hall of 1000 pillars) and inside several small bodies 
of water. The 1000-pillars hall is made of granite with sculptures of ri-
ding horses and is unique among all Hindu religious shrines. 
(v) Goddess/Devi. In most cases and in most religious heritage sites the 
female counterpart of the male deities is represented as the goddess or 
devi. The Swayambhu Alyam (“Mother Earth” or Bhu-Devi) temple 
related to Swayambhu Gudi and Rudreshvara (both, forms of Shiva) at 
Kakatiya contains unique depictions. 
4. Framing HR IDAY and PR ASA D
The Government of India’s Ministry of Tourism and Culture and the 
Ministry of Urban Development are attempting to view the relation-
ship between tourism and cultural development as complimentary. 
Both ministries want to preserve the ancient roots of heritage proper-
ties and the traditions of spirituality, sacrality and pilgrimage. As a re-
sult, two innovative national programs have emerged: (i) Heritage city 
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Development and Augmentation Yojana (HRIDAY), and (ii) Pilgrim-
age Rejuvenation and Spiritual Augmentation Drive (PRASAD). With 
these programs the ministries of Tourism and Culture as well as Urban 
Development collaborate to strengthen and promote heritage sites and 
centres of pilgrimage-tourism.12 
(i) National mission of HRIDAY
The National mission on HRIDAY was launched on January 21, 2015 
with the allocation of five billion rupees (circa 84 million USD) for the 
next 27 months. It aims at revitalising through conservation and pres-
ervation the distinct and unique characteristics of the heritage cities, 
and to maintain the continuity of their traditions of heritage (tangible, 
intangible, and cultural landscapes, including written, oral, and per-
formed ones) to ensure that they will be used as a resource for sustain-
able development and ecological restoration. In a broad sense, it aims 
at bringing together urban planning, economic growth, and heritage 
conservation in an inclusive manner with the objective of restoring, re-
viving and strengthening the heart and heritage of the city. It is hoped 
that beautification, conservation, and sustainable development will 
grow in a more rational and sustainable way. Consequently, a holistic 
view of the site is being pursued in terms of its cleanliness, planning, the 
livelihood of its people and economy.13 The major twelve sites selected 
at priority level include Varanasi, Amritsar, Warangal, Ajmer, Gaya, 
Mathura, Kanchipuram, Vellankini, Amaravati, Badami, Dwarka, and 
Puri. None of them are official religious WHS yet, and only eight are 
broadly associated with Hinduism; however, in their respective devel-
opment plans the emphasis has not been laid on religious codes and 
symbolic meanings. This strategy may enhance universal values and 
encourage mass awakening for preserving and maintaining religious 
heritage sites, while making them more functional for the society and 
the environment. 
Cultural heritage sites represent though in several cases a certain 
people’s time-specific (both short and long term) understanding of the 
divine order and humankind’s response. “Religious” from that point of 
view may refer to something scientific, recreational, aesthetic, economic 
and sacramental. The metaphorical meaning of “HRIDAY” (literally 
“heart”) is a core concern that may reflect a holistic approach for the 
“inclusive-sustainable development of heritage-and-pilgrimage cities” 
in India, in which religion may also play an important role. 
The protection, augmentation, management, authenticity and in-
tegrity of properties (both tangible and intangible) are also important 
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considerations, together with the above specific characteristics. In this 
context, three basic meanings for the understanding of heritage sites 
can be drawn: 
∙ political – to assure responsibility for the decisions;
∙ cultural – to save culture rootedness and a sense of continuity; and 
∙ didactic – to promote citizen participation.
These meanings can be broken down into six elemental values: 
∙ aesthetic: the visual-iconographic beauty of the building, site, and  
  so on; 
∙ spiritual: the significance of the asset in providing understanding  
  or enlightenment or in representing a particular religion or  reli- 
  gious tradition; 
∙ social: the role of the site in forming cultural identity or a sense  
  of connection with others; 
∙ historical: connections with the past; 
∙ symbolic: objects or sites as repositories or conveyors of meaning,  
  and 
∙ authenticity: the uniqueness of visiting “the real thing”.
(ii) The National mission of PRASAD
The National mission for “Pilgrimage Rejuvenation and Spiritual Aug-
mentation Drive” (PRASAD) is included in the Union Budget 2014-
2015, and proposed a one billion INR (circa 17 million USD) initiative. 
It aims at beautifying and improving the amenities and infrastructure at 
pilgrimage centres of all faiths. Under PRASAD, old historical-cultural 
pilgrimage routes and associated sites that have heritage repositories 
can be developed. However, no detailed plans for such pilgrimage-he-
ritage cities have yet been made. Even in reference to Varanasi, where a 
good mass of detailed works on pilgrimage routes is already available, 
no plans have yet been formulated. We personally opine that Varanasi 
should be conceived as a model pilgrimage-heritage city, since it can 
record the continuity and popularity of at least fifty pilgrimage  routes. 
These are well marked, mapped and supported with explanatory 
literature.  
As in the case with HRIDAY, it is clear that interconnectivity and 
reciprocity between pilgrimage and tourism are integral to human 
travel. “Pilgrimage-tourism” is an expression that underscores an un-
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derlying metaphysical and life philosophy defined in the deepest sense, 
in which the sacred-and-profane interact. Pilgrimage-tourism can then 
easily be seen as a strategy for heritage awakening and deeper experi-
ences that transfer religiosity and enrich global humanism and spiritu-
ality. The sustainable frame of pilgrimage-tourism and heritage should 
be promoted in three ways: in philosophical, organisational, and 
managerial terms. The eco-healing approach to pilgrimage-tourism is 
a post-modernist path in which pilgrimage becomes a bridge between 
recreation and spirituality; this sort of pilgrimage-tourism may provide 
a rational alternative for promoting cultural consciousness, become a 
strategy for poverty alleviation but also help heritage preservation and 
facilitate the encounter with religion and spirituality.
UNESCO supports both PRASAD and HRIDAY since they com-
plement UNESCO’s work on heritage conservation and sustainable 
development. Clearly, a deep attachment is a pre-requisite for the awak-
ening (of awareness) and action; once a person develops deep feeling 
(of love) to a place he/she will help caring for it. Realization and revela-
tion are inseparable. As the “caring for the place (the Earth)” is inher-
ent in pilgrimage-tourism, it provides opportunity to intimately sense 
and feel deeply for a place and its people – their behaviour, their herit-
age, and the present in which they live, act, and sustain their cherished 
tradition. People’s appreciation for Religious Heritage Sites often only 
develops gradually given the prevalence and diffusion of the modern 
and the secular. Due to the nature of the secular state, in which religion 
is defined as personal, religion is not properly exposed and promoted, 
despite the fact that it so strongly controls people’s life, their pilgrim-
ages and many other related activities.
5. Epilogue: From Perspective to Appeal
Cultural heritage sites related to religion are the true representatives 
of a perceived “divine order” and the human’s deep involvement with 
faith. This is how they may be accepted as a religious “resource”, but 
they have scientific, recreational, aesthetic, economic and sacramental 
values too. At a holy place one may get close to what one perceives as 
the ultimate good. Cultural heritage offers a rich source of environ-
mental well-being in terms of human beings’ deep attachment to their 
identity and support for continuity and existence. Carl Jung has already 
acknowledged spirituality as an integral aspect of human nature and a 
vital force in human life. To realise and reveal that vital force, one needs 
to preserve the religious resources of cultural heritage – i.e. the shape 
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of the spiritual landscape. Following Confucius’ wisdom, Swan has es-
tablished the idea of cosmic integrity: “Heaven directs things, the earth 
produces, and man co-operates to create success”.14
For a religious heritage to become a resource for development first 
it needs to be documented, then protected, and finally utilized accord-
ing to specific heritage guidelines and legislation. Only then, with an 
increased stakeholder awareness and participation, will policy efforts 
and interventions become sustainable – environmentally, socially, and 
culturally. We may separate ourselves from the web of our heritage in 
the pursuit of modernity and secularism, but it will always be at the 
cost of our hearts and souls. 
A recently founded Global Hindu Heritage Foundation (GHHF) 
uses non-violent actions of mass awakening to preserve cultural herit-
age among Hindu communities around the world. This helps to con-
serve and preserve Hindu Religious Heritage Sites, contributing to 
Hindu heritage ecology in service of humanity through the ethics of 
integrating humanity with the ancient Hindu presence of “divinity”.15 
The current emphasis on architectural preservation overlooks the dia-
lectics between the tangible and intangible forms of heritage. As impor-
tant as it is to preserve significant material remains from the past, the 
knowledge base and skills that produced them should be preserved as 
well in order to support a living heritage tradition.16 Obviously
with the ongoing integration of new forms of ‘universal value’, the 
heritagescape will continue to expand, complexifying participants’ 
conceptualisations of their position with others in history and in the 
world – their very heritage – linking them with disparate times and 
places, and orienting them towards meaningful future activity.17
It is thus crucial to achieve that noble goal of making happy, friendly 
and good heritagescapes – incorporating satyam, shivam, sundaram 
(the truth, the good, the beautiful). 
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Globalization: Culture and Dynamics
Globalization refers to the process whereby the world becomes “one 
place”. The globe has compressed into a locality where various others 
have become neighbors with whom we must necessarily interact, and 
whom we must listen and relate to. The more widespread contacts we 
make, the more global culture we receive. In this sense the notion of a 
global culture must be distinguished from the one modeled after the 
nation state. Globalization may be seen as an attempt to homogenize 
culture, a project for creating a common culture and unifying it out of 
the need to ignore, refine, synthesize and blend local differences. Glo-
balization may also be viewed as the outcome of our interdependency. 
The flows of information, knowledge, money commodities, people and 
images have intensified to the extent that the perception of spatial dis-
tance has vanished. We all live in each other’s backyard. This involves 
reductions in barriers and establishing contacts that underscore the 
idea of “one world” as part of the project of modernity. This process 
helps to connect people physically, legally, culturally, and psychologi-
cally. Hence, globalization leads to a shift in the social space of the 
world as a whole. This change in spatial structure affects the whole 
society as well as each individual. It is interrelated with the individual’s 
economic, political, social, moral and cultural life as well as with pat-
terns of knowledge, identity and social ecology. Hence, globalization 
has its own dynamics of social change. 
Today, whether we like it or not, social life must recognize the new 
patterns that emerge from the process of globalization. New techno-
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logies connect people to collaborate in sharing knowledge, without 
regard to geography or language. Globalization is related to Interna-
tionalization, Liberalization and Universalization. But we also need to 
realize that there is nothing called “global culture”, nor “local culture” 
as such, although we do use such concepts. Assuming the key role of 
these categories, a local culture is a particularity that is opposed to the 
global, i.e. the culture of a relatively small, bounded space in which the 
individual lives and engages in daily face-to-face relationships. It is the 
habitual and repetitive nature of everyday life and culture that an indi-
vidual gradually learns to master. The common stock of knowledge of a 
group of people, inhabitants of a physical environment, space, building 
etc. is relatively fixed; it has persisted over time and may incorporate 
rituals, symbols and ceremonies that link several diverse people to a 
place and a “common sense” perception of the past. The sense of be-
longing, the common regimented experiences and cultural forms that 
are associated with a place are crucial to the concept of local culture. 
Yet, the concept of local culture is a relational one. The drawing of 
boundary around a particular space is a relational act, which depends 
upon the figuration of significant other localities within which one 
seeks to situate oneself. Therefore the global and the local as discussed 
herein are not real dichotomies separated in space and time. The pro-
cesses of globalization and localization are necessarily bound to each 
other. If a culture is defined as a mechanism that allows to relate to 
others by way of trust, freedom and social relationships then it is ever 
flowing and never static at any point in time or space. It is placed in the 
past, present and future all at once. Thus both an internal dynamism 
as well as an external one are constitutive parts of globalization and 
culture. Furthermore, it is interesting to note the paradoxical conse-
quences of the process of globalization, i.e. the awareness of the fini-
tude and boundedness of the planet and humanity. It does not produce 
homogeneity, but on the contrary familiarizes us with diversities and 
the extensive array of local cultures. The process of globalization leads 
thus to migration, intermingling of cultures, and an increasing percep-
tion of differences.1
Globalization, Modernity and Religion
Differences in culture, religion and language naturally create separa-
tions among human beings. Exclusiveness and social rigidity are inte-
gral parts of a culture. But, culture is never static; it is always changing. 
Its growth and transmission are carried out through communication in 
the form of language, symbols, and literary and artistic forms that play 
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a critical role in an individual’s development. The more communication 
takes place between various individuals and cultures the more steps are 
taken towards globalization and “humanization”, leading to a decrease 
of conflicts. In this sense, the process of globalization should result in 
the understanding that the world is a single place where increased con-
tact and more dialogue among different nation states is unavoidable; 
we have now a dialogical space in which we can expect many disagre-
ements, clashes and conflicts but also agreements for cooperation and a 
working consensus. It is bound to increase our web of interdependence 
and power balance. This means that in the present condition it is more 
and more difficult to retain simplified images of “me” and the “other”. 
But this does not imply that non-Western cultures will simply give way 
to the logic of modernity and adopt Western approaches to it. Globali-
zation cannot be taken to imply that there is, or will be, a unified world 
society or culture. To draw this conclusion would be a mistake. Such an 
outcome may though have been the target of a particular nation-state 
in the past, and that possibility cannot be ruled out for the future. The 
theory of modernization was initially developed with the assumption 
that as each non-Western nation eventually was modernized it would 
move up the hierarchy and duplicate or absorb the dominant global 
culture to the extent that ultimately every locality would display the 
cultural ideals, images and artifacts of the globally dominant way of 
life. That dominant culture was framed by Europe in the nineteenth 
century and by the United States in the twentieth century. The assump-
tion that all local cultures would eventually give way under the force of 
modernization to some kind of cultural imperialism and that all parti-
cularities would be linked together in some symbolic hierarchy proved 
to be wrong in the 21st century. The unification of culture in a strict 
sense appears today to be impossible. Modernization has failed to give 
rise to widespread cultural imperialism; on the contrary, it has led to 
multiple modernities and multiculturalism. 
The process of globalization and homogenization is in no way a gen-
tle process and power politics have always played an important role 
in promoting its goals. In this respect, the West has been thought as 
having the moral right and duty to guide and educate all others because 
of the self-proclaimed need to “civilize” the rest of the world. The West 
has for a long time understood itself as the guardian of universal values 
on behalf of a world formed in its own image. One must though always 
question the “universality” of such claims. Nonetheless, this process 
can also be seen as the development of a global culture in a less totali-
tarian sense, i.e. through the creation of various interdependencies of 
practices, bodies of knowledge, conventions in lifestyles, etc. 
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Åke Sander (2015a) following Peter Berger (1997) makes a distinc-
tion between technological/economic globalization and cultural glo-
balization – presented as “hard” and “soft” respectively – within the 
frame of for example Westernization and Easternization. The first hard 
pattern of globalization often leads to the soft one through large scale 
migration.2 The multiculturality and multireligiosity generated in that 
way are often met with strong resistance in many parts of the world, es-
pecially in Islamic countries, but also in India and China. These nations 
are at present working on new ideologies to meet the new challenges 
brought about by “hard” processes of globalization. If we look at the 
relation between modernity and religion in the Western context we find 
two models: one is American and the other is French or European. The 
first assumes that religion and modernity can thrive together side by 
side, without much conflict. The second assumes that the two cannot go 
together, as modernity necessarily excludes and marginalizes religion. 
Durkheim, Marx, Weber, Freud, Nietzsche and others all agreed that 
with the rise of modernity, religion as a whole would gradually dimin-
ish its influence. They believed that the increase of modernity would 
lead to more and more secular states and more and more secularized 
individuals. The assumption was also that the rest of the world would 
follow the European model. The choice for the world was and still is in 
many persons’ mind: “man without God” or “man with God”. Sander, 
however, writes: 
it appears that it is the American brand of modernity that is spread-
ing throughout the world: the one in which religion and modernity 
are thriving very well together in places like China, India, South-
East Asia, Africa, Arabia and Latin America.3 
Religion is thriving in many modernizing countries but also in modern 
nations such as the United States. Interestingly, we have now a para-
dox: the more modernity, the more religion, and the less modernity, the 
more (again) religion. Independently from modernity, it seems that we 
all have to live with religion. An argument for this state of affairs is that 
religion is thriving in underdeveloped countries because they are not 
enough “civilized”. Religion is though thriving in modernizing coun-
tries such as India, but also in modern countries in Europe and America 
due in fact to modernization and globalization and their widespread 
consequences. Religion is now thriving everywhere. People in the devel-
oping world react against modernization by taking shelter of religion, 
like in India and Turkey; people in the United States turn to religion as 
seen in the emergence of right wing Protestant Evangelicals; in Europe, 
83
millions of Muslim immigrants have made Islam and Islamophobia a 
part of everyday life. In the Middle East, Muslim political groups are 
gaining power and influence. Events like 9/11, radicalism, extremism 
and terrorism are matters of serious debate and concern all over the 
globe.4 Earlier it was thought that people who were weak, poor, un-
educated, and ignorant were the ones embracing religion, but today the 
world is witnessing an upward movement of educated middle classes 
towards religious faith, against the predictions of Marx and Weber. 
Sander argues with Peter Berger (1999) that India, China, Turkey along 
with Latin America provide clear examples of this trend.5 Therefore, the 
crucial connection between modernization and secularism has proven 
to be wrong: it was in fact a “category mistake”. Sander asserts instead 
that the relation is between “modernization and pluralism”.6 Moderni-
zation provides more choices and competition. This means that reli-
gious belonging in a modern context is no longer taken for granted; 
adults have more choices of faith and commitment beyond the religion 
that they learn at home. Sander argues therefore for the key role of 
religion in the modern world: 
today religion has come to play a significant role in the public 
and intellectual lives of many peoples throughout the world. This 
can be seen, for example, in the increased number of university 
departments and other intellectuals that are dedicated to the study 
of religion, as well as in the number of educated middle class 
people that are in some way or another involved in religion, from 
fundamentalists Christians, Muslims or Hindus or New Age, yoga 
or mindfulness practitioners. Due to globalization, the WEIRDs 
(Western[ized], educated, industrialized, rich and democratic) are 
becoming more and more similar all over the world.7 
Sander also interprets the rise of religiosity in North America as part 
of a “commodification of religion” regulated by demand and supply 
dynamics similar to the ones found in trade. 
Samuel Huntington traces the reasons for the rise of religiosity in 
the complex interplay between globalization and religion. According to 
Huntington, in an early phase Westernization promotes modernization. 
In later phases, however, modernization promotes de-Westernization at 
two levels: at the societal level modernization enhances the economic 
and political power of society and encourages people to be culturally 
more assertive; at the individual level, modernization generates feelings 
of alienation and anomie as traditional bonds and social relations are 
broken, which leads to a crisis of identity. Religion provides an answer 
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to that crises.8 Sander, along with Campbell discussed below, argues 
that the currents of modernization and Westernization do not move 
in one direction. Modernization in regard to the East promotes both 
Eastern ization and de-Easternization: Western modernity is influential 
and hegemonic (thus conducive to de-Easternization) but it is also per-
ceived as a different kind; the result is the rise of multiple modernities 
that in many respects differ from Western (European or American) mo-
dernity and are instead conducive to Easternization. 
Possible Responses
Sander writes about various reactions of individuals and social groups 
to globalization depending on their degree of tolerance: zero tolerance 
among fundamentalists and maximum tolerance among pluralists. 
Pluralists tend to express serious concern about the rise of anti-liberal 
fundamentalism and intolerance around the world. For pluralists, phe-
nomena such as the Protestant fundamentalism in the United States, 
Hindutva in India, Islamism in the Arabic world, Islamophobia in Eu-
rope and the tendency towards ghettoization and particularism among 
diaspora populations in the West are of great concern. 
Let me briefly discuss some of the possible as well as factual respons-
es to the process of globalization by individuals and social groups. One 
response may be further immersion in local culture and resistance by 
maintaining a long-established identity and refusing to be drawn into 
wider collectivities and broader cultural flows. However, this is difficult 
to achieve without military and economic power. A second response is 
escaping modernization. Members of ethnic groups sometimes roman-
tically pursue a simpler and more natural life and find there a sense of 
being at “home”. A third one is the option of nation-state participa-
tion, which allows a greater recognition of regional and local diver-
sity and multiculturalism. A fourth response is represented by peoples, 
who travel to and enter the domain of other cultures and take along 
their own. This is seen in the case of short and long term tourists, or of 
those who enter the local workforce as working class. A fifth response 
is shaped by those with a professional culture framed by a cosmopoli-
tan approach. They live and work in a “third culture” and are happy 
to move between local cultures. They develop practical and working 
relationships in multicultural settings that enable them to communi-
cate with persons around the world. The sixth and last response comes 
from those that do not judge local cultures depending on their pro-
gress towards an idealized level of modernity. They partake of higher 
education within the ranks of the emerging middle classes and actively 
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participate in the local consumer culture. They gaze over other cultural 
settings with eager curiosity and view them as “amazing places”. They 
are able to work and live within third cultures and properly represent 
them to “tell it from the native’s point of view”. They enjoy both the 
reproduction of the effect of the real, the immersion in it in controlled 
or playful ways, and the examination of the backstage areas on which 
it draws.9 If we accept Sander’s characterization of zero tolerance and 
maximum tolerance, all the six types of responses discussed above fall 
under the second category of maximum tolerance. It would be hard to 
find anyone falling into the first category, since even someone with zero 
tolerance would show some tolerance for the sake of having working 
relationships with the despised “others”, motivated if nothing else by 
economic and social interests.  
Globalization and Value Changes
Sander agrees that globalization has become one of the most signifi-
cant determining factors affecting not only the way people think about 
norms, values and ethics, but “their actual conduct as well”.10 Using the 
distinction proposed by Shweder (1997) between the ethic of autono-
my, the ethic of community and the ethic of divinity, Sander explains 
in detail how this distinction captures the phenomena of transforma-
tion of norms and values and the actual conduct of individuals in a 
globalized context.11 Liberalism, which advocates the ethic of auton-
omy and the fundamental freedom of an individual goes all the way 
to create space for rights, liberty and justice without interfering much 
with the freedom of others. The theoretical basis for this perspective is 
found in the writings of John Stuart Mill, Immanuel Kant, John Rawls 
and others and is mostly found in Western secular societies. The ethic 
of community is based on the idea that the individual is a member of 
larger units such as families, tribes, caste, community and nations. Ac-
cording to this view, these larger units are real and more important 
than individual interests and therefore the individual must compromise 
in order to protect them. Furthermore, each individual has an obliga-
tion to perform her duties in hierarchical order. The moral concepts of 
respect, honor, reputation, partnership, patriotism etc. are all part of 
the greater unit of ethical responsibility. The ethic of autonomy in this 
sense goes against the ethic of community: individual goals are selfish 
and dangerous for the existence and development of the community. 
The second type of ethics is more common in less modernized societies 
where the State cannot guarantee its citizens protection and their basic 
needs and liberties. In these societies various communities, religions, 
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social classes etc. often serve as a sort of social insurance guaranteeing 
individual survival and safety. This is close to the contractual theory of 
justice developed by Robert Nozick. Nozick argues that a minimum 
state structure would naturally arise out of an association of human 
beings “even though no one intended this or tried to bring it about, by 
a process which need not violate anyone’s right.”12 In the first case it is 
the state which guarantees the welfare of the individual, while in the 
second, it is the society or the community that guarantee and protect 
individual welfare, and their relation is reciprocal. The third ethic, the 
ethic of divinity, is based on the idea that the individual is a “child of 
God” whose body is a temple and whose acts should be carried out ac-
cordingly. The ethic of divinity discourages what degrades the individ-
ual, or dishonor the Creator, or violates “the will of God”. This ethic is 
understood to be objective and independent of human judgement and 
gives rise to the notions of sin, purity, pollution and degradation. From 
the point of view of the ethic of divinity, the Western secular commit-
ment to individual liberty and freedom is perceived as hedonistic, and a 
celebration of the lower instincts of humanity. Sander argues that 
up to the second half of the twentieth century, the areas of the 
world dominated by one or the other of this ethic largely existed in 
isolation from each other. Since then, however, and especially from 
the 1980s onwards, the situation has dramatically changed with 
the rise of globalization and pluralization. This has had serious 
consequences for the many people and countries in the so called 
developing world.13 
A little deep understanding of the three types of ethics that we have 
discussed above reveal that these types are not truly as different as they 
appear to be. The first and the second are two sides of the same coin. 
An individual is always part of a community and a community is al-
ways constituted by individuals: the two cannot be separated. Further-
more, strictly speaking, John Stuart Mill (1957) does not leave much 
place for autonomy in his utilitarian framework; it is Immanuel Kant 
(1949) and his followers such as John Rawls (1971) and Robert Nozick 
(1974), who make the principle of autonomy their foundation.14 For 
Rawls and Nozick both ethic of autonomy and the ethic of commu-
nity are equally important. In Plato’s ideal state, the well-being of the 
individual is part of the state’s well-being. Justice is ethic of autonomy 
as well as ethic of community. In Book I of the Republic, Plato defends 
some odd views through the sophist Thrasymachus, but later Socrates 
gives a more positive definition of justice. Justice is “self-control” from 
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passion and desires. It is achieved through the “performance of one’s 
proper function”. Individual pleasure, passion, and various forms of 
self-interest are seen as an abuse of the ideal life or “just life”, since 
they contain features that go against reason. The ideal State and its 
political well-being requires the regulated cooperation of all the three 
social classes represented by silver, copper and gold. The coordination 
of different functions is itself justice, which leads to well-being. To use 
an example, it is like the relation between music and nodes, without 
which there would be no music; however, the presence of nodes alone 
does not lead to music. Coordination is a necessary condition, but not 
a sufficient one. Plato presents the nature of justice or ethics in terms of 
coordination, both within the state and within the individual. Socrates 
tries to prove that justice is not merely a means to well-being; rather it 
is an essential part of it. If there were no risk of punishment or other ill 
consequences, a person may rather choose to be unjust, although this 
aspect is not much discussed by Plato. His model of the ideal State is 
based on the ideal life of man. Every human has an ideal life and a duty 
to perform. Some important aspects of justice are that it is inseparable 
from the principle of equality and that justice and self-interest can and 
do conflict with each other.15
To take another example, Indian civilization bases its ethics on 
Dharma, an extremely complex concept to explain. Dharma may re-
fer to human dignity and worth in terms of justice and benevolence, 
and as virtue required for human fulfillment along with the theological 
insights and metaphysical doctrines that explain it. Dharma has both 
descriptive and prescriptive contents; it tells the way things are and the 
way things ought to be, i.e. the nature of man and his obligations or 
duties. Dharma also transcends man and accompanies him in the world 
beyond, thus it is said that it accumulates through the process of re-
birth. Dharma can thus be understood as religion, as human dignity, as 
the metaphysical foundation of human rights, as customary morality, 
as reflective morality, as justice, as law, as consideration for others etc., 
which are all related to each other. The question is which of the three 
types of ethics categorized by Sander fits in the concept of dharmic eth-
ics, if we do grant to dharma the status of ethics. In order to understand 
the Indian notion of ethics (niti or dharma) we need to consider all 
three types of ethics discussed earlier, i.e. the ethic of autonomy, the 
ethic of community and the ethic of divinity. Sander elaborates over 
a three-dimensional value system in Hindu life: “respect for elders, 
tradition and traditional norms and values as well as emphasis on the 
spiritual”.16 This value system is represented for example by the RSS 
(Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, The National Voluntary Association, 
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i.e. Hindu nationalists) and may sound strange even in India. A balance 
though is often suggested instead for the benefit of the urban youth 
and the wealthy Westernized, educated, industrial elite. The Indian ur-
ban youth is greatly influenced by television, internet, Facebook, and 
other sorts of social media, which have changed their lifestyle, dress, 
music, including their perspective on values and norms. Global culture 
is conveyed through the media, but in India there are also a number 
of hybrid Indian-Western cultural programs and serials promoting In-
dian traditional values for women. Spirituality and cultural fusion play 
indeed an important role in the Indian market. The important point 
here is that all sorts of fusion take place within the three types of ethi-
cal norms mentioned above, but also hard and soft globalization, East 
and West, the rural and the urban, the poor and the rich, the elite and 
the middle class, the educated and the uneducated. Yet, it is hard for 
Indians in India to accept full-blooded Western culture and globaliza-
tion upfront. Hindutva politicians, who represent the voice of the “so-
cially conservatives”, reject Evangelical Christianity as well as “sinful” 
Western  morals, rendering foreign direct investments harder. In this 
way, economic globalization or hard globalization is restricted or fil-
tered. A critical assessment and evaluation of the process of globaliza-
tion has always been carried out in India since independence as part of 
the engagement with modernity and Westernization. Many protracted 
debates between Nehru, Gandhi, Tagore, Zinnah as well as other key 
intellectuals in South Asia were based on a recognition of the rich and 
deep tradition, culture and civilization of India. Several attempts have 
been made to create a workable fusion of modernity and Indian tradi-
tions, developing in the process a local brand of modernity. The devel-
opment of a unique brand of Indian modernity has been a challenge for 
all political parties. The admission of foreign companies in the Indian 
market as part of the process of economic liberalization has been and 
still is a matter of protracted debate in the Indian parliament. 
India has consistently been a cultural transmitter and it has been a key 
player in the so called “Easternization of the West”, which is  nothing 
more than the plain transfer of Indian culture from India to Europe 
and North America. Even if India’s youth find Western culture seduc-
tive – a product of globalization (both hard and soft) – there has been a 
critical assessment of Western modernity at every stage and on all levels. 
This has led on several occasions to stagnation in technological and eco-
nomic development, such as in the well-known cases of the Narmada 
dam, the Nano car project, delays in major metro construction projects 
in India’s major cities, etc. This shows that various initiatives towards 
what are perceived as technological and economic “Westernization”, 
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which imply changes in the pattern of local traditions, have been care-
fully assessed through critical examination. This critical evaluation of 
globalization is extremely important for the East, but also for the West. 
Furthermore, the point that these types of ethics have a temporal and 
geographical place such as “modern” or “less modern” and are situated 
by statements such as “up to the second half of the twentieth century 
they existed in isolation”, is not convincing. In fact, if we look at history 
we will find that these ethics have never existed in isolation. The ethic of 
divinity has in many occasions been accompanied by a rational search 
for profit under the notion that by making economic gains  people would 
be “saved”. This ethics included the denial of immediate consumption 
for the purpose of re-investing one’s profits. The grace of “God” was 
bestowed to those who worked hard and were successful financially. In 
the words of Max Weber:
The development of the concept of the calling quickly gave to the 
modern entrepreneur a fabulously clear conscience – and also indus-
trious workers; he gave to his employees as the wages of their ascetic 
devotion to the calling and of co-operation in his ruthless ex ploi ta-
tion of them through capitalism the prospect of eternal salvation.17
The East-West Dichotomy
Following Berger and Frankl, Sander in his article “Hinduism Meets 
the Global World: the ‘Easternization’ of the West?” (co-authored with 
Clemens Cavallin) points out that due to globalization, migration and 
increasing ethnic and religious diversity that has emerged during the 
phase of modernization, secularization and post-modernization, the 
Western mind has suffered from alienation. It has also grown a hun-
ger to recapture the spiritual and existential meanings of life lost along 
the way, a need so compelling that it appears to be almost genetically 
based.18 There is a sort of persistent breakdown of traditions in the 
West and an attraction for Eastern traditions has emerged instead as 
a compelling phenomenon. The West is taking much interest in health, 
well-being and self-realization after a phase of expanding consumerism. 
Accepting Eastern traditions of health and well-being as an alternative 
seems to be a natural outcome of globalization and easier connectivity. 
East and West are often taken as reciprocally opposed and based 
on exclusive cultural values. The East is perceived as spiritual, intro-
verted, synthetic and subjective while the West is seen as materialist, 
extroverted, analytic and objective. The question though is: does this 
dichotomy really exist? Hajime Nakamura has looked for an answer 
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to such question and argues that “the East is used as if there is a single 
cultural unit which is common to all Eastern countries, this is rather 
unfortunate”. He presents five criteria commonly used for classifying 
widespread thinking and then he rejects them all by saying that “there 
is no such thing as a single fundamental principle which determines the 
characteristic ways of thinking of people”.19 Various factors influence 
the way people think. Family lineage, climate, environment, material 
conditions, religious ideology and language, none of them can be taken 
to exclusively determine or regulate peoples’ thinking. Furthermore, the 
belief that the West is rational and the East is spiritual is also incorrect. 
The West almost up to the 18th century was as spiritual as the East, if 
not more. It is only after the scientific revolution that we notice a rise of 
secular thought. Chinese and Japanese cultures also need more detailed 
analysis, since they have strong traits of rationality beyond spiritual-
ity. How do we otherwise explain the contribution and commitment to 
social life of the Zen monasteries? East Asian people by and large share 
the view that all men are one in essence. Indians are prone to tolerate 
the co-existence of differing philosophical thoughts in the diverse meta-
physical schools. With all these differences taken into consideration, we 
do not find any typically “Eastern” standpoint among either the Chi-
nese, Japanese or Indians.
The characterization of a people’s way of thinking as typically Eastern 
or Western is too simplistic as it does not capture the real complexity 
and pluralism of that peoples’ thought. If we just focus on India, China, 
Japan and Tibet, which share a Buddhist heritage, we will find so much 
variation that we will not be able to draw a unified picture. Within the 
East are found many differences in philosophy, including several under-
standings of the nature of the empirical world, and the same holds for 
India as well and any other country in the East, for that matter.20 
Sander also argues that when it comes to exchanges between India 
and the West
it is undeniable that since the 1960s (with a decided movements 
forward from the period of British rule to then) the influence of 
various Indic traditions on Western culture, society, philosophy 
and spirituality, and even on the Western psyche itself, has been 
surprisingly profound. Indeed so unexpected is today’s penetrating 
outcome that it would have been beyond the wildest imagination of 
even the late 19th and early 20th century missionaries who travelled 
from Britain, Scotland and other parts of Europe to “civilize” 
India’s “heathen” population.21 
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Sander refers here to data collected by Eric Kaufmann that points to 
the fact that countries such as India with larger religious populations 
and their diaspora tend to have higher and more rapid levels of popula-
tion growth than nations with more secularized citizens, and thus the 
impact of their religion on the world is on the rise. Such a fact on a 
global scale, inclusive of other populations from prominent world re-
ligions, may well lead to the gradual diminishing of liberal secularism 
and Western modernity, and the “religious inheriting the earth”.22 The 
influence of Eastern cultures and religions is also on the rise due to their 
increasing global economic power.23 It was previously widely assumed 
that with secularism and modernization religion would gradually dis-
appear, but several studies have shown that immigrants from religious 
backgrounds tend to become more religious after settling into host 
secularized countries. In the last fifty years there has been a renewed 
and growing interest in the academic study of religion and scholars are 
seriously studying the lives of religious individuals and large religious 
diaspora communities, looking for new methods to study such complex 
phenomena. Sander argues that earlier the world was divided according 
to religions and their geographical boundaries: Christianity in Europe 
and the Americas, Islam in the Middle East, Hinduism in India, Bud-
dhism in China, Japan and East Asia. In the 21st century, however, most 
religions have populations spread out in almost every society of the 
world, and thus “almost everyone is everywhere”. The pattern of reli-
gious pluralism has increased in the US, the UK, in Europe and Canada, 
giving rise to migration studies and other related disciplines.24 If mi-
grants live in the West and make the West their home for all practical 
purposes, they also naturally carry with them their own way of liv-
ing. They also develop ways to keep their traditions and cultures alive, 
which in turn affects the Westerners around them and their hosts’ way 
of living. Two persons living as neighbors side by side will interact and 
at least to some degree get to know each other’s cultures. This is not 
only natural, but also desirable. 
Globalization has enhanced the role of religion through the search 
for identity, belonging and the search for meaning. As Robertson has 
rightly stated: “globalization is at the same time the universalization 
of the particular and particularization of the universal”.25 Globaliza-
tion and particularization bring the “hybridization of tradition”, that 
is the selection of what is valuable and relevant and the reshaping of 
religious tradition according to the needs of the local environment. The 
process has prime examples in the Hindu and Buddhist diaspora. It is a 
process that can be described as universalization, de-traditionalization 
and re-traditionalization.
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Sander finds the notions of “East” and “West” intriguing and dis-
cusses Colin Campbell’s thesis of the Easternization of the West, which 
according to Campbell is taking place from the 1960s onwards. Sander 
agrees with Campbell that the Eastern influence has been an integral 
part of Western religious and intellectual life from the early beginnings 
of Western civilization. The influence dates back to the ancient Greek 
Pythagoreans and reached the New Age movements of today under 
the umbrella of Western Esotericism. Western Esotericism moved East 
through, among others, Vivekananda’s interpretation of Hinduism as 
a tolerant, universalistic tradition, which accepts the truth of all reli-
gions without any need of conversion. Campbell contends that Western 
religious traditions such as Christianity entail a dualism between God 
and God’s material creation, i.e. the idea that the human and the divine 
are entirely separated. This is in sharp contrast to Eastern traditions, 
which according to Campbell are based on the non-dual conception of 
an impersonal divine force that permeates the universe, and hold the 
view that the world is an emanation from God rather than a creation.26 
Sander argues that Campbell is wrong and that within many Hindu 
traditions we find alternative views of understanding the relation be-
tween God, the world and humanity, such as simultaneous duality and 
non-duality. For this reason, non-dualism or monism cannot be the sole 
criterion for discussing Eastern – and particularly Indian – traditions. 
Sander further argues that globalization ultimately entails both the 
Westernization of the East and Easternization of the West or east in the 
west and west in the east. Hinduism, Islam and Christianity though are 
all going through a phase of tension between protectionism and univer-
salism as a result of globalization. In India there is on one hand an em-
phasis on the unity of Hindu culture, national identity, and indigenous 
religions, which collectively lead to an attempt to restrict conversions 
to Christianity. On the other hand, Hindus try to propagate a universal, 
“glocalized” Hinduism for a Western audience involving intense prac-
tices, but free from the requirement of conversion. 
It cannot be any longer contested that Indic traditions have an im-
pact on the West. As mentioned earlier, with modernity and globali-
zation the distant “other” has become the next-door neighbor. One 
not only gets to know the other but in the process both affects and 
is affected by this encounter even with minimum communication. The 
dress, food, culture, tradition, language of the “other”, which were ear-
lier only seen on television or in movies are no longer distant realities, 
but part of everyday life. This profound change cuts across the East-
West divide. The new phenomenon is neither a Westernization of the 
East nor an Eastern ization of the West, but just a human phenomenon, 
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bringing people together with common concerns for well-being (health, 
self- realization). Anything leading away from such goals bring people 
to fight one an other. The relation with neighbors may not always be 
friendly, it may be antagonistic and in such cases instead of homo geni-
zation we would have an assertion of differences. But the differences 
are not to be confused with dichotomies. Campbell states that the 
East and the West are dichotomies, but they are not, they are at best 
diffe rent ways of looking at the world. In my view, the divide between 
Eastern ization and Western ization rests on an over-inflated dichotomy. 
The harmless distinction between East and West has led to the idea of 
an absolute dichotomy of “spiritual” versus “rational”, “objective” ver-
sus “subjective”, often advocated by scholars. One dichotomy becomes 
dependent on the other, and have then consequences for our experi-
ences of the real world. 
Concluding Words: the Role of Reason
19th century Europe faced a crisis in the sense that Western culture, 
which had developed on the foundation of thousands of years of litera-
ture, religion, philosophy and arts, was collapsing. The foundation on 
which human existence depended on was deeply shaken and human ex-
istence increasingly meaningless. The crisis was indeed about the West-
ern role given to reason, an unchallengeable faith on the possibilities of 
reason that made it the principle of reality and the ultimate criterion of 
philosophical inquiry. Even Marx saw self-alienation of humans from 
themselves being lost in mass industrialization as the necessary conse-
quence of the control exercised by “Western” reason. It is almost ac-
cepted by all that the crisis originated from a certain understanding of 
reason and if this is the case then the simple way out would be to elimi-
nate the root of this problem. A number of attempts have been made by 
Western and particularly French intellectuals in the last three centuries, 
but most of them have been unsatisfactory. Without going into details 
of these trials, we need to ask nonetheless whether the crisis is really 
only European, as Husserl has spoken of it. If it is European then by 
implication the rest of the world does not have a crisis. Or even if it 
has a crisis, it is not the same that Europe has. But we realize now with 
great concern that the Crisis of Reason that was faced by Europe in the 
19th and 20th century is today faced by many Asian countries through 
the far reaching impact of Western education and the globalization of 
Western culture.27 
It was an assumption of “European” reason that Reality and Know-
ledge were separate and they needed to be brought together. The object 
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is always an object in relation to a subject. Being is also supposed to be 
objective when it is placed in a relation of inter-subjectivity with others. 
The subject is the agent or the “Self”, who knows Being, and Being is the 
object of knowledge. Reason plays the role of distinguishing between 
subject and object. But once they are distinguished by Reason they also 
need to be unified, as Hegel has shown, by negation again and again. 
But the question is how can we transcend the divide between object and 
subject and also reason itself, which negates again and again? This is 
precisely the point that needs to be solved, and at that moment wisdom 
from the classical Indian philosophical traditions may be useful as an al-
ternative framework. Western Reason has taught us that the distinctions 
inherent in reality are absolute, but they are not. Nihilism has resulted 
from these distinctions and by mistaking Nothing for Being. As long as 
we believe that Reason is the sole means to approach reality, nihilism 
is going to stay; but if we find a way to be one with reality without the 
subject-object divide, the Crisis of Western Reason may be solved. No 
doubt, we cannot deny or ignore the Western concept of Reason and yet 
we want to explore other alternatives in order to be free from the Crises 
and “experience and be in tune with” primordial reality. It is perhaps 
in this light and with these motivations that we should understand the 
world that has emerged, in which “religion is thriving”. 
I would like to conclude with a quote from K.C. Bhattacharya, who on 
several occasions has rejected the universalism of reason or of religion:
It is sometimes forgotten by the advocates of universalism that the 
so-called universalism of reason or of religion is only in the making 
and cannot be appealed to as an actually established code of uni-
versal principles. What is universal is only the spirit, the loyalty to 
our ideals and the openness to other ideals, the determination not 
to reject them if they are found within our ideals and not to accept 
them till they are so found.28
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Reality-program med spiritualistiska medier har blivit internationella 
tittarsuccéer under 2000-talet, med produktioner som Most Haunted 
och 6th Sense. I Sverige kommer trenden till uttryck i serierna Förnim-
melse av mord (2003), Andarnas makt (2003–2004) samt i den po-
pulära långköraren Det okända (2004–), där medier undersöker och 
rensar hem från störande andar. Genom programmen har medierna, 
varav majoriteten har bakgrund i spiritualistiska organisationer i Sve-
rige och/eller Storbritannien, fått tillgång till ett nytt digitalt utrymme 
och blivit kändisar på köpet. Tv-inträdet har dock inte varit ovillkorat, 
utan medierna har fått anpassa sig till rådande trender i den kommersi-
ella tv-sfären. Detta har inneburit att de varken haft möjlighet att välja 
tv-format eller programmens inriktning. Huvudsakligen har de fått ett 
rum inom reality-tv, en genre där verkliga personer agerar inom ramen 
för koncept och situationer som skapats för tv i underhållningssyfte.1 
Villkoret för att ta plats i den ”digitala offentligheten” har därmed varit 
att acceptera och anpassa sig till detta format. Jag har tidigare beskrivit 
hur hemsökelsetemat i Det okända medfört förändringar i deltagarnas 
mediumskap. De har nämligen anammat en praktik som majoriteten 
inte tidigare ägnat sig åt och som inte haft någon framträdande posi-
tion inom spiritualismen: att ”rensa hus” eller driva ut andar.2 Tv-serien 
har dock inte bara inneburit ett brott med den spiritualistiska traditio-
nen. Det okända innehåller dessutom ett missionerande drag som kan 
studeras utifrån ett kontinuitetsperspektiv.3 Flera i redaktionen bakom 
programmet är tydligt ”troende”4 och Det okända söker på olika sätt 
övertyga tittaren om att hemsökelserna, liksom mediernas förmåga att 
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kommunicera med andar, är verkliga. På Internet har verklighetsansprå-
ken diskuterats flitigt av både skeptiker och troende. Kommunicerar 
medierna med andar eller är de cyniska bedragare? Som religionsvetare 
har man (tack och lov) privilegiet att kunna ställa sig utanför debat-
ten och fokusera på andra spörsmål, som vilka övertygandestrategier 
som används och var de har sina rötter. I artikeln exemplifieras både 
hur Det okända knyter an till en spiritualistisk argumentationstradition 
med rötter i 1800-talet, och hur redigeringstekniker från reality-genren 
används i övertygande syfte.5
Spiritualistisk bevisföring
Medan andekommunikation förekommit i en mängd historiska reli-
giösa traditioner måste spiritualismen ses som en modern rörelse.6 Den 
fick sitt genombrott i Förenta staterna år 1848 då systrarna Kate och 
Maggie Fox utformade ett knackningssystem för kommunikation med 
avlidnas andar – ett system som utvecklades till de för spiritualismen 
kännetecknande seanserna.7 Spiritualismen spreds därefter till olika 
delar av världen. I Sverige grundades den första föreningen 1878 och 
kring sekelskiftet fick den flera efterföljare.8 Spiritualismen växte fram 
parallellt med de naturvetenskapliga akademiska disciplinerna, vilket 
präglade den på flera sätt. I likhet med andra nya religiösa rörelser har 
inställningen till dessa varit ambivalent. Samtidigt som man sett dem 
som trångsynta (dess företrädare har till exempel varit ovilliga att ac-
ceptera kunskap baserad på religiösa erfarenheter) har man framhållit 
att den egna världsbilden är förenlig med spjutspetsforskning. Åtskilliga 
försök har också gjorts att genom naturvetenskapligt influerade meto-
der bevisa existensen av en andevärld dit man kommer efter döden.9 
Under slutet av 1800-talet grundades flera organisationer vars syfte var 
att framlägga sådana bevis. Två exempel är engelska Society for Psycical 
Research (1882) och Svenska samfundet för psykisk forskning (1890).10 
I fokus för undersökningarna stod medierna, vilka sågs som kanaler till 
andevärlden, och de underliga företeelser som börjat dyka upp i seans-
rummen, som ektoplasma, andematerialiseringar och föremål som ver-
kade förflytta sig av egen kraft. Det gjordes då försök att testa medierna 
för att utröna om fenomenen var autentiska (i betydelsen från andevärl-
den) eller om de var fabricerade. Även seanserna var viktiga ur över-
tygandesynpunkt. Tanken med dessa var nämligen att medierna skulle 
leverera uppgifter (namn, karaktärsdrag och livshistorier) från andevärl-
den som besökarna skulle bekräfta som till hörande avlidna anhöriga.11
Spiritualister tog också tidigt tekniska innovationer i sin tjänst i jakt-
en på bevis. De båda fotograferna Frederick. A. Hudson och William 
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Hope blev mycket uppmärksammade för sin strävan att fånga ande-
aktiviteter med kamera, och fotografierna de presenterade – porträtt 
av personer omgärdade av skugglika gestalter och bilder av medier 
med ”ektoplasma” rinnande ur mun, näshåla och öron – uppfattades 
av många som övertygande.12 Personliga redogörelser (i muntlig och 
skriftlig form) spelade också en viktig roll inom den tidiga rörelsen. 
I den svenska tidskriften Efteråt? (1891–1922) publicerades regelbun-
det en berättelsegenre som kan beskrivas som en form av spiritualistisk 
omvändelseberättelse, där en skeptisk huvudperson genom att uppleva 
en rad underliga händelser gradvis övertygas om andarnas existens.13
De vetenskapliga ambitionerna gav inledningsvis spiritualismen gott 
anseende, men gjorde den samtidigt sårbar för vederlägganden. Kring 
sekelskiftet 1900 ertappades flera kända medier med att smuggla in 
”ektoplasma” till seanser, fabricera ”andeknackningar” och många av 
andefotografierna avslöjades som bedrägerier, vilket fick rörelsen att 
förlora i popularitet.14 Den bevisande ansatsen har trots detta förbli-
vit stark, och företrädare har fortsatt att bruka ny teknik i bevissyfte. 
Under den andra hälften av 1950-talet försökte tysksvensken Friedrich 
Jürgenson spela in anderöster via radio – ett experiment som utmyn-
nade i böckerna Rösterna från rymden (1964) och Radio- och mikro-
fonkontakt med de döda (1968).15 Under 2000-talet har mobilkameror 
och sociala medier gjort det möjligt för privatpersoner att själva skapa 
och sprida bild- och ljudupptagningar. I synnerhet filmklipp och foto-
grafier föreställande små flygande ljuspartiklar – så kallade orber – har 
blivit populära. Idag kan man på både Facebooksidor och i spiritualis-
tisk nischade Internetfora som Spiritualism i fokus se hur sådana bilder 
sprids och presenteras som bevis för andlig aktivitet. Några av skriben-
terna framhåller även att man genom träning kan lära sig att se orberna 
med blotta ögat.16 
Spiritualister i tv
I ljuset av spiritualisternas historia av att använda nya tekniker och 
(mass)medier i bevisföringssyfte är det inte så underligt att dagens me-
dier har valt att medverka i tv, trots begränsande möjligheter att påver-
ka programmens innehåll. Utöver drivkraften att bli känd (som förvisso 
inte bör underskattas) är det tydligt att de sett sitt deltagande som en 
möjlighet att övertyga tittarna om att det finns en andevärld.17 Första 
gången medier medverkade i en svensk reality-produktion var 2003, i 
Kanal 5:s satsning Förnimmelse av mord.18 Bland medierna fanns bland 
andra Jill Petersson, Jörgen Gustafson, Lena Ranehag och Terry Evans, 
och som titeln antyder bestod deras uppgift i att försöka klara upp 
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olösta mordfall (och ett par försvinnanden). TV4 Plus har dock blivit 
den i särklass viktigaste digitala arenan för denna typ av program. Re-
dan under startåret 2003 värvade man producenten till Förnimmelse av 
mord, Caroline Giertz, som sedan dess varit drivande för utveckling av 
genren och som fungerat som både producent och programledare i Det 
okända. Hösten 2003 köpte TV4 Plus in danska Åndernes magt (som 
gavs titeln Andarnas makt), en serie där medier driver ut andar ur dans-
ka hem.19 Serien omredigerades dock för att ges en lokal inramning; 
de danska ”fallen” presenterades av programledaren Malin Berghagen 
Nilsson från en studio på Häringe slott, där de avslutningsvis kommen-
terades av svenska medier. Andarnas makt blev så populär att kana-
len redan året efter skapade en egen, inhemsk, version: Det  okända. 
Man rekryterade då medier från tidigare produktioner, som Elisabeth 
Lannge, Jörgen Gustafsson, Lena Ranehag, Anders Åkesson, Iris Hall 
och Terry Evans. Det okända har producerats kontinuerligt sedan 
starten 2004 och innehållsmässigt har få förändringar skett. Medan 
enstaka avsnitt behandlat healing, privata seanser, spådomskonst och 
klär voajans, har tonvikten hela tiden legat på husrensningar. Serien har 
dock inspirerat till spinoffer med annan inriktning, som talangjakten 
Akademien för det okända (2007) och En natt på slottet (2014–). 
Reality och vardagligheten 
På vilka sätt söker då Det okända (eller personerna bakom program-
met) övertyga? Man skulle kunna säga att redan genren bär med sig 
sådana möjligheter. Reality, som fick ett globalt genombrott i mitten av 
1990-talet (och som i Sverige kommit till utryck i serier som Expedi-
tion Robinson, Farmen och Big Brother), bygger nämligen på att visa 
upp verkliga, vardagliga, människor, även om dessa agerar i situationer 
som skapats för tv. Som andra reality-program anspelar Det okända 
på alldagligheten, vilket här också bidrar till att skänka trovärdighet 
till spökerierna och mediernas förmåga att tala med de döda. Serien 
utspelar sig i hemmiljö, där tittaren får insyn i de boendes kök, sov- 
och badrum, barnkammare och förvaringsutrymmen. Medievetaren 
Eva Kingsepp som studerat serien har myntat det träffande begrep-
pet ”IKEA-kontext”, och påpekat att vardagligheten hos de boende 
och deras hem fungerar autentifierande; det är inga ”flummare” som 
fått andar i huset utan helt vanliga människor.20 Man kan också se hur 
filmtekniska grepp från reality-genren används för att skänka trovär-
dighet till konceptet. Redigeringsmässigt består reality av kollage av 
sammanklippta intervjusektioner, filmklipp och dramatiserade hän-
delser som görs begripliga genom en pålagd speakerröst (voice-over) 
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som för handlingen framåt.21 Det okända följer i samtliga avseenden 
denna redigeringsmall, men här bidrar den karaktäristiska speaker-
rösten (Giertz) till att trovärdiggöra det tittaren kommer att se under 
programmet. I varje episod understryker den allvarliga rösten att me-
dierna inte getts någon information om vare sig de personer som sökt 
deras hjälp eller den plats dit de kallats, något som bidrar till att skapa 
en övertygande inramning till programmet och mediernas arbete. 
Boende som omvända skeptiker
Det okända har också en argumenterande berättarstruktur, och det är 
möjligt att i denna finna paralleller till äldre tiders spiritualistiska om-
vändelseberättelser.22 I detta fall är det de boende som får den berättar-
mässiga funktionen som övertygade skeptiker, och tittaren får genom 
programmets tre delar följa deras resa. Även om många onekligen ver-
kar ”omvända sig” måste denna berättelse ändå ses som resultatet av 
en redigeringsprocess där man sammanfogat valda klipp från intervjuer 
och mediernas besök, vilka tolkas och ges mening av speakerrösten. I 
den första delen introduceras de boende – nästan samtliga barnfamil-
jer – och deras problem. Ofta redogör de för hur de känt sig iakttagna 
på vissa platser, hört steg, sett skuggor i ögonvrån eller i sällsynta fall 
angripits av osynliga inkräktare. Det är uppenbart att åtminstone nå-
gon i familjen tror att de har ”andebesök”, annars hade man knappast 
vänt sig till Det okända.23 I det sammanvävda berättarkollaget betonas 
dock starkt deras skeptiska hållning, vilket bidrar till att stärka deras 
trovärdighet. Speakerrösten poängterar till exempel att de tidigare 
varit kritiska till övernaturliga fenomen men att upprepade oförklar-
liga händelser i hemmet fått dem att ifrågasätta sin hållning. I regel 
är kvinnor na redan inledningsvis mer ”öppna” än männen (som ofta 
är ifrågasättande eller rent av avfärdande), men även de uttrycker oro 
över att de kan ha inbillat sig alltsammans. Speakern förstärker reto-
riskt osäkerheten genom att framhålla att de kan ha fel eller rentav vara 
lite tokiga. Kanske har den manlige skeptikern rätt? 
Därnäst anländer ett av medierna som, tätt följt av nyfikna familje-
medlemmar, börjar undersöka hemmet. Berättartekniskt fungerar den-
na del som ett omskakande steg på vägen mot omvändelse. Under sin 
husesyn ”upptäcker” mediet olika andar som befinner sig på platsen, 
både anhöriga ”på besök” från andevärlden och en obehagligare vari-
ant. Momentet där mediet pekar ut anhöriga känns igen från äldre (och 
samtida) seanser, där de boende kopplar samman de karaktärsdrag me-
dierna beskriver med avlidna personer i sin närhet och således ”bekräf-
tar” deras uppgifter. Dessa klipp är ofta känsloladdade, och både män 
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och kvinnor torkar tårarna då de ”känner igen” mormor eller pappa 
och får motta budskap från dem. De obehagliga andar som utpekas 
som orsak till värre störningar beskrivs av medierna som personer som 
tidigare bott på platsen och inte ”gått över till andra sidan”, och i den 
andra delens dramatiska avrundning kämpar mediet med att förmå 
dem att lämna hemmet och gå över till andevärlden.
Den tredje delen inkluderar en uppföljning där Giertz intervjuar fa-
miljemedlemmarna. Narrativt utgör detta moment slutpunkten; det är 
nu de boende blivit omvända och ”kommer ut” som troende. I regel 
beskriver de mediets besök som omtumlande och framhåller att de 
”träffsäkra” beskrivningarna av deras avlidna anhöriga övertygat dem 
om att det finns en andevärld. Nästan samtliga poängterar också att det 
blivit lugnare i hemmet, vilket de presenterar som ytterligare belägg för 
att det funnits andar på platsen, som mediet lyckats avlägsna. Det är 
tydligt att Giertz under intervjuns gång inbjuder de boende att forma 
sina berättelser i enlighet med omvändelsemodellen, genom direkta frå-
gor om hur besöket påverkat deras inställning. Ofta vänder hon sig spe-
cifikt till män som uppgett sig vara skeptisker och frågar, i lätt retsam 
ton, om de reviderat sin uppfattning – en fråga som brukar resultera 
antingen i försiktigare uttalanden som ”jo, det är ju konstigt att me-
diet kunde veta så mycket om mig” eller också i helomvändningar som 
”detta har verkligen förändrat mitt sätt att se på världen”. I somliga 
fall förstärks omvändelsetemat genom att speakern avrundar program-
met genom en kommentar som ”ja även skeptikern har ändrat åsikt, 
och äntligen har det blivit lugnt i hemmet”.
Återblickar som övertygandestrategi
Medan omvändelseberättelserna kan sägas ha förts över från skriftligt 
till digitalt format har massmedial och teknisk utveckling också skapat 
nya möjligheter att övertyga.24 Jag har beskrivit hur Det okända använ-
der typiska realitygrepp för att signalera att vad tittaren kommer att 
få se är ”på riktigt”. Det är dock inte bara det överordnade konceptet 
som skänks trovärdighet genom realitymässig redigering; det arbete 
mediet utför hemma hos familjerna bearbetas på liknande sätt. För att 
underlätta för nytillkomna tittare innehåller reality-produktioner korta 
återblickande repriser där tidigare händelser illustereras genom svart-
vitta, suddiga klipp.25 I Det okända har dessa klipp också en annan 
funktion: att skapa tilltro till mediernas förmåga att kommunicera med 
andar. I programmets andra del, där mediet ”diagnostiserar” hemmet, 
redogör vederbörande ofta först för upplevelser han eller hon menar att 
de boende haft på olika platser: de kan till exempel ha hört steg i  hallen 
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eller känt sig iakttagna. Mediet kan då även peka ut vissa rum som 
särskilt starkt påverkade av andliga energier och därmed obehagliga 
att vistas på. Klippen från mediernas besök bryts dock av återblickar 
från programmets första del – intervjupassager eller dramatiserade 
händelser – som valts ut så att de boendes berättelser och mediernas 
iakttagelser framställs som samstämmiga. Därigenom ges en vink om 
att det faktiskt finns något övernaturligt i hemmet som både familjen 
och mediet kommit i kontakt med. Låt mig ge ett exempel. I ett avsnitt 
som sändes den 29 oktober 2008 undersöker mediet Jörgen Gustafsson 
en gård utanför Västerhaninge. Efter att ha hälsat på familjen som bor 
där börjar han sin sedvanliga tur genom huset, åtföljd av modern och 
tonårsdottern. Då han kommer upp på övervåningen stannar han till i 
ett av rummen och ser plötsligt berörd och lätt förvirrad ut. Här intro-
duceras ett svartvitt dramatiserat klipp från programmets första del, 
där fadern i familjen ses dammsuga i just detta rum, samtidigt som han 
(i form av speakerröst) återger en underlig upplevelse han hade vid det 
tillfället. Mannen beskriver denna som ”en hårresning”, som om någon 
”smekte sakta över snagget” på huvudet. Omedelbart därefter återförts 
tittaren till mediets undersökning och Gustafsson som förklarar att två 
andar brukar uppehålla sig i rummet. Han konkluderar att de ”måste 
göra något åt det här: här var det nästan värst utav alla ställen”.26 
Arkivbesök och ”andeskapande”
Att söka belägga de uppgifter som medier presenterar har varit ett åter-
kommande inslag vid spiritualistiska seanser och det har varit besökar-
na som förväntats bekräfta dem. Det okända har fortsatt i samma spår, 
men har även introducerat ett nytt sätt att söka och presentera bevis. 
Programmets tredje del innehåller, utöver uppföljningsintervjuerna, ett 
moment där en av Det okändas reportrar beger sig till olika arkiv för 
att i de historiska källorna ”hitta” de osaliga andar medierna pekat ut. 
Inslaget för tankarna till historisk forskning eller grävande journalis-
tik, aktiviteter som kan tänkas väga tyngre och ge ett mer seriöst och 
objektivt intryck än seansernas personbaserade bekräftelser. Tittaren 
får här följa hur reportern, tillsammans med en arkivarie,  söker efter 
spår av historiska personer vars namn, yrken och levnadslopp stäm-
mer överens med information som mediet uppgett. Momentet är tydlig 
missio nerande och man söker i praktiken snarare belägga än veder-
lägga mediernas uppgifter. I regel har mediet i fråga lämnat relativt 
mångtydig information, vilket förenklar processen. Har vederbörande 
till exempel angett att den ande som ”fastnat” var en Anna, Anne  eller 
Anna-Karin som arbetat på en gård som legat på platsen och som av-
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lidit 1860 eller 1816 i en olycka kan man se hur reportern (eller pro-
gramledaren) förhandlar med uppgifterna i arkivmaterialet. Hittar man 
inte någon historisk person som haft Anne eller Anne som förnamn 
används  ibland mellannamn. En Greta Maria Anne Petersson kan till 
exempel presenteras som den ”Anne” som mediet talat om. Även årtal 
och plats kan omförhandlas. Har det inte legat en gård precis på plat-
sen, men väl en bit bort, är det förmodligen denna det rör sig om, och 
årtalen mediet uppgett är kanske inte så exakta. Det finns dock avsnitt 
där programledaren framhåller att man inte kunnat bekräfta något av 
det mediet berättat.27 
Det är inte bara arkivforskningen som verkar trovärdighetsskapande 
i denna sista del av programmet. Avslutningsvis ges ”andarna” kött 
på benen i ett moment bestående av reprisklipp från mediernas besök, 
”bildbevis” i form av äldre fotografier från trakten, tidningsutklipp, 
detaljer från arkivens mantalslängder och om möjligt fotografier på 
”anden” i fråga.28 Speakerrösten redogör under vägens gång för an-
darnas (ofta tragiska) livsöden, och sammanför då historiska uppgifter 
med dem som mediet angett. Att på detta sätt visualisera och ”berätta 
fram” andarna ger förstås intryck av att det var just dessa personer 
som medierna haft kontakt med. Speakerrösten förhandlar nu också 
diskrepanser mellan mediernas utsagor och den information man fann 
i arkiven. I ett par avsnitt antyds att medierna kan ha rätt, men att de 
myndighetspersoner som fört in uppgifter i kyrkoböcker och mantals-
längder utlämnat känsliga uppgifter, som existensen av oäkta barn till 
mäktiga personer. I de fall där reportern inte lyckats presentera överty-
gande historiskt material beskrivs detta ändå inte som belastande för 
mediet. Speakern, som rör sig inom en spiritualistisk förståelsehorisont, 
kan till exempel avrunda med en kommentar som ”vi har tyvärr inte 
lyckats ta reda på vem mannen vårt medium hade kontakt med var”, 
där det tydligt signaleras att andarna faktiskt fanns där och att mediet 
kommunicerat med en av dem.
Utanför tv-rutan
Personerna bakom Det okända har fortsatt ett spiritualistiskt projekt 
som syftar till att belägga existensen av en andevärld. Det är värt att be-
tona att motiven bakom detta står att finna i såväl kommersiella intres-
sen (att skapa underhållande tv) som i personligt engagemang. Från ett 
historiskt perspektiv har programmen fått en funktion som påminner 
om den som de bevissökande organisationerna hade under 1800-talets 
andra hälft. Det nya massmediala formatet (tv) har dock gjort det möj-
ligt att nå ut till betydligt fler personer. Under åren som gått har Det 
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okända också lyckats attrahera en stor tittarkrets. Hösten 2011 sågs 
serien av i genomsnitt 195 000 tittare med en relativt jämn fördelning 
mellan män och kvinnor.29 Något man kan spekulera i såhär avslut-
ningsvis är huruvida serien lyckats övertyga sina tittare. Det faktum att 
tron på andar och mediers förmåga att kommunicera med dem ökar 
i landet skulle kunna indikera att Det okända faktiskt bidrar till att 
forma samtida svenskars religiösa föreställningar.30  Något annat som 
stödjer en sådan tolkning är att antalet personer som vill få sina hus 
”rensade” verkar ha ökat också utanför tv-rutan sedan  seriens start.31 
I varje fall är det tydligt att Det okända väcker en rad olika känslor 
bland sina tittare. Under de två år som jag studerat spiritualistiska 
medier i reality-serier har jag, i helt ovetenskapliga sammanhang, haft 
möjlighet att diskutera programmet med personer med mycket olika 
inställning. Bland dessa finns skeptiker som inte kan begripa hur ”man 
kan ge plats åt bedragare i tv”, personer som beundrar de ”träffsäkra 
medierna” och en grupp som ”egentligen inte tror” men som tycker 
att programmet ”är läskigt”. En av de senare, en kvinna i tjugofemårs-
åldern, berättade skrattande att hon inte vågade se Det okända av 
rädsla för att det skulle börja spöka i hennes lägenhet. Är andarna verk-
liga eller är de sociala konstruktioner? Oavsett om Det okända lyckats 
övertyga dig är det kanske bäst att ta en titt under sängen innan du 
somnar. Bara utifall att … 
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13 Sanner: Att älska sin nästa såsom sig själv, 358.
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pass 37:4 (1990), 471-482.
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Jürgenson: Radio- och mikrofonkontakt med de döda (Uppsala, 1968).
16 Se t.ex.: https://sv-se.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.379386788753285. 
94680.293538674004764&type=3[sidan tillgänglig 29/1 2016]; http://
spiritualism.ifokus.se/discussions/4dbd97e288f4725bed0003f4-orb [sidan 
tillgänglig 21/8 2015].
17 Se t.ex. Det okända (12/10 2003), TV4 Plus.
18 Serien producerades i två säsonger. 
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20 Kingsepp: ”Medier i medier”, 140.
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Ett exempel är Elisabeth Lannges Budbärare från det okända (Norrköping, 
2008).
23 Det är tydligt i många avsnitt att några av familjemedlemmarna verkligen 
är rädda. Det finns också indikationer på att många redan har någon form 
av nyreligiöst engagemang, även om speakerrösten istället betonar deras 
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27 I dessa fall betonas istället de boendes bekräftelse att det blivit lugnare efter 
mediets besök, och speakerrösten framhåller att det viktigaste är att friden i 
hemmet återställts. 
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Sedan sommaren 2014 har framväxten av den Islamiska staten i Syrien 
och Irak (förkortat som IS) varit föremål för ett stort antal journalistiska 
och vetenskapliga studier.1 Rörelsens brutalitet, ideologi/teologi och dess 
historiska rötter har belysts och analyserats i både populärvetenskapliga 
och akademiska texter. Även det faktum att omkring 300 svenska med-
borgare kan ha anslutit sig till IS har bidragit till en växande uppmärk-
samhet i Sverige.2 Enligt uppgifter från The International Centre for the 
Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence har så många som 20,000 
personer från olika delar av världen anslutit sig till IS och liknande rörel-
ser som förespråkar våld. Av dessa uppskattas cirka 4 000 komma från 
Västeuropa.3 De utländska stridande utgör en betydande del av IS totala 
mängd soldater, men framför allt är det personer från Syrien och Irak 
som stöttar och strider för IS. Genom att ett litet antal avhoppare från 
rörelsen har gjort sig kända kan vi få en bild av varför individer både 
ansluter sig till och lämnar en rörelse som IS. Samtidigt som denna sorts 
vittnesmål kan vara färgade av det faktum att individer vill lämna och ta 
avstånd från sitt tidigare liv är dessa röster betydelsefulla att analysera ef-
tersom de kan ge oss en bild av varför vissa individer lockas till en rörelse 
som IS. Stuart A. Wright pekar på detta faktum när han skriver: 
Important insights may be culled from those adherents who find 
continuation untenable. Locating sources of disillusionment or 
disaffection can tell us as much about attachment and commitment-
building as studying consecrated devotees. By exploring how com-
mitment is weakened or destroyed we advance our understanding 
Göran Larsson
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of factors and processes that sustain commitment. In sociological 
terms, attachment/commitment processes and mechanisms are often 
mirror images of detachment and withdrawal.4 
På basis av den knapphändiga information som finns tillgänglig har före-
liggande kapitel som syfte att dels ge en övergripande bild av varför indi-
vider väljer att lämna IS och dels att knyta dessa berättelser till forskning 
om inträdde samt utträde ur religiösa rörelser. Väl medveten om de meto-
dologiska problemen som finnas när man skall jämföra olika individers 
berättelser och olika typer av rörelser oberoende av tid och rum är mitt 
fokus i föreliggande kapitel främst inriktat på att jämföra olika berättel-
ser som just handlar om varför individer lämnar ett religiöst engagemang 
som har tagit upp en stor del av deras liv och som i vissa fall också kan 
ha varit destruktivt för individen och det omgivande samhället. 
Avhoppare från IS
Enligt The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Po-
litical Violence har totalt 58 individer lämnat IS sedan januari 2014 
till och med augusti 2015.5 Mörkertalet kan dock vara mycket större 
och siffran avser endast personer som öppet har vittnat om att de har 
lämnat IS. Det faktum att avhoppare löper en stor risk att bli dödade 
innebär att många väljer att inte offentliggöra sitt avståndstagande – ett 
faktum som speciellt gäller för de som fortfarande lever kvar i områden 
som domineras av IS eller som ligger i närheten av områden som kon-
trolleras av rörelsen.6 De som offentligt har lämnat IS fördelar sig på 
följande länder enligt ovan nämnda rapport: 
Tabell 1: Antal individer som har lämnat IS uppdelade efter nationalitet. 
Källa: Neumann: Victims, 16.
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Tabellen ovan visar att merparten av de som offentligt har lämnat IS – 
genom att till exempel meddela detta i intervjuer med dagstidningar el-
ler via sociala medier (speciellt på Youtube) – har sin bakgrund i Syrien. 
Detta är kanske inte konstigt, med tanke på att merparten av de som 
har anslutit sig till konflikterna i Syrien kommer från Mellanöstern och 
Nordafrika, men också från andra delar av den så kallade muslimska 
världen.7 Uppgifterna är överlag osäkra och mörkertalet är förmodli-
gen stort. Antalet som lämnar eller minskar sitt engagemang i rörelsen 
utan att ta avstånd från IS i ett publikt sammanhang är antagligen stör-
re. I tabellen ingår exempelvis inte 17-årigen från Lund som lämnade 
IS och som återvände till Sverige under hösten 2015. Under september 
2015 blev hans avståndstagande från IS offentligt.8 
Likt många andra avhoppare var lundensaren besviken på IS efter-
som deras tolkning och tillämpning av islam inte överensstämde med 
hans bild av vad som var ”sann” islam. För att manifestera sitt av-
ståndstagande från IS publicerade han följande text på Facebook.
Under de senaste månaderna jag spenderade i den Islamiska 
Staten uppenbarades sig en annan verklighet inför mina ögon 
som pressade mitt bröst. Bakom dem uppriktiga bröder och 
 systrar som infinner sig på gatorna och i hemmen, bakom dem 
överväldigande affischerna som kallar till Tawheed [enhet] och 
bakom de svarta flaggorna som stolt fladdrar i luften, så existerar 
det en högmodig ’Aqeedah [dogm, lärosats] som nu har blivit 
någonting stressande. 
Jag lämnar dess öde till Allâh, för jag är endast en enkel tjänare, 
och det påverkar inte Allâhs slutgiltiga beslut varesig jag försvarar 
den eller gör det motsatta. Men jag stödjer härmed inte Islamiska 
Statens handlingar. De har en extrem tro när det kommer till takfir 
[att förklara någon som icke-muslim, det vill säga kafir/kufar], och 
de förlöjligar nobla ’ulama (lärda). Lärda som Allâh har väglett oss 
genom, vilkas uppriktighet är välkänd. Jag stödjer inte IS, bl.a. på 
grund av deras uppförande mot både muslimer och oskyldiga icke-
muslimer. Jag stödjer inte dem då de dödar muslimer, bryter förtro-
enden och löften, inte följer vår religions balans i alla aspekter och 
då de förkastar råd från dem som inte är med dem.9 
Hans berättelse tycks dock vara långt ifrån unik. Även den svenska sä-
kerhetspolisen vittnar om att många återvändare har blivit besvikna på 
IS. De skriver: 
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Erfarenheter från olika europeiska länder visar att många som 
stridit i Syrien och sedan återvänt till sina hemländer lider av sina 
erfarenheter. Det kan handla om skuldkänslor för handlingar de 
begått, besvikelse över hur vistelsen var, eller om psykiska besvär 
efter att ha varit rädda och bevittnat grymheter.10 
Peter R. Neumanns rapport Victims, Perpetrators, Assets: The Narrati-
ves of Islamic State Defectors, som för tillfället är den mest omfattade 
rapporten om avhoppare från IS, innehåller ett flertal skildringar som 
pekar på att många är besvikna. Enligt Neumanns analys är det fyra 
berättelser (”narrativ”) som återkommer när avhoppare motiverar och 
förklarar varför de har valt att lämna IS. De fyra narrativen kan sam-
manfattas på följande sätt: 
Figur 1: Motiv till varför avhoppare lämnar IS.
 Källa: Neumann, ”Victims”.
Figuren ovan pekar på att avhopparna som inkluderats i Neumanns 
rapport har drabbats av vad som närmast kan liknas vid en kognitiv 
dissonans (se nedan). Att gå med IS motsvarande helt enkelt inte vad 
anhängarna hade hoppats på och verkligheten i Syrien och Irak överens-
stämde inte med deras behov, önskemål och drömmar om ett bättre liv. 
Vägar ut
För att kunna analysera avhoppares berättelser måste en distinktion 
upprättas mellan de som lämnar frivilligt och de som blir ”utplockade” 
ur en rörelse mot sin vilja (detta gäller framför allt metoder som har an-
vänds inom den så kallade anti-kultrörelsen11). Inom forskningen är det 
även vanligt att skilja mellan avhoppare som är desillusionerade (disil-
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lusioned), känslomässigt avståndstagande (disaffectioned) och de som 
bryter med en rörelse (disaffiliated). Till den senare kategorin kan även 
så kallade avhoppare (defectors) inkluderas och hit räknas exempelvis 
de som lämnar ”något” (till exempel ett land, en regim eller en rörelse). 
Skillnaden mellan dessa ”typer” kan oftast placeras längst en glidande 
skala där den första kategorin främst inkluderar personer som har tap-
pat intresset och engagemanget medan de sista kategorierna omfattar 
de som aktivt och publikt tar avstånd från sitt tidigare engagemang.12 
Till den sista kategorin räknas ofta avhoppare eller apostater (om det 
handlar om religion) som har en stark önskan att vittna om hur dåligt 
livet var i den tidigare rörelsen. Bland dessa är det inte ovanligt att hitta 
så kallade karriärapostater eller ”professionella ex” som har gjort en 
karriär på att kritisera den rörelse/organisation som man tidigare till-
hört.13 Samtidigt som studier visar att både konvertering liksom olika 
grader av avståndstagande bäst kan beskrivas som ”en ofta utdragen, 
mångfacetterad och individuell process, snarare än den konfliktladdade 
händelse som annars framställs” 14, menar andra att ett återkommande 
drag att personliga kriser har betydelse för både inträde och utträde. 
Bert Schuurman och Edwin Bakker skriver till exempel:
It is striking that personal crises are frequently the instigators of 
both movements towards and away from extremism and terrorism.15 
Men i linje med tidigare konverteringsstudier är det också tydligt att vä-
gen ut ur en rörelse kan ta sig många olika uttryck. Sällan handlar det om 
en enskild händelse utan snarare om en dynamisk process som kan leda 
till ett minskat intresse och till slut till ett avståndstagande.16 Trots att 
utträdet är en komplex och dynamisk process tycks de flesta som lämnar 
eller ”hoppar av” en rörelse av egen vilja gå igenom följande steg. 
Figur 2: Inträde/utträde ur en rörelse
Källa: Wright: ”Disengagement”, 711–712.  
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Den avgörande punkten i flödesschemat tycks vara när ”tvivlaren” 
upplever en kris som utlöser en stark känsla av det som Leon Festing-
er kallar för kognitiv dissonans. Festinger sammanfattar sin teori på 
 följande sätt:
This theory centers around the idea that if a person knows various 
things that are not psychologically consistent with one another, 
he will, in a variety of ways, try to make them more consistent. 
Two items of information that psychologically do not fit together 
are said to be in a dissonant relation to each other. The items of 
information may be about behavior, feelings, opinions, things in 
the environment and so on.17 
En upplevelse av kognitiv dissonans tycks vara en starkt motiverande 
faktor för förändring.18 Men samtidigt som en kognitiv dissonans eller 
en generisk socialpsykologisk förklaring19 framstår avgörande för de 
som lämnar en rörelse kan också individer som fortfarande är aktiva i 
en rörelse uppleva olika former av kognitiv dissonans – det vill säga en 
spänning mellan ideal och realitet. Carolyn Hoyle, Alexandra Bradford 
och Ross Frenetts studie av västerländska kvinnor som har anslutit sig 
till IS innehåller exempelvis vittnesmål om att allt inte har blivit som 
kvinnorna hade hoppats på när de kom till Syrien och Irak. Vid sidan 
av ett starkt stöd för IS och dess anhängares användning av våld vittnar 
kvinnorna exempelvis om rasism mot icke-arabiska muslimer (främst 
mot västerlänningar som har anslutit sig till IS), brist på solidaritet och 
avsaknad av stöd till de som blir änkor.20 Även kvinnor som har en bak-
grund från Syrien som också har lämnat IS vittnar om att änkor blir 
dåligt behandlade, men dessa kvinnor menar istället att det är de ”ut-
ländska” kvinnorna som får en bättre behandling än de inhemska kvin-
norna som tillskrivs en lägre status.21 Till exempel har en av kvinnorna 
som har blivit änka twittrat hashtagen #Nobodycaresaboutthewidow 
och en av kvinnorna i Hoyle, Bradfor och Frenetts studie skriver:
The Muhajireen [de som ansluter sig till kampen] are also subject to 
mistreatment and discrimination from the locals. Many are welco-
ming, hospitable and eager to help whilst many others aren’t.22 
Trots att vi inte har några uppgifter om hur kvinnorna de facto bemäst-
rar de problem som nämns i citatet ovan är det möjligt att spekulera i 
ett antal strategier som kan användas för att mildra eller helt ta bort 
upplevelsen av kognitiv dissonans. En möjlighet är att de ser ”proble-
men” som prövningar från Gud. En annan möjlighet är att de ser den 
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faktiska situationens reella problem som en illustration av det faktum 
att det är nödvändigt att skilja mellan ”islam” (idealet) och muslimers 
beteende (realiteten som visar att människor kan begå fel tillskillnad 
från ”islam” som uppfattas som något ofelbart). De som beter sig på ett 
”felaktigt” sätt kan också framställas som hycklare som endast säger 
att de är muslimer. Genom sina tankar och sina handlande visar de att 
de inte är ”äkta” muslimer. 
Utöver förklaringarna ovan är det även möjligt att motsättningar och 
ouppfyllda löften om att allt skulle bli bra när man kommer till Syrien 
och Irak eller när IS styr leder till ett fördjupat engagemang. Om detta 
är en plausibel tolkning är det även möjligt att se kvinnornas reaktioner 
som en slags copingstrategi (”en metod för att uthärda” och handskas 
med en svår situation23) när profetior och löften inte infrias. Exempelvis 
menar Lorne Dawson att många medlemmar i så kallade apokalyptiska 
nya religiösa rörelser är kapabla att möta kognitiv dissonans i form 
av motgångar och oinfriade förutsägelser (till exempel att jorden inte 
har gått under vid ett visst datum) genom att omtolka centrala tankar 
i teologin eller genom att engagera sig ännu hårdare i rörelsens mål. 
Istället för att dessa ”motgångar” leder till avhopp eller besvikelse kan 
de till och med vara en källa till fördjupad tro och till ett intensivare en-
gagemang.24 En sådan tolkning skulle till exempel kunna tillämpas på 
de tre avhoppade kvinnorna som Azadeh Moaveni intervjuade i New 
York Times. Trots att de hade känt en stigande aversion mot IS valde 
de att gå med i IS kvinnliga ”moralpolis” (”Khansaa brigaden”) innan 
de lämnade rörelsen.25 Huruvida detta är en medveten eller omedveten 
strategi eller om det endast skall ses som ett desperat försök att över-
tyga sig själv om att man har handlat rätt och att man helt enkelt måste 
fortsätta kampen eftersom det finns ytterst små möjligheter att ta sig 
ifrån de områden som kontrolleras av IS är svårt att säga. Här krävs 
framtida studier och intervjuer med avhoppare och återvändare för att 
kunna ge en djupare bild av dessa frågor. 
Avslutning
Samtidigt som många representanter för svenska myndigheter har ut-
tryckt en glädje över att 17-åringen från Lund nu vittnar om IS och 
dess grymheter är det andra röster som har uttryckt en oro för att av-
hoppet eventuellt inte är genuint.26 Många frågar sig om hans avhopp 
är äkta eller om det endast är ett försök att få strafflindring för eventu-
ella brott som han kan ha begått i Syrien och Irak. Samtidigt som detta 
kan vara ”en fjäder i hatten för samordnarens [Mona Sahlins] utåtrik-
tade verksamhet” och en viktig början på en svensk exit-verksamhet 
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för individer som ansluter sig till våldsbejakande tolkningar av islam 
är det inte säkert att han tar avstånd från så kallade fundamentalis-
tiska tolkningar av islam.27 Utan att fördjupa sig i frågan om vad som 
kan avses med fundamentalistiska tolkningar (något som till exempel 
Svenska dagbladets journalist Per Gudmundson inte förtydligar i sin 
text om den 17-årige svensken) indikerar tidigare studier av avhoppare 
att många som lämnar en rörelse inte nödvändigtvis återgår till ett liv 
i majoritetssamhället. Flera av de som lämnar en radikal rörelse väljer 
ofta att engagera sig i en ny rörelse som också kan uppfattas som kon-
troversiell enligt majoriteten.28 I sammanhanget bör det till exempel på-
pekas att ingen av de 58 avhopparna från IS i Neumanns studie tycks 
betrakta våldet mot shia-muslimer och andra religiösa och etniska mi-
noriteter som felaktigt. Det var endast IS våld mot sunni-muslimer som 
avhopparna tog avstånd ifrån. Neumann konstaterar:
Brutality, therefore, didn’t seem to be a universal concern: it was 
seen through a sectarian lens, and caused outrage mostly when its 
victims were fellow Sunnis.29 
Det är inte heller tydligt huruvida avhopparna de facto tar avstånd från 
IS anspråk och ambition att upprätta ett kalifat med hjälp av våld. Kri-
tiken mot IS tycks främst vara på individnivå – det vill säga att det är 
personer som missbrukar och utnyttjar situationen – och på basis av 
Neumanns rapport är det inte tydligt om avståndet också innefattar en 
systemnivå.30 Om detta är en korrekt tolkning så är avståndstagandet 
främst inriktad mot det faktum att vissa personer inom IS har missbru-
kat islam (”systemet”) och tillämpat vad som anses vara ”oislamiska 
principer” snarare än mot användningen av våld för att uppnå ett sam-
hälle baserat på islam. 
Samtidigt som det kan finnas fog för en viss skepsis mot de som hop-
par av från en rörelse som IS så är det nödvändigt att samhället finner 
vägar och tillvägagångssätt för de som vill hoppa av från våldsbejakan-
de rörelser.31 Erfarenheter från tidigare avhopparverksamhet (så kallade 
Exit-projekt som till exempel utförs av Fryshuset i Stockholm32) visar 
att den som lämnar en auktoritär rörelse ofta befinner sig i en mycket 
känslig och utsatt situation.33 Ett utträde kan ofta innebära ett socialt 
stigmata och de som endast bemöts av avståndstagande och disciplinä-
ra åtgärder och ingen plan för hur individen skall komma tillbaks till en 
situation där han eller hon kan leva inom och tillsammans med majori-
tetssamhällets medlemmar kan mycket lätt hamna i en annan våldsbe-
jakande och kriminell miljö.34 Schuurman och Bakker är mycket tydliga 
på denna punkt:
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If the literature offers one clear point of guidance, it is to empha-
size that reintegration programs should also focus on social and 
practical aspects of deradicalization and disengagement. […] For 
instance, by helping to develop a new sense of personal meaning 
 through work or education or building alternative social ties 
 through reconciliation with family.35
Sammantaget kan man konstatera att ur ett positivt perspektiv kan de 
som lämnar en rörelse som IS vara en betydelsefull resurs för samhäl-
let i arbetet med att bekämpa och förhindra att andra ansluter sig till 
rörelser som anammar våldsbejakande tolkningar, men detta innebär 
också ett ansvar att ta fram tillvägagångssätt som kan användas för att 
hjälpa avhoppare att lämna en våldsam miljö och återinträda i samhäl-
let.36 Detta återinträde kan antingen bygga på ett förändrat beteende 
(det vill säga att man inte är beredd att använda våld, men att man 
inte nödvändigtvis överger sin tidigare tillhörighet eller syn på världen) 
eller på en kognitiv förändring där individen tar aktivt avstånd från 
sitt tidigare liv. Medan den första utgångspunkten ofta benämns som 
disengagement i den internationella litteraturen omnämns den andra 
utgångspunkten vanligtvis som en form av deradicalization.37 För att 
uppnå en framgång i detta arbete är det först och främst nödvändigt 
att definiera vad som avses med en ”framgång”; med andra ord vad 
skall uppnås och på vilka sätt? Utan en tydlig målbild går det inte att 
mäta graden av framgång. Det är också nödvändigt att arbetet bygger 
på ett förtroende mellan ”klient” (det vill säga den som vill lämna en 
rörelse eller ett beteende) och den som ”vägleder”. Samtidigt måste ar-
betet också vara baserat på en respekt för mänskliga rättigheter, en stor 
portion av flexibilitet (det finns inga ”one-size-fits-all” lösningar) och 
de som arbetar måste därför vara både lyhörda för insatsers eventuella 
politiska och sociala implikationer vilket kräver att ”vägledarna” är 
välutbildade inom sina respektive områden enligt Schuurman och Bak-
ker.38 Misslyckas samhället med dessa båda uppgift finns en överhäng-
ande risk att avhoppare antingen sugs upp av kriminella rörelser eller 
av nya rörelser som har kommit på ”bättre” modeller för att införa just 
deras förståelse av hur samhället bör organiseras. Vad dessa nya model-
ler kan innebära återstår att se, men det finns anledning att tro att dessa 
inte nödvändigtvis eller automatiskt kommer att bli mindre våldsamma 
eller mindre tvingande än IS. 
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I arrived in Syria to take up the post as head of mission at the Swedish 
embassy in Damascus on June 16 1979. The same day a series of poli-
tical assassinations of Alawites culminated when Alawite cadetts at the 
artillery academy in Aleppo were massacred. When the report below 
was written, approximately one year later, Syria was on the brink of 
a civil war. This uprising was brutally crushed in the city of Hama in 
February 1982. Following the uprising the regime referred to the brutal 
methods that were used as “the Hama rules”, an expression meant to 
be a reminder and to deter all opposition. While it is likely that Bashar 
al-Assad – the current president of Syria – probably had his father’s 
rule in mind when he brutally responed to the first signs of opposi tion 
that followed after the Arab spring revolutions that took place in 2011, 
he forgot that memory is short and that a majority of Syria’s popula-
tion were not born when the opposition was massacred and  silenced in 
1982. To put the current conflicts in a historical context and to show 
how I interpreted the situation at the time, the following text is a copy 
of a report that I wrote back to Sweden in the summer of 1980. 
The Report
When Hafez al-Assad took power in Syria by staging a military coup 
d’état in November1970 a long period of internal stability started, un-
precedented in the country’s history since its indepencence. Syria was 
then considered to be the most unstable country in a chronically unsta-
Ingemar Karlsson
The Political Crisis in Syria
A report from the Swedish embassy in  
Damascus dated June 5 1980
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ble region. During the 24 years that followed after the French left Syria 
the country had experienced twenty military coups d’état.
After his successfull coup d’etat Assad was regarded as a sort of na-
tional saviour. His so-called “corrective movement” had done away 
with the dogmatism that characterized the earlier leftist Baath-regim 
and even considerably eased the repression of the overthrown Attasi-
regim. Assad launched a policy called “infitah” (opening) which meant 
encouragement of the private sector and foreign investments and ini-
tiation of an economic cooperation with the neighbouring Arab states, 
especially Jordan. 
Furthermore, restrictions on foreign travels were eased and Western 
press became available, although censured. The aim of this policy was 
first of all to attract the mainly Sunni business bourgeoisie and secure 
its support. At the same time Assad tried to broaden the basis to the left 
by creating in 1972 the so-called Progressive National Front which also 
included the Communist party and two minor Arab socialist parties 
whose members were given seats in the government. 
During the years 1970–75 this policy proved to be succesful and 
Syria experienced a period without major internal political problems 
even though the secular policy of the Assad regime met resistance from 
Muslim fundamentalist circles. Thus in 1973 Assad was forced to re-
treat when the draft of the new constitution failed to postulate that 
islam was the state religion. This led to violent riots in the city of Hama 
which in their turn forced changes in the draft to prescribe by law that 
the president must be of the Muslim creed.
The improved relations with the conservative oil states led, especially 
after the war in October 1973, to a growing economic assistance and 
during 1971–1975 the formerly stagnating Syrian economy could show 
an average annual growth of 14 %.
The internal stability was accompanied by a pragmatic foreign poli-
cy. Assad was doing his best in trying to keep both Moscow and Wash-
ington at the same distance. After the October War diplomatic relations 
were established with the USA. Syria accepted the UN resolutions 242 
and 338. A separation of forces agreement on the Golan heights was 
negotiated. In February 1975 Assad declared for the first time that he 
was prepared to sign a peace agreement with Israel in exchange for a 
return of the Golan Heights and the establishment of a Palestinian state 
on the West Bank and in Gaza.
During 1976 both the domestic and the international scene became 
tense. As a consequence of the Syrian intervention in Lebanon the 
economic assistance from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait was withdrawn. 
Furthermore, the growing enmity against Iraq resulted in a stop of the 
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transit of the Iraqi oil export which in 1975 brought 130 million US dol-
lars in revenues. The regime had however calculated with an unchanged 
high level of economic assistance. The public expenditure thus grew and 
the adjustment to a gloomier monetary reality could soon be felt.
Furthermore during the years with an uninterrupted flow of econom-
ic assistance development projects were initiated on a such scale that it 
was impossible to complete them. The ease with which it was possible 
to acquire hard currency lead to leniency as far as the scrutinization of 
suggested projects was concerned, A growing tendency to invest in new 
prestigeous projects could be seen while more urgently needed invest-
ments into existing industries were neglected. Above all, this artificial 
economic boom was followed by a growing inflation which averaged 25 
per cent in the years 1975–77. In the same period housing prices grew 
by 300 per cent, and rashwa (corruption) followed at the same pace.
In foreign policy the Syrian engagement in Lebanon became a grow-
ing burden and it soon had a negative impact on the moral of the army. 
The higher officers used their service in Lebanon for private enrich-
ment, and this further increased a general dissatisfaction with the exist-
ing corruption. Finally, Sadats journey to Jerusalem was a blow to the 
Syrian policy in the Middle East. The Camp David Agreement had the 
bilateral approach that Assad had been fearing most; one in which the 
Golan Heights were not mentioned at all thus leaving it to rest as one of 
the problems that could possibly be discussed when all other problems 
have been solved. Assad received nothing in return for his pragmatic 
foreign policy and thus the negotiations at Camp David forced him 
to get closer to Moscow, away from the non-alignment policy he had 
pursued until Sadat’s initiative. Syria was thrown back into isolation, 
this time also within the Arab world, and suddenly, maverick states like 
Yemen and Libya seemed to be the closest allies, a company that an 
average Syrian rather detested.
The factors that triggered the political assassinations that became the 
start of the regime’s growing political difficulties were, however, first of 
all the growing influence of the Alawite minority and the emphasized 
secular policy. Members of the Alawite sect, to which president Assad 
belongs, have gradually taken over key positions within the administra-
tion, the military, and the Baath party and this at a significant dispro-
portion to their numbers within the population. Approximately 70 per 
cent of the population of Syria are Sunni Muslims while the Alawites 
make up a bit over 10 per cent, the same as the Christians. Even though 
the number of Alawites in the governing bodies is not directly eyecatch-
ing – only two of the 37 government members are Alawites – they have 
got almost all key posts in the “regional command” of the Baath Party 
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which is the governing body in reality. Every highly placed Sunni state 
functionary is also being controlled by often formaly subordinated 
Alawite. This has led to a serious loss of balance among the various 
ethnical, religious, and political groups, and family clans that existed 
during the first years of the new regime, a balance which is of utmost 
importance for the internal stability. 
Furthermore, also Syria has come to experience an Islamic reviv-
al even though no parallell to Iran can be drawn. There is no Syrian 
Khomeini. The higher priesthood is appointed and paid by the gov-
ernment and it does not engage in any agitation against the regime. 
Nevertheless, this relationship has not prevented a growing influx to 
fundamentalist groups that are united in their opposition against the re-
gime, partially because they consider the president and all Alawites to be 
heretics and partially because they strictly oppose secularism. The Sunni 
majority has also of old looked down upon the Alawites who were tra-
ditionally considered to be gypsy-like vagrants living isolated and cut off 
from the rest of Syria in the Alawite mountains east of Lattakia. Togeth-
er with other minorities like Christians, Druzes, Circassians and Kurds 
they were without any political consequence untill the French mandate 
power started recruiting army officers from these minorities.
Assassinations against Alawites in leading positions that started in 
1977 were staged by these Muslim fundamentalist groups who were 
given the common denomination “the Muslim Brotherhood” even 
though it was not clear to what extent The Muslim Brotherhood was 
involved.
During 1977 and 1978 no fewer than twenty Alawites in leading po-
sitions lost their lives and no perpetrator had been apprehended. The 
regime’s measures to counter these attacks were to further increase the 
guard around the potential victims which made the other side invent 
new a tactic. At the beginning of 1979 the attacks were first of all di-
rected against the security police and mainly against the premises of 
the Baath-partie’s youth organisation. Many of those situated in larger 
cities were blown up and in Damascus a bomb was placed in a room 
in the party center. These attacks were carried out without any loss 
of lives while the attacks against the all-present security police, the so 
called mukhabarat, led to several casualities
This wave of violence culminated on 16th June 1979 when Alawite 
cadetts at the artillery academy in Aleppo were massacred. The person 
behind the attack was the Sunni captain on duty, a long-time member 
of the Baath-party whose field of responsibility was ideological instruc-
tion. Over seventy cadettes were murdered and the perpetrators fled 
from the scene. 
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The attacks were gradually spreading and also directed against Sun-
nis who were accused of collaboration with the regime, against regime-
friendly religious leaders and against the Russian advisors.
In the media campaign and in the statements from the government 
that followed all the blame for the political violence was put on The 
Muslim Brotherhood, Israel, and the USA. The Aleppo massacre was 
followed by executions. Fourteen persons were hung in Damascus, 
even though they were not involved in the massacre in Aleppo but sen-
tenced earlier for crimes against state security and alleged membership 
in The Muslim Brotherhood. It is quite likely that they were criminals 
sentenced to death earlier for other crimes and now used as warning 
examples.
It has to be admitted that apart from these drastic measures the re-
action of the regime in face of the violent deeds were during a long 
period surprisingly mild – a similar internal situation in Irak would 
have caused summary mass executions. Assad himself kept an almost 
defensive attitude, he admitted economical and judicial mistakes on the 
part of the regime and gave a prospect of political changes. An anti-
corruption campaign got under way but it soon turned out to have the 
opposite effect than intended as only minor commercial actors were 
arrested while those who so to say personified corruption, that is presi-
dent’s brother Rif’at and his circle, were not investigated.
The Baath-party congress that followed at the end of the year was 
marked by a surprisingly open critical debate but did not lead to any 
changes in the party leadership. After the congress the salaries of all 
state employees including the army were raised by 50–75 per cent for 
those with the lowest wages and by 10–25 per cent for all others. At the 
beginning of the new year (1980) the government was reconstructed. 
The majority of its 37 members were now young technocrats in their 
35–40-ties. The purpose of this appointment policy was to give an im-
pression of renewal and efficiency but it was hampered by the fact that 
there were no signs whatsoever that the power of the hated brother 
of the president was being limited. As a political gesture, about one 
hundred political prisoners were released, mainly persons from the left-
wing opposition.
These measures had no political effect. On the contrary they rather 
gave the impression that the regime was on the defensive, an impression 
that was further strengthened by Assads appearances on the TV where 
he looked almost frightened in contrast to his earlier appearances when 
he used to radiate self-confidence.
The assassinations continued and at the beginning of March the op-
position seemed to consider the time ripe for an open confrontation 
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with the regime. The tactic that proved to be so successful in Teheran 
was employed and a civil disobedience movement was formed in Aleppo 
and Hama in northern Syria. In Aleppo the whole bazaar, next to Fez the 
largest in the Arab world, closed down as well as all shops whereupon 
the military tried to open them by force. Fighting in the streets broke out 
which lasted a few days and left 60 dead and more than 100 injured. 
Also in Hama, the Sunni stronghold, the shops closed after a general 
school strike. No open fighting ensued though. In Damascus the shop-
keepers were enticed secretly but they did not follow the example of the 
other two cities and thus the situation remained normal except for a 
noticeably larger number of mukhabarat throughout the city.
Simultaneously with these strikes acts of terror committed against 
Alawites and Baath-party members were intensified. I have got the 
opportunity to read the weekly report of the vice-minister of internal 
security to the minister on political crimes. The report that normally 
was of a half-page length now consisted of five pages and showed that 
the attacks became more spread, also to parts of the country that were 
untill then untouched by the violence, like Deir az-Zor close to the Iraqi 
border and other larger towns like Idlib. The worst situation was in 
Hama where the opposition killed 80 persons considered to side with 
the regim that week. All over Syria 100 persons lost their lives in politi-
cal assasination.
Even more serious for the regim than these assassinations was the 
fact that also other groups critical of the Alawite regim who untill then 
only had observed the actions of the opposition with a silent approval 
now began to act more openly and demand political reforms. This op-
position is however very heterogenous and the only factor unifying 
them is their opposition against the Assad regime. No political demands 
have been presented as yet except unsigned leaflets demanding release 
of political prisoners, free elections and above all equal rights, i e an 
end to the Alawite minority hegemony. It is thus difficult to discern any 
organised groups within this opposiiton. The largest and the one that, 
if organised, could represent a more serious threat than the Muslim fa-
natics is the Sunni bourgeoisie which has always constituted the back-
bone of the country’s economy, both in the cities and in the countryside. 
The opposition from this group is based partially on their exclusion 
from the centers of political power and partially on their having lost 
control over the economic life. They now watch how almost all bigger 
transactions pass through the hands of the Alawites and are not willing 
to accept that the Alawites have taken over their earlier dominant role 
within the private sector and the posts within the public administration 
that offers the best possibilities for fast enrichment.
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Opposition however also exists within the Baath-party itself: the left 
wing opposes what they consider to be Assad’s concessions both to re-
actionary Muslim fundamentalists and by furthering the private sec-
tor to the economical interests of the bourgeosie. The leaders of these 
groups are in exile and they want to bring Baathism back to more rig-
orous and pure Arab-socialist radicalism.
There are also secessionist groups within all left-wing parties that 
form the Progressive National Front and are part of the government. 
As the opposition within the Baath-party they could count on outside 
support, first of all from Iraq. Even the Muslim opposition could count 
on support from outside. Damascus has accused first of all Jordan but 
also the so called reactionary Arab states of having supported the Mus-
lim Brotherhood both materially and morally which probably can not 
be excluded. There is no doubt though that the Muslim opposition in 
northern Syria has received support, even material, from Erbakan’s Na-
tional Salvation Party in Turkey which would consider a purely islamic 
regim in Syria to be of advantage for their own political endeavours.
Finally, it should be pointed out that also the Alawite minority is 
split, both along political lines and due to old clan rivalries. Assads 
archenemy, the strong man of the previous regime, Salah Jedid, is for 
example Alawite and even his followers have most likely a fair share in 
the number of political killings.
In the beginning Assad tried to react by political counter-moves. The 
criticism of the Muslim Brotherhood was diminished. Instead USA, 
Israel, and Sadat were said to be the archenemies with the common 
aim to overthrow the Syrian regime because of its successfull resist-
ance against the Camp David agreements. Members of the Progressive 
National Front were promised an increased political influence and a 
permission to publish their own newspapers as well as political activi-
ties at the universities, but not in the army. No measures were though 
taken in this respect in reality.
Furthermore, a series of trade union congresses were organized to 
expresss the support for the regime. The unions that refused to partici-
pate – engineers, advocates and physicians – were dissolved and then 
re-created. In connection with these congresses Assad declared that mi-
litias of workers, farmers, students, etc would be created and immedi-
ately armed. This has however not happened for the evident reason that 
every such militia would have an overwhelming Sunni majority with a 
doubtful loyalty. The lack of weapons is the weakness of the Muslim 
opposition. These countermeasures were so clearly empty of any mean-
ing that they were considered to be just another proof of the regime’s 
weakness and the attacks continued.
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Assad decided to play it the hard way. During the night between 
Easter Saturday and Easter Monday the central parts of Hama and 
Aleppo,were occupied by government troops and every house was 
searched for regime opponents and weapons. The troops acted with 
great brutality and a number of summary and often bestial executions 
took place, among others of prominent representatives of the doctors 
trade union in Hama. In Aleppo eyewitnesses have spoken about corps-
es being dragged behind tanks through the streets in the center of the 
town and people being killed openly.
Both these cities are now besieged and at times even occupied by the 
troops. Nevertheless, the attacks against symbolic targets, even persons, 
among them the Soviet advisors who are seen as symbols of the regime, 
continue. 
This type of actions cannot bring the regime down. The active core 
of the fundamentalist opposition seems to consist of only two thousand 
persons. There is however neither a political nor a military cure against 
this religious fanaticism with its hatred of the Alawites. The Assad re-
gime is now in a vicious circle. The larger the scope of the killings, the 
greater the dependence of the feared Alawite militia and security forces 
will be which in its turn only will ignite more hate.
The unity within the army is of decisive importance for the regime’s 
survival, a fact that both sides are well aware of. Armed attacks by the 
fundamentalist opposition continue with the same stregth almost daily 
even in Damascus. Yesterday for example ten members of the security 
police were killed on their way by bus to the airport. The purpose of 
these attacks is most probably to forcibly create civil war circumstances 
which would compell the army to act and thus risk falling appart along 
sectarian lines. This could be the beginning of the minority regime’s 
downfall. Assad has however so far carefully avoided this pitfall. In 
Aleppo and Hama the troops of his brother Rifaat, the so-called de-
fence brigades that count 25 000 men and function as a sort of preto-
rian garde have been deployed together with the quwwat khassa, the 
special forces known for their brutality, under the commando of the 
Alawite Ali Haidar. The army units are kept only for emergency out-
side these two cities. There are no signs of any split within the army. A 
parallell with Lebanon comes automatically to mind but has to be dis-
missed since in Syria there is no firmly established organisatorial struc-
ture based on ethnic, religious or clan affiliation. Furthermore, during 
his more than ten years in power Assad has been able to purge the army 
of officers who were not considered to be totally reliable. A number of 
his closest political advisors as for example Mustafa Tlas, the Minister 
of Defence, are Sunnites and they are indebted to Assad for their posi-
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tions. They see in the present regime a guarantee for their continued 
dominating political influence in the army.
It is difficult to see any way out of the internal political crisis and 
a long hot summer is to be expected. There are no signs of a “fin de 
régime”. Assad’s power base seems to be intact, as mentioned above, 
and the regime is also protected by half a dozen various security or-
ganisations, all of them under the presidents control plus a number 
of elite-units, first of all the abovementioned special forces, under the 
command of the president’s brother. The time when a general with his 
troop could drive with tanks into Damascus och take the power are 
over. All the sophisticated equipment that Syria has got from the Soviet 
Union, like the T-72 tanks, have not gone to Golan or Lebanon but to 
Rifaat Assads special forces for an eventual “internal” use. These have 
carried out series of demonstrative maneuvres in the vicinity of Damas-
cus with the presence of the defence minister Tlass. 
Rifaat Assad is said to have declared that he would first turn half of 
the city into ruins if he should be forced to leave Damascus. Irrespec-
tive of whether this is true or not few doubt that a massacre would 
await the city should the situation in Damascus become risky for the 
regime. A voluntary retreat on the part of Assad is unthinkable not least 
due to the risks of massacres this would entail for the million Alawites 
living in Syria. Should Assad loose power the developments to be ex-
pected are so dramatic that this perspective in itself serves as a strong 
re straining factor.
The weakest point of the regime – its total dependence of the Presi-
dent and his brother’s special forces – have, paradoxically, become a 
guarantee of its continued existence.
The broad passive opposition is probably well aware of the fact that 
in case of Assad’s downfall the only likely alternative, and this after 
a period of bloody chaos, is either a Muslim fundamentalist regime 
of Iranian character or a return of the Baath-party’s left-wing branch. 
Both these alternatives are odious for the overwhelming majority 
within the opposition. Not least the leading circles of the Sunnite bour-
geoisie would give preference to Assad if they had to choose between 
these two alternatives. The recent terror acts – explosions in cinemas, 
in shops selling liquor and in banks in Aleppo and Hama, and death 
threats against children going to school seem alien to the large majority 
of the Sunni opposition who understands that the regime is militarily 
too strong to be overthrown and who now seems to be getting tired of 
the personal consequences the internal unrest has caused them. There is 
hardly any business activity going on and in Aleppo the students have 
lost the whole year due to a strike to no avail. 
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If Assad can make political use of these moods the silent support 
for the militant opposition could be noticeably diminished. He could 
achieve this through satisfying the Sunni bourgeoisie politically and 
economically by giving them an increased influence in the political or-
gans and at the same diminishing the Alawite dominance in the pri-
vate sector. This policy entails however several difficulties. Assad is too 
much dependent on people like his brother Assad who is the symbol of 
the dissatisfaction with the regime and thus he cannot carry out any 
substantial personnel changes as they would be immediately seen as 
a sign of his weakness. An increased influence in economy of the Sun-
nites would be opposed by his own supporters who now profit from 
the system. 
Any radical political changes can not be expected. Assad might try to 
satify the non-fundamentalist opposition by some economic measures 
but the armed attacks will probaby continue and be met with gradu-
ally more brutal methods. The regime however has such instruments 
of power at its disposal that the only way to bring it down would be a 
simultaneous liquidation of the president and his brother, an unlikely 
scenario. If this would happen it would lead to a chaos in Syria with 
severe consequences for the whole region. 
When assessing the international consequences of the internal politi-
cal situation in Syria it should be taken into consideration that Assad 
has been the most consistent Arab politician during the 1970- ies. Un-
der his rule Syria has, in contrast to earlier regimes, become a stabilising 
factor in the Middle East due to Assads pragmatic policies. The internal 
difficulties together with Carter’s policy in the Middle East have forced 
Assad to leave his earlier principles to try to keep an equal distance to 
both superpowers.
Should the Assad regime be overthrown and replaced by either a 
radical branch of the Baath-party or fall into the same fundamental-
ist abyss as Iran the consequences would be noticeable far outside the 
borders of this already unstable region. It is only wishful thinking to 
believe that a new regime in Syria would be internally less repressive 
than the present one or that it would support the solution of the Mid-
dle Eastern conflict in accordance with some Camp David-formulas. 
One prediction can however be maid.
A post-Assad Syrian regime would be substantially more “rejection-
ist” than the present one.
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Inledning
Islams närvaro i det mångreligiösa Sverige har skett genom migration 
från länder och regioner som länge har varit präglade av islam, som 
Turkiet, Mellanöstern, Afrikas horn och Balkan. Från att ha varit en 
minoritetsreligion som framför allt har förknippats med arbetskrafts-
invandring har islam kommit att bli Sveriges näst största religion; idag 
finns muslimska organisationer och föreningar från hela världen repre-
senterade runt om i landet. De muslimska grupperna är också mycket 
heterogena när det gäller kulturella, religiösa, socio-ekonomiska fakto-
rer och det finns inte en enhetlig syn på religion och religiositet.1 Den 
ökade muslimska synligheten i form av moskéer och islamiska insti-
tutioner har kommit att aktualisera den offentliga diskussionen om 
vilken plats religion och religiositet skall få i det offentliga rummet.2 I 
den offentliga diskussionen om islam har bland annat frågor om kläd-
sel, slaktmetoder och byggandet av moskéer dryftats. Samtidigt har en 
ökad anti-muslimsk – ”islamofobisk” – retorik framträtt i det svenska 
samhället.3 Med kulturgeografen Lily Kongs ord kan man beskriva si-
tuationen som att 
the intersection of these [rasifierade och könade] discourses with 
reworked Orientalist leanings that construct Islam as antithetical 
to ’western’ culture and Muslim women as the embodiment of a 
’fundamentalist’ and repressive religion […] young Muslim men’s 
masculinities are shaped by markers of social difference and loca-
lity, and thus are multiple and fluid.4 
Daniel Enstedt
Islamiska staten,  
hijrah och jihA¯d
Religionsbeteendevetenskapliga perspektiv
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En sådan betoning av religiös tillhörighet, som det här är fråga om, har 
inneburit, menar Kong vidare, att ”young Muslim people are increa-
singly defining their identities in terms of their religion, as opposed, for 
example, to their parental country of origin”.5 Religionens framskjutna 
plats som identifikationsobjekt har, som Synnøve Bendixsen visar i sin 
studie av unga muslimska kvinnor i Berlin, medfört att andra och tredje 
generationernas migranter vänder sig till islam ”in a quest for authenti-
city, an individual identity, and as part of their group orientation”.6 De 
unga muslimska kvinnorna söker, menar Bendixsen, efter en ”renare” 
och mer autentisk form av islam än den kulturella, urvattnade varian-
ten av islam som de tillskriver sina föräldrar. 
I föreliggande artikel ska jag diskutera en motsvarande vändning till 
islam i Sverige, närmare bestämt den som har varit förknippad med 
rekryteringen till Islamiska staten (al-dawla al-islamiyya) och krigs-
föringen i Syrien och Irak. Islamiska staten har från flera håll – bland 
annat av FN och USA:s president Barack Obama – pekats ut som en av 
de värsta terrororganisationerna i modern tid. Även om det är svårt att 
ange en exakt siffra så uppskattas ett hundratal individer från Sverige, 
i huvudsak unga män, men också kvinnor, ha anslutit sig till IS. En av 
dessa män, här kallad Amer, intervjuades i Göteborgs-Posten med an-
ledning av sitt deltagande i IS krigsföring. Amer avfärdar bestämt den 
kritik som har riktats mot Islamiska staten från muslimskt håll: ”De är 
hycklare. De vet att vi har rätt, men de låtsas något annat för att passa 
in i det västerländska samhället.”7 Därtill framhåller Amer att Kora-
nen uppmanar alla rättrogna muslimer till att utföra jiha¯d, även om 
det skulle innebära att andra muslimer riskerar att dö på kuppen. Det 
är emellertid inget egentligt problem för Amer, som menar att det inte 
är alla som kallar sig muslimer som är ”riktiga muslimer”. För de ”rik-
tiga” muslimerna, som enligt Amer följer Koranen och profeten Mu-
hammeds ord, finns ingen död: ”Det här livet är bara en prövning, en 
prövning som avgör vilket liv vi kommer att leva efter döden. Det här 
livet är inte viktigt. Det är vad som händer efter döden som är viktigt”.8
Det förekommer inte någon rekrytering till IS, menar Amer; det rör 
sig snarare om ett kall från Gud: ”Om du ska ansluta dig till kampen 
så är det för att du är kallad av Gud. Det vet du själv, ingen annan kan 
berätta det för dig.”9 Det är frågan om människor som ansluter sig till 
Islamiska staten – deras personlighetsprofil, egenskaper och drivkrafter 
– som kommer att dryftas i det följande, där Amers berättelse får tjäna 
som en utgångspunkt. Närmare bestämt kommer jag härnäst att beakta 
några psykologiska och sociologiska perspektiv på hur det kommer sig 
att unga män och kvinnor ansluter sig till islamistiska rörelser som IS. 
Eftersom forskningsläget ännu är skralt när det gäller Islamiska staten 
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kommer jag att vända mig till tidigare forskning om terrorism – bland 
annat självmordsbombares psykologi – som har en del beröringspunk-
ter med rörelsen, även om det också finns uppenbara skillnader. Först 
ska jag emellertid teckna en bild av hur Islamiska staten framställer sig 
själv i olika media, främst genom den internetbaserade tidskriften Da-
biq. Den Islamiska staten har lockat till sig människor från en rad olika 
länder. I det följande fokuserar jag i huvudsak på IS-anhängare från 
Sverige och gör därmed inga anspråk på att förklara hela den Islamiska 
statens uppbyggnad och medlemsprofil.
Dabiq och Islamiska statens självbild
Den 1 juli 2014 kungjorde Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi – IS självutnämnde 
ledare och sedermera även känd som Kalif Ibrahim – kalifatets åter-
komst och med det muslimers rättigheter och värdighet. Platsen var den 
stora moskén i Mosul, som IS hade intagit i början av juni samma år. 
Delar av talet i Mosul publicerades därefter den 5 juli i det första num-
ret av den engelskspråkiga, webbaserade tidskriften Dabiq.10 Talet är 
att betrakta som ett första offentliggörande av den Islamiska statens 
intentioner och inriktning. Bakr al-Baghdadi: ”Soon, by Allah’s per-
mission, a day will come when the Muslim will walk everywhere as a 
master, having honor, being revered with his head raised high and his 
dignity preserved.”11 Tanken om ett återupprättat Kalifat omnämns i 
samma andetag som uppmaningen till jiha¯d och utplånandet av fien-
den. I en värld som beskrivs som delad mellan de rättrogna och de 
otrogna kallar al-Baghdadi muslimer till att emigrera (hijrah) till den 
Islamiska staten. I synnerhet högutbildade muslimer, som läkare och 
ingenjörer ombeds bege sig till Syrien och Irak; det framställs till och 
med som deras plikt (wajib ‘ayni).12 
En mer detaljerad utläggning om hijrahs betydelse publiceras i det 
tredje numret av Dabiq, där hyckleri omnämns som en motpol till bred-
villigheten av att utföra hijrah. Oviljan till hijrah och jiha¯d framställs 
i själva verket som ett uttryck för otro och apostasi. I Dabiq beskrivs 
förvisso även den inre kamp som muslimer kan uppleva dagligdags när 
det gäller hijrah och jiha¯d: ”This condition described is probably one 
many Muslims experience daily. There is no solution for it except by 
taking the first step towards jiha¯d – hijrah.”13 Det råder emellertid ingen 
tvekan av vad innebörden av jiha¯d och hijrah är i Dabiq: det hand-
lar primärt om att ansluta sig till Islamiska staten och krigsföringen i 
Syrien och Irak. En eventuell tvekan eller oro inför att ansluta sig till 
IS framstår som överflödig: ”Do not worry about money or accom-
modations for yourself and your family.”14 Kalifatet tillhandahåller 
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allt som behövs, som exempelvis en fungerande sjukvård.15 I retoriken 
ställs också en förnedrande tillvaro i icke-muslimska länder mot livet i 
Kalifatet: 
The modern day slavery of employment, work hours, wages, etc., 
is one that leaves the Muslim in a constant feeling of subjugation 
to a ka¯fir master. He does not live the might and honor that every 
Muslim should live and experience. […]. Whereas when you com-
pare the situation of the Saha¯bah after hijrah and jiha¯d, you see that 
the dunya¯ came to them without them following its tail. They dedi-
cated their lives to Allah, so the dunya¯ came to them unwillingly.16 
Istället för att vara förslavad i icke-muslimska länder, och vara tvungen 
att underkasta sig de otrogna, kan de rättrogna muslimerna alltså välja 
Kalifatet, där de inte längre behöver slita för att få materiella, världsliga 
ting (dunya¯). Genom att välja hijrah and jiha¯d, och på så sätt bli Mu-
hammeds följeslagare (Saha¯bah) i Kalifatet, får anhängarna tillgång till 
vad de tidigare strävade efter. Den tidigare depriverade tillvaron i utan-
förskap, förnedring och förtryck ställs alltså emot befrielsen i Kalifatet. 
Det är i huvudsak män som avbildas och kommer till tals i Dabiq. 
Vid ifta¯r-firandet under Ramadan sitter män samlade på filtar; i för-
grunden av en bild ses en man mata en av pojkarna, medan den mot-
satta sidan visar upp en manlig militär som ligger död på marken.17 
Döda män och segergestikulerande IS-krigare, sprängda byggnader och 
vapenarsenaler skapar sammantaget en bild av IS som en mansdomine-
rad rörelse. Islam är, enligt Dabiq, inte fredens religion utan svärdets.18 
I Dabiq varvas utläggningar om kalifatet, jiha¯d och hijrah med 
ocensurerade bilder på döda människor från Islamiska statens sam-
mandrabbningar i regionen. I Dabiqs hittills utkomna nio nummer 
förklaras emellanåt, men inte alltid, grundläggande muslimska termer 
och begrepp; tidskriften är dessutom skriven på engelska. Språket kan 
närmast beskrivas som arkaiskt och mässande, medan bilderna och 
layout rör sig mellan dataspelsestetik, Hollywoods dramatiserade bild-
språk och dokumentära skildringar av döda kroppar och krigsscena-
rior. Det är, som Charles H. Lippy och Eric Tranby skriver i ett annat 
sammanhang, inte bara ett faktiskt krig utan också ”a theatrical form 
of violence; in other words, it is as a symbolic act. It uses images of 
a cosmic war between good and evil or martyrdom and is performed 
to dramatize a cause”.19 Samtidigt efterliknar Dabiq mer traditionella 
tidskrifters format, vilket skapar ett trovärdigt uttryck. Dabiq är emel-
lertid inte den enda källa till information om IS på nätet. Det finns en 
uppsjö bilder och videoklipp där människor avrättas eller där en IS-
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anhängare, ofta i stridsmundering, uppmanar potentiella kandidater att 
ansluta sig till kampen. 
Religiös nationalism och drömmen om  
ett kalifat
Det kalifat som Islamiska staten har utropat sträcker sig över den 
landsgräns mellan Syrien och Irak som Sykes-Picot-fördraget drog upp 
1916. Även om Kalifatet inte är en nation i formell mening så finns 
det flera begynnande tecken på nationsbygge.20 Krigsföringen i Syrien 
och Irak inbegriper en strävan att uppnå territoriell självständighet. 
Statsvetaren Gunnar Jervas urskiljer några faktorer som har bidragit 
till att en religiöst underbyggd terrorism fått en renässans de senaste 
decennierna, där revolutionen i Iran, som utgjort en förebild för många 
senare islamistiska rörelser, är den kanske främsta och mest tongivande 
faktorn. Det som utmärker religiöst motiverade terrorister är, menar 
Jervas, att de anser sig föra ett heligt krig och inte skyr några medel 
när det gäller att uppnå sina mål. Det övergripande målet är vanligtvis 
att utplåna det onda på jorden, för att istället upprätta en ny ordning 
som genomsyras av den egna religiösa övertygelsen.21 Jervas lyfter även 
fram olika sociala och ekonomiska förändringar som gynnat uppkom-
sten av den hänsynslösa formen av terrorism som framkommit under 
senare tid. Han menar att många muslimer upplever en frustration över 
de egna islamska ländernas oförmåga att förhindra exploateringen av 
deras mark och naturtillgångar. Denna exploatering beskylls ofta USA 
och dess allierade ligga bakom.22 
Den religiösa och nationalistiskt präglade diskursen kring Islamiska 
staten tenderar att framhålla IS-anhängarna som Guds folk och mot-
ståndarna som ondskans hantlangare. Det finns inga neutrala eller 
oskyldiga civila människor då man endast kan stå på en sida av konflik-
ten. Utifrån en sådan ståndpunkt är även civilbefolkningen att betrakta 
som part i målet. Det är uttryckligen en tydlig dualistisk världsbild som 
frodas i IS propaganda och retorik. I en sådan föreställningsvärld ten-
derar motståndarna att dehumaniseras, medan hjältarna återfinns på 
den egna sidan av konflikten. Inte minst i krigssituationer är det vanligt 
att parterna dehumaniserar varandra, bland annat för att rättfärdiga 
handlingar som drabbar en civilbefolkning. Den dissonans som kan 
uppstå med dödandet av jämlika människor reduceras om fienden de-
humaniseras. Dessutom bör varje tillstymmelse till empati för fienden 
undermineras eftersom empati är aggressionens och dödandets främsta 
fiende.23 Härnäst ska jag vända mig till frågan om huruvida detta krä-
ver en specifik personlighetstyp.
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Personlighetsprofil och patologi 
I Maxwell Taylors numera klassiska och omdiskuterade terroristprofil 
framställs den typiske terroristen som en ensamstående man strax över 
20 år som har läst något inom humaniora på universitetet. Han tillhör 
medel- eller överklass och vände sig till terrorism efter att ha stiftat be-
kantskap med marxistiska idéer.24 Även om det är vanskligt att fastställa 
sådana personlighetsprofiler så har flera försök gjorts, inte minst inom 
säkerhetspolisen, i syfte att kunna förutse terrorattentat. Antaganden 
om terroristers trait – en för individen bestående och grundläggande 
egenskap – har vanligtvis gjorts utifrån ett litet antal empiriska analy-
ser, som sedan generaliserats. Av den moderna personlighetspsykologin 
bedöms emellertid ett trait som en bristfällig indikation på hur en män-
niska kommer att bete sig i en specifik situation.25 Det finns dock en rad 
andra psykologiska förklaringsmodeller som vill ge svar på frågan om 
terroristens psyke. 
Richard Perlstein menar att en narcissistisk besvikelse har en av-
görande psykobiografisk betydelse hos 90 procent av terroristerna. 
Narcissism definieras här som ett intrapsykiskt regleringsverktyg som 
förmår individen till att försvara jaget från hot och skada.26 Narcissism 
kan därtill ses som det sätt på vilket individen relaterar till den yttre 
världen och dess potentiella förmåga att stärka, tillfredsställa och kom-
pensera individens Jag. Perlsteins förklaring är relativt väl mottagen 
och accepterad av psykoanalytiker.27 Flera andra teoretiskt besläktade 
försök att patologisera terrorister har gjorts. Redan i inledningen av 
”The Childhood Origins of Terrorism” slår Lloyd deMabuse fast att 
roten till terrorism inte står att finna i amerikansk utrikespolitik, utan 
snarare i den familj terroristen vuxit upp i. Islamistiska terrorister är 
enligt deMabuse, kort sagt, en produkt av ojämlika, könsstereotypa och 
fundamentalistiska system som segregerar familjen i två delar: mannens 
och kvinnans. Barnen växer upp i kvinnans del där mannen inte är när-
varande.28 Joan Lachkar baserar likaså sina antaganden om terroristens 
personlighet på en föreställning om att fadern ofta är frånvarande i 
långa perioder i Mellanösterns muslimska samhällen. Vid de tillfällen 
männen närvarar är de känslomässigt otillgängliga, vilket beror på de 
muslimska samhällenas polygamiska struktur, menar Lachkar.29 Sådana 
föreställningar om den muslimska terroristens personlighet baseras på 
Freuds teori om oidipuskomplexet. Den kamp mot auktoriteter som 
utförs av en terrorist antas därmed bottna i en omedveten kamp med 
fadern.30 Terroristen befinner sig här i ett symbiotiskt förhållande till 
modern som den frånvarande fadern möjliggjorde när han inte avbröt 
den incestuösa relationen mellan mor och son. Eftersom inte sonen 
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mötte något motstånd från fadern i det oidipala stadiet kunde symbio-
sen med modern fortgå till vuxen ålder. 
I samma anda resonerar Joan Lachkar kring självmordsbombarens 
psyke utifrån borderlinepersonlighetens särdrag.31 Lachkar formule-
rar det på följande sätt: ”both the borderline and the terrorist think 
they have separated from mother’s body, but they are forever stuck 
living emotionally in utero”.32 Barnet blir överstimulerat av moderns 
närvaro, menar Lachkar, eftersom fadern är otillgänglig. En översti-
mulans av en kärleksfull moders närvaro gör det svårt för barnet att 
kontrollera sin sexualdrift. Senare i livet straffar pojken andra män-
niskor för sina okontrollerade incestuösa driftsimpulser.33 Terroristens 
uppfostran innebär, utifrån ett sådant perspektiv, att de uppfattar sina 
drifter som farliga och agerar därför ut dem irrationellt och impulsivt. 
Borderlinepersonligheten är distanserad från sina behov, vilket innebär 
en frånvaro av impulskontroll och förmågan att göra rationella om-
dömen. En grundläggande rädsla för att bli övergiven och tillintetgjord 
är kännetecknande, liksom en brist på verklig jaguppfattning och 
realitetsprövning. 
Motiv och drivkrafter 
Det finns en tendens inom forskningen att förenkla de bakomliggande 
psykologiska processer och mekanismer som motiverar en terrorist. 
Det florerar en myt om terroristen som framställer honom som psy-
kologiskt avvikande, vilket framgått av ovanstående psykoanalytiskt 
grundade resonemang. Terroristen antas ha en empatistörning och en 
patologisk dragning till våld. Terroristen beskrivs vidare som antisocial, 
paranoid och narcissistisk, eller, som ovan, med en borderlineproble-
matik. På så sätt reduceras komplexa mekanismer och processer till 
relativt enkla psykologiska termer och psykopatografier. Efter den 11 
september 2001 återupplivades ånyo myten om terroristen. Det som 
återkommer i de förklaringsmodeller där terroristen patologiseras är en 
tankefigur där en extrem och avvikande handling antas spegla ett ex-
tremt och avvikande psyke. Nasra Hassan menar att detta är ett direkt 
felaktigt och missvisande antagande. På frågan om självmordsbomba-
rens psykologi ger hon istället följande svar: ”What is frightening is not 
the abnormality of those who carry out suicide attacks, but their sheer 
normality. They are so normal for their communities and societies.”34 
Även Andrew Silke menar att majoriteten terrorister inte har en speci-
ell personlighetstyp eller lider av en psykisk störning. Detsamma gäller 
självmordsbombarnas personligheter, som snarare bedöms stabila och 
inte särskilt anmärkningsvärda ur ett personlighetspsykologiskt per-
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spektiv.35 Det finns ingen särskild personlighetstyp som är benägen att 
hemfalla åt terrorism och det är i analogi med ett sådant resonemang 
rimligt att anta att även IS-anhängarna vanligtvis har en normal psy-
kologisk profil. Människor väljer att bli medlem i en terrorgrupp och 
utför terrorhandlingar av flera olika skäl. Den övervägande delen av 
IS-anhängarna är sannolikt inte psykiskt störda. 
Även om människor som är beredda att utföra terrorhandlingar 
inte kan kategoriseras utifrån en psykisk störning, en särskild person-
lighetsorganisation eller profil, så kan man diskutera de psykologiska 
motiv och drivkrafter som utmärker en IS-anhängare. Det är främst 
två saker som kännetecknar en IS-anhängares motivation. Anhängaren 
är vanligtvis mycket starkt motiverad, vilket bidrar till acceptansen av 
dödande. IS-anhängaren verkar därtill i grupper som stärker denna mo-
tivation. Interaktionen med andra som uppmuntrar till hijrah och jiha¯d 
gör att kandidaterna undviker tvivel och argument som strider mot 
deras uppfattning.36 Utöver dessa två aspekter kan hämndmotivet och 
frustrations-aggressionshypotesen tilläggas; de har anförts som centrala 
motiv när det gäller att förstå den religiöst motiverade självmordsbom-
barens psykologi och kan även tas i beaktande i relation till rekrytering-
en av IS-anhängare, de uppenbara kontextuella skillnaderna till trots.
Hämndmotivet har länge framställts som ett av palestinska själv-
mordsbombares viktigaste motiv; viljan att hämnas är så stark att at-
tentatorn är redo att offra sig själv. Dessutom kan hämnden upplevas 
nödvändig och rationell för att återupprätta den egna stoltheten, vär-
digheten och självkänslan, som har kränkts av motståndaren. Hämnd-
begäret påverkas också av attentatorns erfarenhet av våld, övergrepp 
och orättvisor som drabbat honom själv eller den egna familjen.37 Det 
är vanligt att attentatorn nämner hämnd som motiv i sin avskedsvi-
deo och sitt testamente, som upprättas inför attentatet. Enligt Avishai 
Margalit är självmordsattackerna ett uttryck för hämnd på israelernas 
militära och politiska oförrätter. Det är dessutom viktigt att attentatorn 
vet att hämnden blir erkänd och accepterad i den egna gruppen.38 Även 
i Dabiq anförs hämnd som motiv, men vanligtvis mer indirekt än i de 
palestinska självmordsbombarnas videotestamente. Det rör sig snarare 
om att återupprätta en förlorad värdighet och undslippa en förtryck-
ande tillvaro, än att hämnas explicita oförätter. 
Frustrations-aggressions-hypotesen, som först utvecklades av John 
Dollard redan på 1930-talet men omformulerades av Leonard Berko-
witz under 1990-talet, är en förhållandevis populär psykologisk förkla-
ring av terrorism. Hypotesen beskriver, kort sagt, olika reaktioner på 
frustration: aggressiv, defensiv eller utebliven reaktion. Frustration är 
förvisso inte den enda orsaken till aggressivt beteende, menar Berko-
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witz, utan en av flera negativa upplevelser som kan leda till aggression. 
Frustrationen skapar negativa och obekväma känslor och det är dessa 
känslor, inte frustrationen i sig, som kan utlösa ett aggressivt beteende. 
Om exempelvis en människa hindras från att nå sina mål kan det leda 
till frustration, vilket kan utlösa ett aggressivt beteende.39
Frustrations-aggressions-hypotesen är emellertid problematisk när 
det gäller att förklara och förstå den enskilde IS-anhängaren och de 
kollektiva grupprocesser som skapar terrorism. Engagemanget i ter-
roristgrupper och genomförandet av ett attentat antas, utifrån frus-
trations-aggressions-hypotesen, ske genom en rad enskilda händelser. 
Terroristen reagerar då aggressivt på de negativa känslor frustrationen 
skapar. Även om man på en samhällelig nivå finner orättvisa i samhäl-
len där terroristattentat utförs kan man inte utgå från att det finns ett 
samband mellan attentaten och orättvisa. Det finns, kort sagt, orättvisa 
samhällen utan terroristattentat. Frustrations-aggressions-hypotesen är 
en förenkling, även om ett terroristattentat kan, åtminstone delvis, vara 
motiverat av de negativa känslor som frustrationen framkallar.40 
Anslutningen till Islamiska statens krigsföring i Syrien och Irak kan 
inte enbart förklaras utifrån personlighetspsykologiska perspektiv där 
individuella liv och erfarenheter analyseras. Även de sociala aspekterna 
kring IS-anhängaren bör belysas mer utförligt, liksom det sociala sam-
manhang anhängaren ingår i inför anslutningen till IS. 
Psykologiska aspekter av tillhörighet
I Dabiq, liksom i mycket av det material som sprids på nätet, hyllas IS-
soldater och framställs som förebilder. I webbaserade videoklipp riktar 
IS-krigare sig till människor runt om i världen och uppmanar dem att 
ansluta sig till Islamiska staten. Det finns en mängd propaganda där 
tillvaron i IS beskrivs i positiva ordalag. Det finns intressanta parallel-
ler med hur självmordsbombare, med Avishai Margalits ord, har fram-
ställts i Palestina: 
If it is easy to question whether being a shahid [sv. martyr, vittne] 
secures an immediate entrance to paradise, no one can doubt that 
being a shahid secures instant fame, spread by television stations 
/…/ which are watched throughout the Arab world. Once a suicide 
bomber has completed his mission he at once becomes a phantom 
celebrity. Visitors to the occupied territories have been struck by 
how well the names of the suicide bombers are known, even to 
small children.41
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Självmordsbombaren framstår här som en hjältefigur, någon att se upp 
till och identifiera sig med. Det är en sådan bild av självmordsbom-
baren som många palestinska ungdomar ser upp till och beundrar.42 
Självmordskandidatens vetskap om att attentatet kommer att betraktas 
som martyrskap – och martyren som hjälte – är en viktig psykologisk 
förutsättning för att attentatet ska genomföras. Om hjälterollen svärtas 
ner är det inte lika attraktivt att ta den. Hjälterollen måste därtill vara 
socialt accepterad, respekterad och hyllad, annars riskerar den att för-
lora sin attraktivitet. 
En terrorgrupp kan erbjuda medlemmarna en alternativ kultur, vars 
normer och värderingar skiljer sig från det övriga samhället. En sådan 
grupp strävar vanligtvis efter likformighet inom gruppen där medlem-
marna inte lämnas utrymme att ifrågasätta gruppens normer och vär-
deringar. En terrorgrupp kan dessutom ge en person som upplever sig 
alienerad från det övriga samhället en känsla av tillhörighet. En sådan 
person tenderar, mer eller mindre, att överge sitt individuella ansvar 
och identifiera sig med gruppen.43 Deltagandet i en terrorgrupp kan 
även uppmuntras av den egna gruppen, vilket också framgår av Isla-
miska statens uppmaning till hijrah och jiha¯d. Anslutningen till Isla-
miska staten kan i vissa sammanhang uppfattas som ett naturligt steg 
för en muslim i Sverige; att utan godtagbara skäl inte ansluta sig till 
rörelsen kan uppfattas som svek och förräderi av övriga gruppmed-
lemmar.44 Det är i den sociala grupp som presumtiva IS-krigare ingår 
i innan de ansluter sig till IS i Syrien och Irak som de får stifta bekant-
skap med rollen som IS-krigare, vilket medför särskilda förväntningar 
och krav. Under förberedelseprocessen bekräftar gruppen kandidatens 
roll och gruppens perspektiv stärks hos individen allteftersom interak-
tionen med medlemmarna fortskrider. I den kognitiva förberedelse som 
föregår anslutningen stärks också övertygelsen om att fienden är orga-
niserad i maskopi med andra, exempelvis med västmakter som USA.45 
Det är därmed en dualistisk världsbild som stärks, där gränsen mellan 
de goda och de onda blir allt skarpare. 
Islamiska staten, grupprocesser  
och identitet
För svenska muslimer utgör Islamiska staten en av många identifika-
tionsmöjligheter. Hur kommer det sig då att rollen som IS-anhängare 
är tilltalande för de svenska muslimer som vänder sig till Islamiska sta-
ten och dess krigsföring i Syrien och Irak?
I Peter Bergers och Thomas Luckmanns kunskapssociologi är kun-
skapsförmedling själva kittet i samhällets dialektik; det är den av 
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människan skapade objektifierade kunskapen som internaliseras i in-
teraktionen med signifikanta andra.46 Subjektiva verkligheter är bero-
ende av det som Berger och Luckmann benämner plausibilitetsstruktur: 
”den specifika sociala bas och de sociala processer som krävs för att 
den [subjektiva verkligheten] skall vidmakthållas”.47 Det är därtill den 
nära omgivningen som definierar de roller som står till buds för indivi-
dens identitetsformande. Ett närliggande teoretiskt perspektiv kommer 
till uttryck med det av Louis Althusser myntade begreppet interpella-
tion, som handlar om hur subjektet blir till. Utgångspunkten står att 
finna i en artikel från 1964 där Althusser skriver om subjektets till-
blivelse utifrån Sigmund Freuds och Jacques Lacans psykoanalytiska 
perspektiv:
Freud upptäcker i sin tur att det verkliga subjektet, individens 
 innersta väsen, inte har formen av ett ego, centrerat kring ”jaget”, 
[…] utan att subjektet är decentrerat och konstituerat av en struktur 
som i sig inte heller har något annat ”centrum” än ”jagets” imagi-
nära misskännanden, det vill säga annat än de ideologiska forma-
tioner som det ”känner igen sig” i.48
De ideologiska formationerna, som Althusser här omnämner, föregår 
alltså subjektet: subjektet träder alltid in i en redan formulerad ord-
ning.49 Subjektet är en effekt av ideologiska formationer, inte dess pri-
mus motor. Inträdandet i den imaginära ordningen, som Jacques Lacan 
för samman med vad han kallar spegelstadiet (le stade du miroir), ligger 
till grund för subjektets igenkännande. Subjektet känner därmed igen 
sig – blir till – i en ideologisk, kulturellt inbäddad bild, som är förank-
rad i en för subjektet relevant plausibilitetsstruktur.50
För att klargöra detta samband ytterligare ska jag vända mig till Ju-
dith Butler och hennes teoretiskt besläktade antagande om hur ”jaget” 
blir till. Butler har påvisat hur interpellationen inbegriper förväntning-
ar på subjektets beteende, språk, föreställningar och begär. Men Butler 
understryker också att subjektet omöjligt helt och fullt kan känna igen 
sig i interpellationen vilket, som hon uttrycker det, ”implies the insta-
bility and incompleteness of subject-formation”.51 Interpellationens 
oförmåga att fullständigt benämna subjektet framträder dessutom när 
Butler diskuterar sociala och politiska grupperingar: 
The identity that the name confers turns out to be empty, and this 
insight into its emptiness produces a critical position on the natu-
ralizing effects of this naming process. The emperor has no clothes, 
and we are somehow relieved of the prejudicial and phobic logics 
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that establish the ”Jews” or any ethnic minority as the ”cause” of 
any array of social anxieties.52 
Interpellationens implicita strävan efter enhet, via en nödvändig av-
gränsning och uteslutning, fallerar alltså då den appliceras på en 
partikulär social gruppering. Dessutom är detta benämnande, eller 
namngivande, också bedrägligt då det är tomt på liknande sätt som kej-
sarens (den sociala gruppen) nya kläder (benämningen) är ”tomma”. 
Men även om man kan få insikt om att det förhåller sig på detta sätt 
– att kejsaren är utan kläder – så reproduceras ständigt denna fördoms-
fulla och fobiska logik i sociala grupperingar och deras framställningar 
och berättelser om sig själva. Interpellationen gäller därför inte bara 
subjektets tillblivelse, utan också gruppers tillblivelse. Hur interpel-
leras, benämns och avgränsas då subjekten och grupperingarna i det 
mediematerial och den diskurs som florerar kring Islamiska staten? 
Den anti-muslimska och islamofobiska diskursen i Sverige fungerar 
som en spegel i vilken IS-anhängare känner igen sig. Den negativa bil-
den inverteras och kroppsliggörs inte utan stolthet, vilket bland annat 
Amers berättelse ger uttryck för. IS-anhängarna antar därmed roller 
som ”hjältar” genom att anamma en negativ stereotyp av muslimer som 
har florerat i västerlandet under de senaste decennierna. Detta kommer 
också till uttryck i intervjun med Amer ovan där han förkroppsligar 
den islamofobiska diskursens negativa stereotyp av ”muslimen” och på 
så vis bekräftar den. Som Nilüfer Göle påpekar:
Islamism as a collective social movement enables Muslim actors 
to adopt voluntarily the religious attributes that are considered 
potentially discrediting from the point of view of the normative 
framework of a modern [secularist] culture.53 
De negativa, stereotypa bilderna av islam som en patriarkal, maskulin, 
misogyn, våldsam och förmodern religion får näring av Amer och hans 
gelikar genom deras berättelser och handlingar.54 Andra, mer liberala, 
former av islam avfärdas, av såväl IS-anhängare som islamkritiker, för 
att de uppfattas vara tillrättalagda, västvänliga eller direkt felaktiga. 
Även om de medialiserade bilderna av Islamiska statens krigs-
föring kan uppfattas som extrema och avvikande, innebär det inte att 
det återspeglar en intrapsykisk störning och avvikelse. Handlingarna 
kan i själva verket ses som rationella och logiska i en specifik social 
grupp.55 För att förstå fenomenet IS och rekryteringen till rörelsen bör 
intrapsykiska aspekter ställas mot grupprelaterade processer, makro-
sociologiska aspekter som rör migration och globala processer, samt 
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situationsbetingade faktorer. För att en människa ska lämna Sverige 
och ansluta sig till Islamiska staten krävs en i Sverige lokalt förankrad 
plausibilitetsstruktur som inte bara gör handlingen rationell, logiskt 
och verklig utan också eftertraktad och nåbar. Om rollen som IS-an-
hängare svärtas ner och ses som opassande av gruppen förlorar den 
sin funktion som identifikationsobjekt, vilket kan leda till en minskad 
förekomst av IS-motiverad krigsföring, hijrah och jiha¯d. Att i det här 
sammanhanget tala om patologiskt störda individer saknar i princip 
förklaringsvärde. Det handlar snarare om att se hur handlingen görs ra-
tionell och normaliseras i den sociala grupp som IS-anhängarna tillhör 
vid tiden för rekryteringen. En sådan social bas finns såväl online som 
offline. Den digitala aspekten av IS-anhängarnas aktiviteter följer dem 
även på plats i Mellanöstern; videomaterial kan distribueras på nätet, 
texter och bilder publiceras i olika sammanhang. Den sociala basen 
måste därtill uppfattas som trovärdig och autentisk för anhängaren. 
Det är först med avsaknaden av en sådan plausibilitetsstruktur som den 
individuella handlingen kan patologiseras, där en avsaknad av realitets-
principen och sekundärprocesser istället blir framträdande. 
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Introduction
Since its inception in the late 19th century, the self-understanding of re-
ligious studies has been marked by attempts to construct a demarcation 
line between itself and Christian theology, its significant Other.1 Un-
derlying such attempts is the idea of a scientific study of religion seek-
ing knowledge about religious phenomena based upon empirical facts, 
abstaining from value judgements and metaphysical discussions regard-
ing religious beliefs and practices. Religious studies is, then, foremost 
an activity of theoretical reason, leaving to extra-academical contexts, 
such as politics, the application of scholarly knowledge. This ideal has, 
however, probably never been upheld in its purity; if it is even possible.2 
With the corrosive critique of postmodern approaches undermining 
a strict separation of fact and value, the principle of empirically based 
objective research and education within the humanities and the social 
sciences has been challenged by emancipatory agendas, for example, 
feminism, post-colonialism and GLBT rights.3 
To this, we need to add the increased salience and political influence 
of religion, which have made questions pertaining to religious identity 
and belief high priority for policy makers.4 Furthermore, the transfor-
mation of the university from an educational institution for civil serv-
ants to the central engine of the information society has made it crucial 
for all its parts, including the humanities, to provide proofs of social 
utility or risk being rationalised away.5 
This new situation of religious studies is foremost a feature of the 
Western world; the institutionalization of the discipline is not evenly 
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spread over the globe. This is clearly illustrated by the book Religious 
Studies: A Global View, despite its intention to provide insights also 
into religious studies outside of Western Europe and North America.6 
The idea of an academic study of religion distinct from theology – that 
is, a study that does not privilege any religion – travels around the globe 
on the waves of westernization and modernization. In his chapter on 
religious studies in North Africa and West Asia, Patrice Brodeur writes:
The historical development of this academic discipline, on both 
discursive and institutional levels, is completely intertwined with 
the development of various initially European modernities, later 
exported to most regions of the world. At the heart of these moder-
nities lay the powerful positivistic scientific discourse out of which 
emerged a ‘science of religions’ (Religionswissenschaft) or ‘sciences 
of religion.’7
However, at some places the adaptation of state secularity worked 
against the institutionalization of religious studies, as in the case of 
India, which has very few departments of religious studies, or of the 
comparative study of religion.8 The following discussion will thus be 
more relevant to the countries where the discipline is well established, 
but will also be of interest for those trying to expand religious studies 
into new territory. 
My main point is that the present situation makes it necessary to dis-
cuss the question of applied religious studies. For some scholars, such 
a coming together of theoretical and practical reasoning is a chance for 
religious studies to make a contribution to a better society. For others, 
such an extension of the academic study of religion into the world of 
policy decisions and practical application is a betrayal of the proper 
limits of scientific studies. 
One scholar of the first category is the German professor Udo Twor-
uschka, who is championing a Praktische Religionswissenschaft. In one 
of his characterisations of the proposed discipline, he writes:
Practical Science of Religion does not only perceive, describe and 
analyse actions. It also deals with “mediation processes” by differ-
ent media. Analyzing present, problematic realities the Practical 
Science of Religion wants to facilitate “better” realities in the future 
by reflected problem-solving action (normative component). The 
interests of this new discipline of the Science of Religion are among 
other things pacifying, restraining conflicts, humanizing.9
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Interestingly, Tworuschka explicitly connects applied religious studies 
(the practical science of religion) to a normative component, which 
empowers the discipline to distinguish between “good” and “bad” (or 
humanizing an dehumanizing) social realities. Such a move can begin to 
dissolve the difference between religious studies and theology; that is, 
if one of the criteria to distinguish religious studies as non-theological 
is its value neutrality. In 1993 in his article “Utility, understanding and 
creativity in the study of religions,” Chris Arthur argued for such a 
rapprochement between religious studies and theology.
It would, I think, be more appropriate to think of work in this area 
as having two aspects, ‘pure’ (a descriptive, analytical approach 
principally concerned with ideas) and ‘applied’ (concerned with 
using those ideas to build something new). … Likewise, the endless 
accumulation of descriptive data about religions would be of rather 
questionable value unless we planned to do something with it. In 
other words, the relationships between religious faiths and the 
disciplines which examine them are no longer as rigidly straight-
forward as was once imagined.10 
However, not all scholars are enthused by an applied dimension. In his 
article “The Politics of wishful thinking? Disentangling the role of the 
scholar-scientist from that of the public intellectual in the modern aca-
demic study of religion,” the Canadian scholar Donald Wiebe rejects 
the idea that religious studies has to show proof of social and cultural 
relevance. He also offers a forceful critique of Russell McCutcheon’s 
vision of a socially engaged discipline providing a radical critique of 
religions. To include social, political and religious activities at depart-
ments of religious studies would, according to Wiebe, “devalue the cog-
nitive objectives of the modern university and will undermine it as an 
institution dedicated to rational inquiry in search for public knowledge 
of public facts.”11
Closely connected to the question of the appropriateness of includ-
ing normative concerns in religious studies is the question of how such 
values are to be derived. That is, the scholar eager to develop applied 
religious studies has to face the question of the rationality of the goal 
of application. As Wiebe indicates, when the academic study of reli-
gion takes upon itself the task of social relevance, the danger is that 
it becomes an arena of conflicting extra-scientific interests fighting for 
hegemony – with other words, an ideological battlefield.
In the following, I will outline four versions of applied religious 
studies as a basis for a discussion of the movement toward practical 
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application. I have designed them as Weberian ideal types and not as 
detailed representations of actual positions of individual researchers. I 
acknowledge that many approaches fall outside of this simplified pic-
ture, but I believe that it still captures key positions. 
The first is the “modernist” approach, which insists, as Wiebe above, 
on the strict separation between facts and values. The second is the 
postmodern approach with its characteristic combination of emancipa-
tory discourses and constructionism. The third is the utilitarian one, 
which insists on the necessity of the economical usefulness of academic 
discourses. The fourth is based upon the close connection between is 
and ought in the notion of human rights and natural law. 
With this overview, I want to contribute to the rethinking of religious 
studies that takes its practical application seriously. Even those who want 
to resist this development need to handle the increasing focus on, for ex-
ample, Global Challenges, on the part of research funding agencies. 
For my own part, I see opportunities worth pursuing, but, at the 
same time, I recognize that there are decisive dangers with including 
an applied dimension in religious studies. My foremost concern is the 
rational foundation of the values that such a move infuses into the 
discipline.
Ideal type 1.  
Modernist applied religious studies
The modernist version of religious studies flows from basic features of 
modernity, or more correctly modernism, the ideological affirmation of 
the processes of modernisation.12 Its important principles are not exclu-
sive for religious studies, but are features of modern science in general, 
and the efforts to build a scientifically based society.
One of the central principles, which has profound consequences for 
religious studies, is the modern self-limitation of reason. The scope of 
rational thought is limited to the empirical world and logics; metaphys-
ics that try to stretch reason beyond this border is by the modernist 
considered as mere speculation without any rational foundation. With 
this follows the powerful development of the disenchantment (Entzau-
berung) of the human life world.13 
This self-limitation of reason makes on the one hand the object, re-
ligions, into irrational speculations, which provide explanations lying 
outside the empirical world, as gods and demons. On the other hand, it 
places religious studies firmly within an immanentist worldview – one 
studies religion as merely a human creation.
Connected to the judgement of the non-empirical as either unknowa-
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ble or non-existent is the problematic foundation for values and norms, 
as these cannot be simply be read of the empirical data. The ought-
dimension, with other words, the whole world of human praxis, has 
lost its foundation in supra-empirical spheres and entities, such as God, 
the gods, fate, the eternal law, or the supreme intellect. The founda-
tion of morality and human practice seems, then, dangerously close to 
be irrational − values based on human feelings and desires are simply 
superimposed upon a neutral material world. 
For religious studies, this means that it is merely theory driven em-
pirical studies of religious phenomena – the results of which are used 
within different instrumental lines of reasoning, such as politics, eco-
nomics or the military. However, there is no absolute rational founda-
tion for the objectives (power, money, victory); the final goal where the 
chain of instrumental reasoning stops is arbitrary and temporary. 
The ideal of a totally objective study of religion, neutral in ques-
tions of values, norms and feelings, has, however, through its particu-
lar European genesis, its own value framework, a kind of immanentist 
soteriology. The Enlightenment invested great trust in the free use of 
human reason – though it was ascetic through self-limitation, purged 
by critique and the rigorous use of philosophical and scientific meth-
ods. Reason was considered to have the ability to create a better human 
world and positive value was affixed to the enlightened mind, and to 
the formation of such a mind. For example, Kant, remarked in his short 
text “What is Enlightenment?”
Enlightenment is mankind’s exit from its self-incurred immaturity. 
Immaturity is the inability to make use of one’s own understanding 
without the guidance of another. Self-incurred is this inability if its 
cause lies not in the lack of understanding but rather in the lack 
of the resolution and the courage to use it without the guidance of 
another. 
[…] 
I have placed the main point of enlightenment – mankind’s exit from 
its self-imposed immaturity – primarily on religious matters since 
our rulers have no interest in playing the role of guardian to their 
subjects with regard to the arts and sciences and because this type of 
immaturity is the most harmful as well as the most dishonourable.14 
In this enlightenment perspective, traditional religion is a human dis-
course that ambiguously restricts the free use of human reason, while 
at the same time overstepping the limitations of proper reasoning: 
religion both restricts the freedom of reason and takes liberties with 
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it. According to Kant, the enlightened mind relies on freedom, but is 
simultaneously through rigorous critique obliged to use its freedom 
within a modern, more limited, sphere of intelligibility. With increasing 
enlightenment, religion as both overstepping the proper limits of reason 
and as restricting the freedom of reason fades away – what remains is 
perhaps merely a sentimental ground for ethics. 
This is old style modernism that influenced many of the founding fa-
thers of religious studies. However, with the new vitality and salience of 
religion in the late 20th century, the modernist argument has shifted to 
consider religion as natural. Not only is it wholly the product of mate-
rial circumstances, but it is also built into the very physics of the human 
person, typically the brain. The most conspicuous theoretical develop-
ment within this new line of thinking is the cognitive study of religion.15 
The idea that through the gradual lifting of self-imposed immaturity 
(i.e. modernisation), humankind would lose its religion (i.e. secularisa-
tion), is not credible in the light of simultaneous religious resurgence 
and increasing modernisation.16 If freedom in itself cannot guarantee the 
withering away of religion, then this must be achieved by the restriction 
of freedom in the name of freedom. The basic opposition within enlight-
enment between freedom and critique then comes to the surface. 
Applied modernist religious studies, thus, forms graduates that relent-
lessly reduces the supra-empirical claims of religions into their material 
matrix. Through critique, they expose the lack of rationality of religious 
dogma and ritual (their ideological nature) by meticulous historical 
analyses of religious traditions. In this way, religious studies supplies 
support to the maintenance of the secular state as founded on human 
will and reason, and not on religious worldviews. 
This ethos suffuses the famous theses on method by the historian of 
religions, Bruce Lincoln. For example in the third of his thirteen theses, 
he states:
History of religions is thus a discourse that resists and reverses the 
orientation of that discourse with which it concerns itself. To prac-
tice history of religions in a fashion consistent with the discipline’s 
claim of title is to insist on discussing the temporal, contextual, 
situated, interested, human, and material dimensions of those 
 discourses, practices, and institutions that characteristically repre-
sent themselves as eternal, transcendent, spiritual, and divine.17
In the twelfth thesis, he insists on the heretical imperative in the histori-
cal study of religion.
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Although critical inquiry has become commonplace in other disci-
plines, it still offends many students of religion, who denounce it as 
“reductionism”. This charge is meant to silence critique. The failure 
to treat religion “as religion” – that is, the refusal to ratify its claim 
of transcendent nature and sacrosanct status – may be regarded as 
heresy and sacrilege by those who construct themselves as religious, 
but it is the starting point for those who construct themselves as 
historians.18
The problem for the secular state is that it is hard to provide ultimate 
rationality for its legal and moral norms. The solution is a basic realist 
principle, in the sense that an enlightened (scientific) society requires that 
decisions on common actions rest on empirical facts; supra- empirical 
claims are data non grata. In the same way, the realist principle res-
tricts the goal to the empirical material world. The basic application 
of modernist religious studies is thus to keep religion out of the public 
arena, to show in what ways it is unreasonable, building as it does on an 
unfettered imagination, or evolutionary instincts blown out of propor-
tion. For example, in his book Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural 
Phenomenon, the philosopher Daniel Dennett argues for a naturalistic 
study of religion, which breaks the spell cast by religions. In the book, 
he refers to himself as a “bright,” a term analogously coined to “gay” 
signifying people with a non-supernaturalist worldview (naturalism). 
Dennett’s advocacy for a scientific study of religion has a decisive app-
lied dimension. In his approach, the understanding of religion as a natu-
ral phenomenon naturally leads to policy decisions. 
Although there are risks and discomforts involved, we should brace 
ourselves and set aside our traditional reluctance to investigate reli-
gious phenomena scientifically, so that we can come to understand 
how why religions inspire such devotion, and figure out how we 
should deal with them all in the twenty-first century.19
The book thus ends with discussions on how to restrict the ability of 
parents to raise their children religiously and how to counteract reli-
gion in education and in the public sphere. 
The most problematic feature of this kind of application is that 
through the ascetic modern reason the irrationality of religion is deci-
ded beforehand, a priori. There is, thus, in applied religious studies 
modernist style, with its insistence on the purity of reason, a troubling 
ideological secularist dimension, which is not open to discussion, as it 
is foundational: the freedom of the enlightened mind builds upon the 
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self-limitation of reason. If proponents of religious traditions who have 
not embraced modernism resist such an application of religious studies, 
this should not come as a surprise.
Ideal type 2:  
Postmodern emancipatory religious studies
As the child of self-confident modernism, born at the zenith of its 
technological success, postmodernism carries radical doubt (critique) 
one step further, and challenges reason itself, by portraying it as dri-
ven by lust for power and without an objective fundament. The proud 
creations of modern science are, then, as all cultural artifices, merely 
constructions, that is, human products, inescapably formed by the par-
ticular conditions of their creators. If modernism has at its heart the 
purity of the mind, postmodernism sees the particular ascetic nature of 
the modern mind as only one of many forms of impurity. According to 
this interpretation, postmodernism is radical modernism; it does not 
only expose religions as ideology, but considers religious studies itself 
as based on a particular form of ideology.
One central concern for this project is the critique of the notion “reli-
gion”; it is analysed as a western construction created in order to single 
out certain human actions and beliefs as religious, thus creating one of 
the preconditions of a secular state. This western taxonomy of religion 
and non-religion (sacred and secular), does not easily fit other cultures, 
thus doing violence to the material, which is arbitrarily cut up accord-
ing to an enlightenment worldview.20 
In his book The Ideology of Religious Studies, Timothy Fitzgerald 
argues such a position.
The construction of ‘religion’ and ‘religions’ is therefore part of a 
historical ideological process. In subsequent chapters I sketch the 
 development of this process in Europe and suggests that the inven-
tion of the modern concept of religion and religions is the correlate 
of the modern ideology of individualism and capitalism. … The 
industry known as religious studies is a kind of generating plant 
for a value-laden view of the world that claims to identify religions 
and faiths as an aspect of all societies and that, by so doing, makes 
possible to separate ‘non-religious’ conceptual space, a fundamental 
area of presumed factual objectivity.21
In this way, the universality of religious studies is undermined, as it can-
not even distinguish its own object of study, without actually creating 
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it. Accordingly, religious studies mainly has to be content with studying 
itself or to dissolve into disconnected microstudies. 
If one tendency of applied postmodern religious studies has been the 
demotion of its own discipline and the destabilising of the strong mod-
ernist self-confidence in the striving for a scientific society, then its nor-
mative concerns lie elsewhere. It has influenced religious studies mainly 
through a will to empower women and minorities: ethnic, religious and 
sexual.22 By gender studies and GLBT studies, scholars use the critique 
of reason as a way to denaturalise human nature: exposing hetero-nor-
mativity or patriarchal value systems. If the modernist application is 
closely connected to the secular state, then the postmodern is tied to the 
multicultural state. All forms of oppression, particularly those posing 
as based upon nature itself, are to be unmasked and unravelled. There 
is often an almost seamless connection between analysis and practical 
application. 
In her overview “Critical feminist studies in religion,” Elisabeth 
Schüssler Fiorenza maintains that both the deconstructive and creative 
potential of feminist analysis are integral to her approach. 
This critical analytics must be judged in terms of its heuristic power 
to investigate and deconstruct relations of domination as well as 
to articulate alternative religious visions for personal and societal 
change and transformation.23
She emphasizes that, besides explaining what is wrong, feminist studies 
of religion also have to be practical and “must identify the agents that 
seek to bring about change.” And, “Finally, a critical theory must be 
normative, i.e. it must clearly articulate practical goals, ethical norms, 
and theoretical visions for a different future free from domination.”24
The particular postmodern version of applied religious studies thus 
manifests itself primarily as strong normative discourses arguing in 
favour of gender equality and the empowerment and safeguarding of 
 sexual minorities within religions. Individual scholars do this both 
through their scholarly work and as public intellectuals trying to pro-
tect the minority in question from religious judgement and by exposing 
theological arguments that argue against this as merely founded on in-
terests of power or similar non-rational motives.
Still, if for modernist applied religious studies the main contradic-
tion was between insisting on intellectual freedom and simultaneously 
on the limitation of that freedom, then postmodern religious studies of 
the emancipist variety is undermined by its use of constructionism and 
different forms of relativism.25 If emancipation does not have any ulti-
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mately real or objective value foundation, but is only a bid for power 
for a group lacking a privileged position, is it then irrational? 
Ideal type 3:  
Utilitarian applied religious studies
When looking at the history of religious studies, which stretches a little 
more than hundred years back, we can see many examples of applica-
tions of the modernist and some of the postmodernist variety; the third 
ideal type, the utilitarian, is, however, not that conspicuous. This is 
bound to change, as higher education worldwide is undergoing a rapid 
transformation in this direction.26 If the 19th century University had as 
its main purpose to educate civil servants, including priests, with an 
increasing importance attached to research as the century drew to its 
close, then the late 20th century and the beginning of the 21st have wit-
nessed a major transformation in the direction of economic usefulness. 
Besides massification of the university, the increasing use of sophisti-
cated information technology and the impact of globalisation processes 
have put the university at the very heart of the knowledge society, and it 
thus has to deliver on these high expectations.27 
In their 2009 report “Trends in Global Higher Education: Track-
ing an Academic Revolution,” Philip Altbach, Liz Reisberg and Laura 
Rumbley highlight the danger that developing countries will not have 
the resources to respond to these challenges and consequently drift 
further and further behind. However, also in the Global North these 
adaptions do not come without some anguish. Under the heading “The 
struggle for the soul of higher education,” they write:
The traditional societal mission of higher education has been under 
pressure for the last half century. Universities, traditionally seen as 
key cultural institutions to be responsible for public enlightenment, 
are increasingly obliged to respond to the many new pressures de-
scribed in this report. The “commercialization” of higher education 
has placed considerable strain on its social mission.28
For example, in Sweden, the rationalisation of state funded universi-
ties is empowered by increasing use of quantitative measurements, such 
as the number of articles written, patents registered, completed higher 
education credits, or number of teachers who have formal pedagogical 
competence. The academic bureaucrats relentlessly pursue the opti-
misation of the modern university (you need to increase the measure of 
X, or …), and the old enlightenment values that focused on the libera-
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ting forces of free reason seem like old ghosts. It is material wellbeing 
as defined by the democratic, or despotic, organs of the state that is in 
focus (that is, the Challenges to address), and the performance is care-
fully measured and put into increasingly complex data systems. The 
problem is, of course, how to connect the teaching and research at the 
university directly to the desired social outcomes. 
In such a situation, it is difficult for religious studies to uphold the 
value of the search for knowledge for its own sake; the system put pres-
sure on the discipline to provide arguments of its usefulness. It has to 
show how the applications of the knowledge it produces relate to dif-
ferent forms of social wellbeing, for example, by focusing on religion 
and health or the threat of religious terrorism. The problem is that the 
values imposed upon science and scholarship are not ultimately ration-
ally founded, but based upon the present will ruling the political sys-
tem, either liberal democratic as in Sweden or totalitarian as in China. 
The function of utilitarian applied religious studies is to help the na-
tion address pressing social issues, as there seems to be little potential 
for religious studies to contribute to economic growth directly. Such 
applications respond both in a direct way to government funding and 
more spontaneously to the general pressure of social relevance. A pre-
sent issue in the Western world, obviously, concerns the question of 
terrorism and religious extremism, the latter that somewhat contradic-
torily is often claimed to have nothing to do with religion. 
For an example of how an arena for applied religious studies can be 
constituted, we can look at my alma mater, the University of Gothen-
burg, in Sweden. In 2015, Segerstedt Institutet was inaugurated at the 
university, as the result of a special assignment of the Swedish govern-
ment, saying, “The University of Gothenburg is to develop and dissemi-
nate knowledge and methods to reduce the recruitment of people to 
violent ideologies and movements and to racist organisations.”29
The Vice Chancellor, Pam Fredman, underscored the applied func-
tion of the institute in her address.
The Segerstedt Institutet will provide a meeting place for academia 
and practice. It is through interaction between various actors and 
between the scholarly world and practical experience that the new 
institute will make a difference.30
In his speech on the inauguration day, the prime minister emphasized 
even more the applied dimension. He said that the initiative to create 
the institute sprung from the conviction that we can make a difference, 
that it is possible to create resistance movements and that we had an 
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obligation to do so, “We are not spectators to what is happening today 
– we are active participants.”31
When the government in this way directly intervenes into the struc-
ture of the university to rouse it to address a particular social problem, 
the result can be controversial. For example, in connection with the 
inauguration, in an article in the national newspaper, Dagens Nyheter, 
eighteen scholars from Gothenburg wrote, 
A focus on fighting violence-affirming extremism means that the 
university is subordinated to a political discourse originating from 
the agendas of some parliament parties; something which is highly 
problematic if our universities are to live up to the principle of 
political independence and to encourage critical thinking.32
This conflict illustrates nicely the problem facing applied religious stu-
dies when taking its social relevance seriously – in this case, the fight 
against racism and terrorism. For how is a centre, or an individual 
 scholar, to evaluate the norms and values that flow into religious stu-
dies if there is no objective basis of those values? Is it merely a question 
of individual preferences or political shrewdness? No amount of know-
ledge about religions will decide this normative question, which is vital 
for religious studies if it is not only to become the servant of the present 
political majority. 
The basic problem with applied utilitarian religious studies that takes 
the political exhortation to be useful seriously is, thus, akin to that af-
flicting the two previous ones, namely, the modern radical separation 
of fact and value. The utilitarian approach has accepted the relativity 
of values and non-foundationalism of theoretical reason, while at the 
same time embracing pragmatism, settling for what seems to work and 
what people prefer, not putting any moralistic restrictions on these. 
Ideal type 4.  
Natural law and human  
rights based applied religious studies
When it comes to religious studies, in contrast to theology, I do not 
think there are strong developments yet of an applied dimension taking 
the close connection between ontology (human nature) and normati-
vity as its point of departure. This would actually require a break with 
a fundamental principle of modernism (and postmodernism) and risk 
the accusation of being anti-modern in one of its many guises. 
There are two candidates for this ideal type based respectively on 
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natural law theory and on universal human rights. However, in their 
book Religion and Human Rights, John Witte and Christian Green put 
forward the thesis that a list of human rights cannot stand on its own, 
that it is dependent upon belief systems for its operation. 
[T]he human rights regime is not static. It is fluid, elastic, and open 
to challenge and change. The human rights regime is not a funda-
mental belief system. It is a relative system of ideas and ideals that 
presupposes the existence of fundamental beliefs and values that 
will constantly shape and reshape it. […] it is the ius gentium of 
our times, the common law of nations […]33
To choose human rights as the basis of values for applied religious stu-
dies is thus to look for a consensus, without arguing that these values 
and norms are natural, in the sense of objective, that is, being valid 
irrespective of human views. 
In 2015, Udo Tworuschka reformulated his vision of a discipline of 
applied religious studies.34 To achieve a value platform for what he calls 
a humanizing critique of religious traditions and religious phenomena, 
he considers the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights a good 
platform. According to Tworuschka, the problem is, however, that it 
can be too abstract to support the interventions of applied religious 
studies. Therefore, he suggests that such a minimal consensus of ethi-
cal principles can be supplemented by overlapping norms of wisdom 
found in religious traditions. This complementary view of religion 
and human rights harmonises with the position of Witte and Green. 
Nevertheless, Tworuschka seems to favour basic liberal values such as 
tolerance, dialogue and the freedom of religion. The major problem 
that his position highlights is that if one bases the value foundation 
of applied religious studies on a minimal consensus of values (what 
almost every human community could agree on), then these will be 
too abstract to be of practical use. And, conversely, the “thicker” the 
value foundation is, the more partisan it will be, and consequently 
more controversial. 
On the other hand, a natural law position, or an understanding of 
human rights as based on human nature, provides applied religious 
studies with a normative framework independent of the political will, 
or the popular consensus. Such an approach to applied religious studies 
has a similar tendency toward emancipation as postmodernist studies, 
but does not see freedom as lying in the distance between the physical 
body and human self-determination. A natural law position put basic 
restraints upon modern autonomous individuals, arguing that they 
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share a basic human nature. The goal is understood more in the manner 
of human flourishing than as radical freedom. 
In his book Natural Law: An Introduction and Re-evaluation, How-
ard Kainz characterises natural-law theory as a group of theories that
emphasize the objectivity of morality, which is to say that there are 
at least a subset of moral norms that are not merely the products 
or creations of subjective viewpoints or to be judged by subjective 
intentions, but based in human nature, the nature of society, or 
evolving nature.35
Then, the crucial question is how a universal human nature is to be 
defined. Especially, as such a nature seems to run counter to the basic 
anthropology informing both the modern, postmodern and utilitarian 
ideal types. How can it escape the accusation of being merely a set of 
norms constructed by humans, moreover informed by a theological po-
sition, and then injected into a presumed objective human nature? 
On the other hand, in his article, “Theocentrism and Human Rights: 
A Critical Argument,” Andrew Fiala criticises the argument put for-
ward by, among others, Alasdair MacIntyre that, “secular or humanis-
tic foundations of rights-talk are unstable, relativistic, and incapable of 
generating universal consensus.”36 And thus in need of religious back-
up. His solution is to abandon speciesism and take the capabilities of 
sentient animals as the starting point, especially their sufferings. In this 
way, he shifts the focus from human rights to animal rights. He ends 
the article without elaborating his position further – it is a mere starting 
point, but it illustrates the problem of finding a stable foundation for 
human rights without a supernatural anchor or religious backdrop. 
It is thus doubtful whether strong versions of natural law and human 
rights approaches will be influential within religious studies at secular 
universities and colleges. The most probable scene for such approaches 
is private colleges based upon religious or alternative worldviews. A 
complication is that these often do not include religious studies, as this 
discipline is characteristically connected to the project of enlightenment 
modernity. Instead, the likely result is forms of applied (practical) theol-
ogy addressing contemporary problems. 
Final thoughts
I have raised the issue of applied religious studies primarily because of 
the mounting pressure facing universities in the western world to prove 
their usefulness. The interested parties often measure the desired utility 
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in economic terms; for example, in 2014, the Danish government decid-
ed to cut down on university programs with poor job prospects, saying 
that no student should end up “unusable.”37 In the same manner, there 
is an intensifying discussion in the United States regarding the cost and 
actual benefits of liberal arts education.38 The ideal of knowledge for its 
own sake seems increasingly fragile.
My main question was whether religious studies, then, should in-
clude an applied dimension, or even give birth to a new discipline, as 
suggested by Tworuschka. If the answer is yes, then the ensuing ques-
tion is – how is it to be done?
In order to begin exploring the alternatives, I formulated four ideal 
types to capture the most influential positions. The first was the mod-
ernist, which by making a strong difference between fact and value, 
insists on the autonomy of the discipline of religious studies. Neverthe-
less, through its foundational naturalism, it has an elective affinity with 
the secular state that reduces religion to the private sphere. The post-
modern type of applied religious studies mostly finds its expression in 
emancipatory studies and interventions, while the utilitarian type em-
braces the needs of the multicultural state, offering its services for fur-
thering interreligious understanding, integration and tolerance. At the 
same time, it does not hesitate to join the fight against religious extrem-
ism and terrorism. The final type of applied religious studies takes as its 
point of departure inalienable rights connected to the human person. 
During the writing of this article, I became increasingly concerned 
about the foundation of the values supposed to guide the application 
of religious studies; that is, who is to formulate the goals of applica-
tion, and how are they to choose the guiding values? The first question 
concerns the autonomy of religious studies, and the second the value 
rationality of the interventions into the social world of religions. If we, 
as in the modernist type, make the distance between is and ought un-
bridgeable, or as in the postmodern type insists on the constructed and 
relative nature of all values, then, at least to me, the danger of exacer-
bating the culture wars of our age seems unavoidable. However, as in 
the utilitarian type to merely put oneself at the service of the present 
political will seems dangerous, for who knows what party will be in 
power next, and what agenda it will pursue. In that light, the regime 
of human rights seems a reasonable foundation for applied religious 
studies. Nevertheless, in their most basic formulations, they are quite 
abstract, and when people apply them to a particular society or situa-
tion, this requires extensive interpretation. Then the question of their 
foundation becomes acute; are they connected to a human nature and 
thus inalienable, or are they the results of political decisions, which can 
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be changed? Can rights be added, modified or taken away? Also in this 
case, when the proponents of applied religious studies get into the busi-
ness of application, they will run the risk of uncritically taking the side 
of one part in a conflict that is both cultural and religious. In a democ-
racy, as the utilitarian, they probably will take the part of the ruling 
majority; and, in other cases, the ruling elite or party. 
As at present, I do not see a clear way out of these conundrums, I 
cannot propose a simple solution for scholars in religious studies, who 
want to develop an applied dimension, for example, at Swedish pub-
lic universities. My exhortation is, simply, that we as scholars should 
not venture into such a development without first seriously discussing 
the values and goals governing this extension of our discipline into the 
world of practical affairs. My hope is that this article will contribute to 
such a critical discussion. 
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Introduction
One of the most prominent and enduring Eastern influences on Western 
spirituality from the late 19th century onwards, is the Hindu philoso-
phy of non-duality, Advaita Vedanta. While the founding of this school 
is usually, and incorrectly, attributed to the mediaeval philosopher a¯di 
S´an˙kara (788–c. 820), it is in particular its modern versions that have 
attracted Westerners.1 Usually referred to as neo-advaita by scholars, 
this collective term covers a wide range of different interpretations of 
classical advaita teachings, framed within the broader context of colo-
nialism and modernity. 19th century and early 20th century proponents 
of neo-advaita were influenced by Orientalism and the Eurocentric 
dismissal of Hinduism as a degenerate form of religion based on super-
stition and idolatry.2 While distancing themselves from more popular 
forms of Hinduism, such as the worship of deities through statues and 
strict adherence to Brahmanic rituals, early Hindu neo-advaita reform-
ers such as Ram Mohan Roy (1772–1833) and Swami Vivekananda 
(1863–1902) not only embraced advaita, but even argued that non-
duality is the very essence of Hinduism, the core around which the 
most significant teachings and practices circle. The modern Hindu self-
understanding saw Hinduism as a rational philosophy (i.e., advaita) 
based on reason rather than faith, but it was also heavily influenced by 
modern Western discourses on democracy and nationalism. 
The earliest, and arguably most important, movement that advocat-
ed neo-advaita, the Brahmo Samaj founded by Ram Mohan Roy, broke 
with the Brahmanical tradition in maintaining that moks
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is available to all men and women, irrespective of their caste or social 
position. The democratisation of Hinduism was taken even further by 
Vivekananda at the World Parliament of Religions, held in Chicago 
1893, where he presented advaita as a universal path to liberation that 
went beyond the traditional borders of religion. Vivekananda’s message 
was highly successful in the West, especially among Theosophists and 
other esoteric groups who found Vivekananda’s universalism congenial 
to their own notions of universal brotherhood and the existence of an 
ancient, perennial religion underlying all current religious traditions.3 
While being conscious of the fact that advaita is not a single, co-
herent tradition, the short and concise definition offered by Phillip C. 
 Lucas serves the purpose of this paper quite well. Lucas writes: “Ad-
vaita Vedanta philosophy asserts that Absolute Reality (Brahman) is 
formless, non-dual awareness, and that the supreme goal of human life 
is the realization that the inner self (atman) is not separate from Ab-
solute Reality – ‘Atman is Brahman’.”4 The notion that the individual 
is separate from the divine or absolute is thus an illusion (maya) and 
it is only through an experience of the unity of existence that the illu-
sion can be overcome. As will be discussed presently, the focus on expe-
rience is central for the understanding of the appeal of neo-advaita on 
Westerners. 
Although much has been written on the reception of neo-advaita in 
the West, surprisingly little has been published about the relationship 
between advaita and British occultism, especially the influence of ad-
vaita on occultists such as Aleister Crowley (1875–1947) and Kenneth 
Grant (1924–2011). One notable exception is Gordan Djurdjevic’s re-
cent monograph, India and the Occult (2014), in which a few pages are 
devoted to advaita in Grant’s work.5 Djurdjevic approaches the subject 
from a comparative approach in which esotericism is seen as a univer-
sal category, and interesting and thought-provoking as this approach 
may be, I will limit my theoretical discussion to the study of Western 
esotericism, in its restricted sense, i.e., as a non universal analytical cat-
egory, used specifically for understanding Western currents and notions. 
In this paper I will thus focus on Kenneth Grant, and especially on 
the influence of Ramana Maharshi (1879–1950) on Grant’s work. Af-
ter a discussion of the central themes of neo-advaita in the writings 
of Grant, I will explore some possible etic or analytic readings of the 
appeal of neo-advaita on occultism from the broader perspective of the 
study of Western esotericism, with special focus on the experience of 
absolute knowledge and “universalism” as a strategy of legitimacy.6 
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Kenneth Grant and ‘Oriental Mysticism’
Kenneth Grant, born 1924, is in the field of occultism best known for 
his Typhonian Trilogies and his close association with Aleister Crowley 
and the British artist and occultist Austin Osman Spare (1886–1956). 
Grant worked as Crowley’s secretary for a short period in the 1940s 
and came to adopt Crowley’s magical and religious system Thelema, 
a system which he continued to study and expound throughout his 
life.7 After Crowley’s death in 1947, Grant belonged to a small  circle of 
thelemites, which in England circled around Crowley’s former  disciple 
Gerald J. Yorke (1901–1983), who sought to preserve Crowley’s pub-
lished and unpublished writings. In the early 1950s Grant and his 
wife Steffi (b. 1923) worked with Yorke in typing copies of Crowley’s 
 diaries, letters and manuscripts before the originals were being sent 
off to Crowley’s successor as head of his magical orders, Karl J. Ger-
mer (1885–1962). The 1950s proved to be a highly formative period 
in Grant’s own magical philosophy and the Typhonian Trilogies, pub-
lished between 1972 and 2002, are to a large extent based upon the 
teachings he encountered and the experiences he had during this peri-
od. Apart from Crowley’s Thelema it was in particular the artist  Austin 
Osman Spare’s peculiar form of magic – Grant collaborated closely 
with Spare from 1949 to the artist’s death in 19568 – and Hindu tantra 
as taught by his fellow Ordo Templi Orientis (an initiatory order that 
Crowley was the head of) initiate David Curwen (1893–1984), that 
formed the basis for his magical system, as I have discussed elsewhere.9 
It is not known when Grant first came in contact with advaita, al-
though it seems that he did so perhaps as early as his late teens or early 
twenties, probably through his early interest in Theosophy. In his mem-
oire of his time as Crowley’s secretary, Remembering Aleister Crowley 
(1989), Grant emphasises the importance of Oriental Mysticism:
My main interest was (and still is) in Oriential Mysticism. When I 
volunteered for the army, at the age of eighteen, it was with the ex-
pectation of being sent to India where I had hopes of finding a guru. 
But the gods decided otherwise. Within eighteen months of joining, 
my health broke down and I was discharged.10
Grant did not have to travel all the way to India to find a guru, but 
found one in Crowley who was living at the Bell Inn, Aston Clinton, 
Buckinghamshire, when Grant first wrote to him in November 1944. It 
is significant, I think, that Grant states that his main interest was Orien-
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tal Mysticism, since – as we will see – advaita lies at the core of Grant’s 
magical philosophy. 
Grant’s interest in advaita becomes evident from 1953 onwards. It 
appears that Grant went through some sort of spiritual crisis in the 
spring of that year and that he turned away from Thelema and instead 
embraced “Oriental Mysticism”. The only testimony we have to this 
shift is an unpublished letter to a German fellow thelemite, Friedrich 
Lekve (1904–1956), dated March 27, 1953, in which he wrote:
I have […] been undergoing certain interior changes which make it 
impossible for me to continue as a follower of A[leister] C[rowley] 
or his doctrine. […] I do not quite know how to explain or describe 
the circumstances which have led up to my abandonment of 
Thelema as a system of thought and as a system of magick. As you 
no doubt will have gathered from various remarks I made when 
you were here, as also from certain books I had much respect for, I 
am really ‘tuned’ more to the Oriental (especially Indian) systems of 
Mysticism than to Western Schools of Magick. For a long time now 
I have felt the utter futility of trying to bolster the ego by acquiring 
useless siddhis [magical powers] and suchlike occult powers. Also, 
I feel I know too little to venture to help others on a path that is by 
its very nature absolutely interior and personal to each and every 
individual. The practical formulae of magick no longer interest me 
and I can no longer undertake to impart what I know in this direc-
tion to other people. I wish to be rid forever of any connections I 
may have had in the past with A.C.’s doctrine or practice.  
 I have learnt certain lessons in the past few months which have 
determined me in my rejection of his system and theories (particu-
larly his theories), and I will not bore you with details here. Suffice 
it to say that I have had enough.11 
While it is evident that Grant quickly overcame his rejection of Thele-
ma as shown by the fact that he launched the New Isis Lodge of Ordo 
Templi Orientis in 1955, the rejection, temporary as it may have been, 
is significant as it shows the importance placed on Oriental Mysticism 
by Grant. But what did he actually mean by Oriental Mysticism? The 
answer is: advaita.
Sri Ramana Maharshi’s Advaita in Grant’s Work 
Two months later, in the May 1953 issue of The Call Divine – a journal 
published in Bombay devoted to the teachings of Sri Ramana Maharshi 
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– an article by Grant appeared. Entitled “Arunachala Siva, the Void Na-
ture of the Self”, the article deals with Maharshi’s method of introspec-
tion, which simply put, consisted in reducing meditation practices to 
one single question: Who am I?12 This was the first in a string of articles 
published in The Call Divine throughout the 1950s in which Grant 
comes across as a devotee or follower of Maharshi and his pragmatic 
approach to advaita.13 Significantly, with two exceptions, these articles 
are written from a strict advaita perspective using the same language, 
themes and examples as other articles published in the journal. In con-
trast to many other articles, however, Grant makes no references to his 
own experiences or practices, but limits his discussions to the works of 
Maharshi. This stands in sharp contrast to, for example, his wife Steffi 
Grant’s article “A Dream”, published in the April 1954 issue of The 
Call Divine, in which she focuses on her own experiences in relation to 
advaita teachings. 
The two articles “One and the Same: A Note on the Tree of Life” 
and “Resignation”, stands apart from Grant’s other articles on advaita 
in that they openly discusses Western esoteric themes in the light of 
Hindu advaita. The first article, published in July 1954, compares the 
kabbalistic Tree of Life with Maharshi’s teachings on non-duality and 
argues that the two systems expresses the same Truth. Or to use Grant’s 
own words:
The above is a tentative interpretation of the major Key of the 
Western Tradition in the light of the initiated Eastern Wisdom, and 
to the writer’s mind no greater help of soldering the love of East for 
West, and vice versa, may be given the demonstration that differ-
ences appear only upon the surface of the two traditions and not of 
the Heart, where all is one and the Same.14
The notion that the Western and Eastern traditions essentially are one 
and the same is something which Grant would return to and expound 
upon endlessly in his Typhonian trilogies – a theme which I will return 
to shortly. The second article, “Resignation”, was published in Septem-
ber 1955, around the same time that the New Isis Lodge was launched. 
It is evident that Grant by now had overcome his temporary rejec-
tion of Crowley’s doctrines, and in the article Grant tries to reconcile 
Crowley’s famous dictum “Do what thou wilt shall be the whole of the 
Law” with the Eastern approach of “Letting things take their course”, 
again by arguing that the ultimate end of the two traditions is one and 
the same. 
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And so, the Eastern method (of Advaita) contemplates the ever 
tranquil and Immutable Shiva by the resignation implied by the 
words “let things take their course”, while the highest initiates of 
the West – now as ever – contemplate the ever-restless stirrings 
of Shakti by the same resignation which is equally implied in the 
precept “Do what thou wilt shall be the whole of the Law”; for 
by ‘ doing the true will’, i.e. letting all parts of the picture fulfil 
themselves evenly without let or hindrance, we come to see the illu-
soriness of the picture and its mirage-like beauty cast in the shining 
waters of the Unmoving Shiva.15 
Although Grant more or less stopped publishing articles on advaita 
in Indian journals in 1960 (he only published a few more in the mid-
1980s and the early 1990s), he continued to take an active interest in 
advaita, particularly in the works of Maharshi, Thakur Haranath, Sri-
mata Anandamayi Ma, and Sri Ramakrishna. Grant not only corre-
sponded with leading advocates of advaita, including Arthur Osborne 
(1906–1970), the British-borne editor of The Mountain Path (a journal 
founded 1966 devoted to the teaching of Maharshi published in South 
India), but even acted as Haranath’s British representative for a while 
and helped to bring out the three-volume work Lord Haranath: A Bi-
ography (1970–73) by Akella Ramakrishna Sastri.16 In 1970–71 Grant 
wrote the entries on Anandamayi Ma, Haranath, Ramana Maharshi, 
Sai Baba, and Sivananda for Richard Cavendish highly influential en-
cyclopaedic series Man, Myth and Magic, alongside entries on occultist 
subjects such as Dion Fortune and Austin Osman Spare. 
Advaita in the Typhonian Trilogies  
1972–2002
These specialised early articles and encyclopaedia entries apart, Grant’s 
magical philosophy is expressed particularly in his Typhonian Trilogies, 
nine volumes published between 1972 and 2002. Throughout these 
volumes Grants refers repeatedly to advaita teachings and the Indian 
mystics that he studied already in the 1950s. What is striking is the 
way that he uses advaita to explain and legitimate Western occultist 
practices and teachings, and I would even argue that non-duality as 
expressed by advaita forms the cornerstone upon which Grant bases 
his own particular current of contemporary occultism, usually referred 
to as the ‘Typhonian Tradition’. This is not the place to discuss the com-
plex nature of this current, but briefly stated the Typhonian Tradition 
can be seen as a bricolage of Neo-Vedanta, Hindu Tantra, Western Sex-
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ual Magic, Surrealism, ufology and Lovecraftian gnosis set in the wider 
context of Thelema; it is a practical epistemological system aimed at 
spiritual enlightenment and the transcending of the illusion of duality.17 
Already in the first volume of the Trilogies, The Magical Revival 
(1972), Grant praises advaita-marg or the path of non-duality as the 
“most profoundly spiritual Path now open to humanity”,18 and in a 
later book, Outer Gateways (1992), he goes even further and states 
that the teachings of advaita is the only way to avoid the destructive 
forces of the kali yuga, or modern age.19 While Grant sometimes has 
been criticised for idiosyncratic interpretations of the teachings and 
doctrines he uses as building-blocks for his Typhonian Tradition, it is 
evident that his understanding of advaita remains true to the way that 
non-duality is expressed by thinkers like Maharshi and Haranath, as 
seen by the definition he offers in The Magical Revival. 
Lit. Not-two. The Vedantin doctrine of Non-duality, which reveals 
the supreme nature of the Self to be One, not two or many; i.e. 
nothing exists apart from the Self (Atman), yet all things are forms 
assumed by the Self.20
As mentioned, Grant frequently refers to advaita teachings when ex-
plaining Western occultists concepts; for instance, in The Magical Reviv-
al and Cults of the Shadow (1975) he refers to advaita when discussing 
Austin Osman Spare’s magical system, especially the so-called Death 
Posture,21 and when discussing Crowley’s ontological formula of 0=2 
he refers explicitly to Not-Two or advaitan non-duality in both Aleis-
ter Crowley & The Hidden God (1973) and Outer Gateways.22 Other 
examples of referring to advaita can be more personal in the sense that 
he is referring to the biography of one advaitan philosopher or another. 
For instance, in Nightside of Eden (1977) he sees a parallel between 
Haranath’s supposed encounter with a higher being and the Golden 
Dawn chief MacGregor Mathers’ (1854–1918) account of his meeting 
with the so-called Secret Chiefs in Bois de Boulogne outside Paris.23 
One of the most conspicuous aspects of Grant’s trilogies is the use of 
fiction, particularly the fictional works of H.P. Lovecraft (1890–1937), 
and Grant repeatedly argued that Lovecraft had through his dreams 
unconsciously tapped into the same magical current that Crowley was 
consciously in contact with. The fictional works of Lovecraft – parti-
cularly those connected to the Chtulhu mythos (or Necronomicon 
Gnosis as Grant calls it), did not only correspond to Crowley’s Law 
of Thelema and The Book of the Law, but more importantly explain 
and give deeper understanding of them. However, a close reading of 
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Grant’s Typhonian trilogies shows, at least to my mind, that Grant’s use 
of Lovecraft’s fictional work – but also that of other authors such as 
Arthur Machen (1863–1947) and Sax Rohmer (Arthur Henry Sarsfield 
Ward, 1883–1959) – was not restricted to a comparative enterprise, but 
seems to have had a more practical function in the sense of challeng-
ing the way that the reader sees fiction and reality. In this Grant was 
influenced by Surrealists such as Salvador Dalí (1904–1989) and their 
method of challenging the notion of the real, and in particular referred 
to Arthur Rimbaud’s (1854–1891) formula of total derangement of the 
senses, which to Grant meant an active overstimulation of the senses 
which would lead the mind to transcend reality as we know it. It is here 
that we find advaita at the very centre of Grant’s work: the notion that 
reality is composed of an objective and a subjective world, or an inner 
and outer world, is an illusion that one has to be freed from. By mixing 
fiction with historical fact the border between these worlds is increas-
ingly being questioned, and ultimately it can be transcended.
A great deal more can be said about Kenneth Grant and advaita, but 
for our present purpose I hope that I have at least demonstrated the 
importance of advaita to Grant, which in itself is interesting given the 
fact that Grant is one of the most, if not the most, influential British 
occultist after Crowley. However, I would like to conclude this paper by 
briefly exploring the relevance of this case study for the wider study of 
Western esotericism. 
Advaita, Occultism,  
and the Study of Western Esotericism
As mentioned at the outset of this paper, much has been written about 
the influence of neo-advaita on Western spirituality. Kenneth Grant is by 
no means unique in terms of his interest in advaita, not even if we limit 
the discussion to the influence of Ramana Maharshi, arguably Grant’s 
main source on advaita. Ever since Paul Brunton’s popular work A 
Search in Secret India (1934) – which Grant, incidentally, had a copy of 
– Maharshi has been read and studied by such diverse thinkers as Carl 
Gustav Jung (1875–1961), Joseph Campbell (1904–1987), Thomas 
Merton (1915–1968), W. Somerset Maugham (1874–1965), and his 
teachings continue to be promoted by spiritual teachers such as Eckhart 
Tolle (b. 1948), Gangaji (born Merle Antoinette Roberson, 1942–), and 
Arunachala Ramana (born Dee Wayne Trammell, 1929–2010). 
In his study of Ramana Maharshi and neo-advaita in North Ameri-
ca Phillip Charles Lucas analyses what he calls the “Ramana effect” 
whereby he “attempts to understand how the Maharshi, in spite 
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of his disinterest in founding a mass spiritual movement, appears to 
have inspired a host of spiritual teachers and organizations dedicated 
to spreading their own interpretation and expression of his Advaitic 
teaching and practice in North America”.24 Lucas frames his analysis 
within theories on religion and globalization, especially Thomas Csor-
das’ theory of the importance of portable practice and transposable 
message for rituals and beliefs to move successfully into a new cultural 
setting. Lucas argues that the simplicity and transcultural nature of 
Maharshi’s method of self-enquiry (introversion of the mind grounded 
in the question, “Who am I?”), and the universality and transformabili-
ty of the Maharshi’s message can be understood from the perspective of 
Csorda’s two factors, and thereby explain the success of the Maharshi’s 
message in North America. The experiential aspect of Maharshi’s self-
enquiry and the universal nature of his message are also emphasised 
by Thomas A. Forsthoefel, but from a theoretically more problematic 
perspective, namely that of perennialism.25 When analysing the use of 
advaita in the writings of Grant, it becomes apparent that the experien-
tial dimension of Maharshi’s method of self-enquiry and the universal 
nature of his message – which both Lucas and Forsthoefel emphasis 
albeit from different perspectives – are central discourses which Grant 
returns to throughout his published works. 
If we look at the first discourse, the experience of transcending the 
illusion of duality, from the perspective of the study of Western eso-
tericism, it ties in nicely with recent research on esotericism by scholars 
such as Wouter Hanegraaff and Kocku von Stuckrad, who both empha-
sise the construct of identity and claims to absolute knowledge (gnosis), 
or to put it simply: esotericism is characterised by an emphasis on gno-
sis, rather than on rationality or the reliance on religious authority, and 
this gnosis should be understood as a revelatory experience that leads 
to an encounter with one’s true self as well as with the divine aspect 
of existence. The quest for perfect or absolute knowledge in esoteri-
cism is often related to discourses of secrecy in the sense that the salv-
ific knowledge strived for by esotericists is an experiential knowledge 
which is impossible to communicate. It is an experience which each 
esotericist has to experience on his or her own. To Grant, Thelema and 
advaita have the same goal, the experience of transcendence: discover-
ing and doing one’s true will is seen by Grant as analogous to the Ma-
harshi’s “Who am I?”-method of introspection, and the ultimate goal is 
the “crossing of the abyss” or the total annihilation of the ego. Grant 
not only used surrealist techniques such as fiction and art to transcend 
the illusion of duality, but, more importantly he devised a peculiar sys-
tem of dream-control whereby the initiate is believed to reach a state 
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between dreaming and dreamless sleep, called the Mauve Zone which 
ultimately would lead to a unity with the All. Grant commented on this 
in Outer Gateways in an, for him, unusually clear and detailed way: 
The universe, as the word itself declares, is a single world. The dual-
ity of subject/object does not obtain in that state: ‘it is as it is’. […] 
In the forefront of consciousness should be held firmly the aware-
ness that all that is seen, or experienced, is a manifestation of the 
Self, not ‘my’-self or ‘your’-self, or any other specific self. The term 
Self signifies only objective Consciousness; it is therefore without 
Subject, or it may be considered as pure subjectivity. There will be 
experienced a gradual, in some cases a sudden, change of viewpoint, 
a sign that the centre of awareness is shifting from the phenomenal 
to the noumenal, from the world of appearance to its underlying 
reality. The Great Work consists in the stabilising of this state of 
awareness. All sense of difference will vanish, until the ultimate dif-
ference is finally abolished.26 
To my mind, the experiential shift alluded to by Grant lies at the core 
of all his works, which for analytical purposes can be interpreted as an 
example of absolute knowledge or gnosis as understood in the field of 
Western esotericism.
The second discourse, the universal nature of advaita, can be un-
derstood from the broader perspective of Western esotericism as a 
legitimating strategy. In his very useful study of strategies of legitimat-
ing esoteric positions in modernity, Olav Hammer argues that these 
strategies fall into three main categories: appeal to constructed tradi-
tion, appeal to science and appeal to experience.27 Although Hammer 
briefly discusses emic speculations about the all-encompassing nature 
of different cultures (when discussing the first category – appeal to 
constructed tradition), he does not discuss universalism us such. Given 
the importance attributed to universalism in many esoteric traditions, 
I would like to propose that the appeal to universalism should be seen 
as a fourth category. In the case of Grant, it is obvious that he uses 
the advaitan claim to universalism as a legitimating strategy: the ulti-
mate goal of all “spiritual culture” is the doctrine of non-duality; the 
very “fact” that all “genuine spiritual cultures” share the same goal, 
“proves” it validity and legitimacy. This notion is expressed repeatedly 
by Grant; for instance, in Aleister Crowley & The Hidden God:
The natural spirit of the East, in its deeper rootage, is in complete 
accord with the doctrine of Thelema. That this is so may be proved 
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by comparing the basic tenets of Thelema with the Chinese Way of 
the Tao, the Vedantic doctrine of Advaita, and the pivotal philoso-
phy of Hindu and Buddhist Tantricism.28
The appeal to universalism is by no means unique to Grant – it can ea-
sily be found in the writings of such diverse esoteric authors as Helena 
Petrovna Blavatsky (1831–1891), Aleister Crowley and Julius Evola 
(1898–1974), to mention just a few, and it would thus be pertinent to 
explore the appeal to universalism as a legitimating strategy on other 
modern esoteric currents. 
In sum, then, Grant can be seen as an illustrative example of the in-
fluence of neo-advaita upon occultism, and that two central discourses 
of neo-advita in the West – the experiential dimension and the universal 
nature of the message – can be fruitfully analysed from the perspective 
of the study of Western esotericism. 
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”Vart rider du, herre?” – ”Det vet jag inte”, sade jag, ”bara bort 
härifrån, långt bort härifrån. Ständigt bort härifrån – bara så kan 
jag nå mitt mål.” – ”Du känner alltså ditt mål?” frågade han. ”Ja”, 
svarade jag, ”jag sade det ju. Bort härifrån – det är mitt mål” 
 Franz Kafka, Uppbrottet
Den här texten handlar om pilgrimen, turisten och resenären, samt om 
landet Indien och om världens mest säljande guideböcker. Jag försöker 
här att resonera kring det faktum att många olika resenärer som är ute 
”on the road” i dagens globaliserade värld mer och mer vill heliggöra 
sitt eget resande och undvika att själva kalla sig turister. De talar i ter-
mer av vagabonder, pilgrimer, resenärer. Detta gäller alla nationaliteter 
och det gäller också dem som designar guideböcker. Min tanke är att 
det egentligen inte är så stor skillnad på turisten och pilgrimen, utan 
att det var den unge medelklassturisten – backpackaren, ryggsäcks-
turisten – som på 1970-talet i sitt eget resande drog upp en skiljelinje 
som inte fanns. Man var tvungen att särskilja den äldre turisten från 
den yngre, den mer stabile resenären med god ekonomi från den flack-
ande luffaren. 
Men den enda skillnad som egentligen finns är intentionen, graden av 
nyfikenhet och öppenhet inför det man ser. 
Daniel Andersson
PILGRIMEN
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Lonely Planet
Ett exempel på hur guideböcker drar gränser mellan turister och ”rikti-
ga” resenärer – att själva språkbruket har förvandlats – kan hämtas 
från Lonely Planet, världens största reseguideboks-företag. 
Lonely Planet grundades 1973, i kölvattnet av hippierörelsen, beat-
nikrörelsen och ett flera decennier långt intresse för asiatiska religiösa 
och filosofiska tankeströmningar. Syftet med bokserien var att under-
lätta resandet för backpackers, dvs västerländska, urbana, sekulära, 
ofta belästa ungdomar som sökte sig bortom de redan då upptrampade 
stigarna som vandrats av charterturismens något äldre garde. Syftet var 
också att finna nya områden att upptäcka, områden som inte mutats in 
av charterturismen. 
”Båtar lägga till vid nybyggd kaj, dumma männskor kalla oss malaj, 
be malaj dansa äkta dans, malaj dansa dans som aldrig fanns”, sjunger 
Povel Ramel redan på 1950-talet i sin satir över söderhavsöturismen, 
just den turism som en backpacker inte ville bli associerad med.
Lonely Planets böcker säljer i miljontals exemplar varje år och det 
idealistiska och alternativa syftet är inte lika tydligt längre. Lonely 
Planets första boktitlar hade som undertitel On A Shoestring, det vill 
säga att man skulle leva så billigt och så ”native” som möjligt och göra 
så lite avtryck på jorden som möjligt. Dagens resenärer ger sig i för-
sta hand inte ut i världen på en budget som ska understiga 15 dollar/
dag. Idag reser backpacker-generationen med tyngre packning än en 
charterturist och är lika oavbrutet uppkopplad. Turismen har blivit en 
massindustri och på många håll är invånarna totalt beroende av turis-
men för att överleva. På de mest avlägsna platserna dansar ”malajen” 
en dans som aldrig fanns. Och i publiken sitter både backpackers och 
åldrande tema-gruppresenärer. Idag har Lonely Planet över 500 titlar 
och täcker 195 länder. 
I det tidiga 1970-talet besökte backpackers samma ställen som char-
terturisten: stränder, tempel, ruiner, städer. Men snart tog han eller hon 
sig vidare till mer avlägsna regioner. Samtidigt var de beroende av li-
kasinnade, av västerlänningar. Ingen vill ju sätta sig helt själv i en by i 
Pakistan, ty där kan ingen se och bekräfta en och där finns det varken 
billig öl eller varma sandstränder.
Idag finns det knappt några upplevt ursprungliga (av modernitet, 
kapitalisering och ”västernisering” ej exploaterade) ställen kvar. Men 
backpackerturisten behöver dem. Annars blir han eller hon enbart en 
vanlig turist, inte en sökare, inte en vandrare. Och det här sistnämnda 
är viktigt. En opposition kan nämligen spåras i det vardagliga talet ”on 
the road” när resenären kategoriseras. Vi kan skilja mellan den äldre 
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charter- (package-) turisten och den yngre luffarturisten, backpackaren. 
En annan opposition är resenären – de där hemma. Ytterligare en an-
nan är pilgrimen kontra både lokalbefolkning och vardagliga (charter-)
turister, som anses mer statiska, som är ute efter det bekväma resandet 
och mindre ute efter varaktig bildning och religiösa upplevelser. Ty lite 
vid sidan om har vi just pilgrimen, vars intresse för andliga platser eller 
religiösa patos gör honom/henne lite främmande för de andra hedo-
nistiska figurerna. Extra poäng ger det om man levt med ”lokalbefolk-
ningen” – den högsta formen av arkeotopisk turism. 
Resemålen måste (av ”rätt” personer, exempelvis de som skriver Lo-
nely Planets böcker) anses exotiska, i varje fall hävdar jag att det var 
så när böckerna började skrivas, och intentionen lever nog kvar idag. 
Det man söker är det ”äkta” och ”oexploaterade”. Man lever billigt, 
eller vill få det till att se ut som man gör det. Detta är någonting som vi 
också möter hos de europeiska manliga äventyrarna, Fawcett, Livings-
tone, Galindo, Stephens. Det som lockade var det exotiska, äventyret, 
manlighetskulten i vedermödan. 
Det pågår ett rollspel därute. Interagerandet med andra turister tar 
sig olika uttryck beroende på vem du upplevs vara och vem du anser 
att du själv är. Det är ett förhandlande om identiteter, precis på sam-
ma sätt som det pågår ett ständigt förhandlande om vad en fulländad 
turist- kanon ska bestå av. Vilka platser är the top ten? En charterturist 
kan inte med framgång ta rollen som en backpacker eller en vagabond 
(även om charterturisten för några dagar kan ”resa” själv, bortom 
gruppen). En backpacker vill inte heller förknippas med all-inclusive-
turisten. Guideböcker beskriver resenären med skiftande ord och be-
grepp. Lonely Planet, som är den bokserie som står i fokus här, skiljer 
diffust mellan wanderers, trekkers, pilgrims och vagabonds. Det är ett 
medvetet spel med ord. 
Ju fler som blir enbart ”turister” och ju fler som försöker att ”go 
native” och upptäcka det hittills icke upptäckta, desto större strävan 
bland dem som inte vill bli förknippade med ”alla andra”, att skapa 
en ny identitet. Då blir, hävdar jag, det uråldriga begreppet ”pilgrim” 
användbart. Ty en pilgrim är väl ingen turist? Eller?
Men först några ord om resandet, turisten och pilgrimen. 
Resan, turisten, pilgrimen
Jesus och Moses ökenvandringar, Muhammeds besök på berget, Bud-
dhas sökande i vildmarken, Teseus i labyrinten, boernas vandring, 
Maos långa marsch, Gandhis risbonde-manifestation … många kultu-
rer och civilisationer har sin kultur-grundläggande vandring, sin hero’s 
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journey, som kan tolkas symboliskt, enligt Jungs psykologi, strukturellt, 
enligt Lévi-Strauss’ mytologi, eller universellt, enligt antropologen Jo-
seph Campbell. Den sistnämnde finner fyra sekvenser i vandringen, i 
resandet, i den mänskliga strävan efter något annat. Huruvida detta är 
applicerbart på alla former av turism eller resande låter jag vara osagt; 
det är en teori, en bild, som tecknas här. 
Resenären, pilgrimen, turisten, finner vägen  
vedermödor längs vägen (separation)  
ankomsten till målet (separation, en initiering)  
återvändandet till hemmet.1
Att resa hör till den mänskliga tillvaron. Människan har i alla tider rest 
för att finna nya åkermarker, för att finna sig nya makar och makor, 
för att handla, för att upptäcka, för att kriga. Hon har rest för att lära 
sig ting om sin omvärld. Hon har rest för att människan är en resande 
varel se. Civilisationen ”has a relatively precarious hold upon us and 
there is an undoubted attraction in a life of absolute freedom once it 
has been tasted. The ’call o’ the wild’ is in the blood of many of us and 
finds it safety in adventure”.2
Människan har rest över land och över hav och ofta har hennes re-
sande klätts i någon form av sökande efter en inre eller en yttre mening, 
en transcendental utmaning. Människan har burit reliker med sig på 
sina vandringar, reliker som sedan blivit pilgrimsmål. Hon har tagit sig 
över öknar och berg i missioneringssyfte. 
Att resandet har blivit än viktigare än det någonsin varit visar nutidens 
stora globala skiftningar. Turism är en av världens viktigaste närings-
grenar med hundratals miljoner mer eller mindre informellt anställda i 
alla regioner och i alla klimatzoner. Möjligen härstammar vårt ord turist 
från latinets tornare eller grekiskans tornos, cirkelrörelse, en rörelse runt 
en axelpunkt. Det är en resa som har en startpunkt och ett mål som man 
ska komma tillbaka till, som en passagerit, som en pilgrimsvandring. Re-
san kan symboliseras av ryggsäcken, som är en annorlunda accessoar 
än väskan med hjul på. Även om begreppet turism som sådant inte har 
använts i Väst i mer än drygt etthundrafemtio år så är resor till heliga 
platser, och med dem en förknippad ekonomi i form av vandrarhem, 
guide böcker etc, ett fenomen med långa historiska rötter. 
Tourism comprises the activities of persons traveling to and staying 
in places outside the usual environment for not more than one conse-
cutive year for leisure, business and other purposes not related to the 
exercise of an activity remunerated from within the place visited.3
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Man kan göra det ännu kortare: turisten är den som reser bort för att se 
nya saker och för att slappa. Västerländsk turism har ofta handlat om 
att ta sig från kallare till varmare trakter för en period. Till definitionen 
kan läggas att om du pratar de inföddas idiom så blir du automatiskt 
mindre av en turist. Men du är fortfarande en främling, en pilgrim.4 
Olika former av individuellt resande har existerat länge, medan nuti-
dens västerländska turism har sitt egentliga ursprung i flera olika tradi-
tioner. Vi kan se gesällvandringar och pilgrimsfärder som tidig turism. 
Vi kan se en tidig turism i resandet i bildningssyfte bland adelsungdo-
mar, ett resande som nådde sin kulmen på 1800-talet. 
Därefter har vi, som sagts ovan, fenomenet med liftande som tog fart 
främst i Amerika på 1950-talet, tack vare bilismen (Kerouac: På drift). 
Beatnikrörelsen var bohemisk och delvis inspirerad av en västerländsk 
läsning av zen. 
Sedan kom hippiekulturen och man började ta sig fram längs en 
rutt från Europa till Marrakesh till Israel till Indien till Himalaya. Ett 
nytt klädmode kom att skapas, ett som fortfarande lever kvar. Det 
var ett mode med (upplevt) indiska influenser, halsband, vida kläder, 
pannband, sandaler, fritt växande hår och skägg, gärna med en blom-
ma bakom örat. Naturlig skönhet bortom modeindustrins kollektiva 
fördumning. 
Och fortfarande är Indien det hägrande målet för många. Det är In-
dien som lockar – både för backpackers och för mer vanliga, trygga 
resenärer. Det Indien som finns därute är romantiserat, lockande, ”färg-
glatt” och mångpolärt. De dåliga tingens Indien – kastsystemet, barn-
arbetena, svälten och korruptionen – blir något som ens eget ego ska 
övervinna och växa ur. 
En så kallad luffarturist är en som mer eller mindre själv bestämmer 
sin resrutt, sitt färdsätt och sin resas längd och som ofta vill vara ute lite 
längre.5 Backpackern söker sig – liksom de andra resenärerna – till sin 
grupp, till hostels (mer än hotell) och till ett mer aktivt förhållningssätt. 
På programmen står exempelvis rafting, sandboarding, surfande, fes-
tande, längre vistelser på klassiska ställen som Varanasi, Bali och Cuzco. 
En pilgrimsresa däremot har traditionellt inte benämnts som vare sig 
turism eller ”leisure”. En vanlig definition är att en pilgrimsresa måste 
innehålla en målplats, en rörelse och en motivation. Det är, sägs det 
ofta, ”a journey to a sacred place or shrine” där mikro-, meso- och 
makrokosmos möts. Pilgrimsfärder och ekonomi kan dock inte sepa-
reras. Runt en pilgrimsplats föds – säsongsmässigt eller ej – en eko-
nomi, baserad på var pilgrimen vill sova, vad han/hon vill äta, köpa, 
se, uppleva och få med sig tillbaka. En vid definition av pilgrims-
platsen och ”pilgrimandet” är: ”a set of ritual actions involving speci-
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fic  human communities, institutions and organized travel to and from 
sacred places”.6 
Det sägs också att en pilgrimsfärd inte är ett mållöst vandrande, och 
inget sökande för sin egen skull. En pilgrim är inte heller enbart en för 
många socialt accepterad flyktväg bort ifrån en moderna världen, stres-
sen, kraven eller vad man nu kan tänka sig. En pilgrim är en volontär 
och en finnare, mer än en sökare. 
En pilgrim eftersträvar oftast sammanhang och sammanbindningar. 
En pilgrim eftersträvar ofta – utifrån religionshistoriska aspekter – ho-
lism mer än förändring. Men ibland är förändringen av varaktig art: då 
blir pilgrimens resa en initiationsrit som för alltid skapar en ny män-
niska. Liksom judarnas bar mitzva och de kristnas konfirmation för 
alltid förändrar personens religiösa status i gruppen kan en vandring 
till ett specifikt mål också förändra en människas roll. 
A pilgrim dies temporarily as a secular man and attains the god-
hood during the time of pilgrimage.7 
Lonely Planet Revisited
Vi kan ana att en pilgrim, enligt en sorts historisk gängse förklaring, 
inte är en simpel charterturist som enbart lämnar sitt land för att under 
en kortare period få slappa, re-kreera sig och bada. Men om vi återgår 
till Lonely Planet – guideböckernas självlysande ledergestalt – så kom-
pliceras bilden. 
Jag har jämfört några guideböcker om Indien. Den första är från 
1987 och heter India – A Travel Survival Kit. Beteckningen säger myck-
et; det är inte enbart tal om att resa utan om att överleva, go Indian. 
Den andra är från 2005 och har samma titel. Den tredje är Rajastan, 
Delhi, Agra från 2011. Jag har inte med den första editionen som kom 
från 1981. Den hette också India – A Travel Survival Kit och blev det 
året utnämnd till världens bästa guidebok. Anledningen till att dessa år-
tal är med är personlig. Jag besökte Indien för första gången 1988 och 
senare 2007 till 2012. Skälet till den assymetriska tematiken – landet 
Indien som helhet kontra en del av Indien, nämligen Rajastan-området, 
är enkel. Landet Indien täcks idag inte enbart av en guidebok utan av 
ett dussintal. Det som var heltäckande faktabeskrivningar för trettio år 
sedan är idag uppdelade på flera delar.
Tittar vi på hur det mest kända av alla turistmål, oavsett om du är 
fakir-resenär från Södermalm eller japansk gruppresenär, så ser vi att 
Lonely Planets beskrivning av Taj Mahal har ändrat form. 
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1987 beskrivs Taj Mahal på en sida. Det är en jordnära beskrivning 
med mest fokus på historiska fakta. I upplagan från 2005 täcker Taj 
Mahal två sidor. Texten är mer utarbetad och dessutom klädd i ett 
innovativt språk: ”sunrise is the magical time”, ”magical allure”, etc.
I Rajastan 2011 får Taj Mahal 7 sidor samt omslaget på boken (men 
det är inget ovanligt när det gäller guideböcker om Indien). Texten är 
historiskt beskrivande, kartorna bra, språket i än högre utsträckning 
färgat av New Age-terminologi. Lägger vi till detta observationen att 
språkbruket i Lonely Planet har förändrats från en sekulär, ungdomlig 
jordnära vokabulär till en begreppsvärld som definitivt är mer ”andlig” 
så ser vi ett mönster. Den som reser bort kallas vagabond, traveller, pil-
grim, trekker, searcher. Platserna som besöks – det gäller pyramiderna i 
Egypten såväl som Macchu Picchu och Taj Mahal är inte längre enbart 
spots utan ”power places”. Man skulle kunna teoretisera över detta ut-
ifrån ett postmodernt perspektiv: det är du själv som definierar vem du 
är. Om jag ser mig själv mer som en pilgrim än som en turist som köper 
sin paketresa hemma och inte lägger mycket pengar i landet man kom-
mer till, ja då är jag det. Att man beter sig likadant själv – i indierns, 
peruanens, kenyanens ögon – är oviktigt. Den västerländske ”pilgri-
men” är dock till dels beroende av massturismen eftersom den bidrar 
med service. Man behöver också stereotypen turistus vulgaris för att 
kunna definiera sig själv.8 Den postmoderna autonoma människans tro 
och vetenskapens (av många upplevda) monopol på sanning banade 
vägar för hur sekulariseringen kom att tillåta valet religion. Detta är 
Sindre Bangstad inne på i sitt definierande av sekularism som en ”poli-
tisk doktrin” som möjliggör tolerans och diskussion kring religiösa för-
ståelseformer. Med försvagningen av religionens maktdimension, eller 
”de-institutionalisering”, har människors religiositet, gått life-as (öde) 
till subjetive-life (val).9 
Globaliseringen och den postmoderna skepcisismen mot beprövad 
vetenskap har exempelvis lett till att medicinsk turism blivit en växande 
bransch. Långt från etiska kommittéer kan man i fattigare turistmiljöer 
världen över driva projekt och experimentella behandlingar som inte 
tillåts i Väst. Behandlingarna utvärderas inte enligt västliga metoder.10 
Det globala resandet förstör jordens ekologi och allt som är ur-
sprungligt samtidigt som ”the original” är förutsättningen för resan-
dets existens. Globaliseringen skapar en likriktning som turismen göder 
men som samtidigt punkterar resandet. Varför ska man resa om det ser 
likadant ut därborta som härhemma? Samtliga resenärer vill – oftast – 
ha det bekvämt inom de ramar som de olika grupperna sätter upp. Och 
alla vill vara tillsammans med likasinnade. Det ovan nämnda hippie-
modet är ju till för en exklusiv grupp som har råd att leka ” indier”. 
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Bekvämlighet kostar och den handlar alltid om bra restauranger, bra 
resmål, värme och intryck. Och här – hävdar jag – är pilgrimen en 
främling och en turist.  
Pilgrimen
Vi anknyter till Joseph Campbell ovan. Att finna vägen innebär att man 
ger sig ut på sin vandring, ofta i grupp, men med ens eget individu-
ella ”uppvaknande” i blicken. Vedermödorna kan liknas vid labyrinter 
(som i katedralen i Chartres, som imiterar vandringen till Jerusalem), 
trappor upp till svårtillgängliga grottsystem (som i Ellora i Indien) eller 
floddalar (Ganges). Uttrycken och platserna skiljer sig åt, men pilgrims-
vandringar och vallfärder har alltid varit en del av de religiösa ut-
trycken, att fullgöra en religiös plikt, att be, bli välsignad eller botad.11 
Pilgrimandet ökar världen över. Pilgrimen är en mycket viktig religiös 
aktör i postmodernitetens tidevarv. 
Ibland är det innersta målet på platsen dolt för andra än de ytterst 
få invigda – som exempelvis Det Allraheligaste i Jerusalems tempel el-
ler Amun-Re-templet i Karnak, vars innersta endast kunde besökas av 
Farao och översteprästen. 
Katolicism och buddhism är de nutida världsreligioner som är mest 
kända för sina pilgrimsplatser. Från 300-talet ser vi i den kristna sfären 
hur pilgrimsplatser skapas runt levande helgon, ofta eremiter och mar-
tyrer. Man sökte efter potentia, kraft, och praesentia, närvaro. Kodord 
var långsamhet, frihet, tystnad, enkelhet (allt det som vi idag absolut 
inte kan förknippa med turism). Man besökte helgonbilder i tystnad. 
Statyn blir helgonet, liksom i alla polyteistiska miljöer.12 Ett helgon, en 
bild, en staty, har också talismanska egenskaper – den beskyddar den 
som tror på dem. 
Återvändandet är det som binder samman trådarna i ritualen. Man 
återvänder till det invanda, det slentrianmässiga. Är det transforma-
tionen och förändringen som resenären, turisten och pilgrimen vill åt? 
Eller är det känslan av samhörighet, connectnedness? Eller handlar det 
i sann postmodern anda om att re-kreera sig, re-laxa, re-definiera sitt 
individualistiska liv? 
Platsen
Platsen får – av skiftande skäl – en helig status, ett sacred space. Män-
niskor kommer till den heliggjorda platsen för att finna just helighet 
och hierofani. Ritualer – cirkelvandring, böner, danser – knyts till 
platsen. Runt platsen växer så småningom upp informella – och sedan 
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formella – institutioner. Om det går illa, eller väl, tas platsen över av 
religionen i sig och blir en global kultplats – Bodh Gaya, Muktinath, 
Kagbeni-dalen. Inte sällan kan de första uppenbarelserna accepteras av 
folket men kritiseras av kyrkan och/eller auktoriteten. Med tiden tar 
det ”folkliga” över.
En pilgrimsplats kan vara en gudaplats, en relikplats där man sam-
lat in benbitar från Buddha, träflisor från Jesu kors, ett hårstrå från 
Muhammed. Hinduism är i liten utsträckning en religion knuten till 
reliker, medan buddhism och kristendom är det; kejsar Ashoka är en 
av de första härskarna vi känner som byggde upp ett ”heligt rum” med 
pilgrimsplatser. 
En pilgrimsplats är ofta en plats där mirakler sägs ha skett, där män-
niskor har blivit helade, erfarit livsförändrande upplevelser, mött perso-
ner och varelser. I fallet med Santiago i Spanien handlade det om synen 
av en stjärna över en åker. Den tolkades som att det blivande spanska 
skyddhelgonet Jakob hade uppenbarat sig för att ge sina trogna käm-
par kraft inför kampen mot morerna. Staden fick namnet Den helige 
Jakob av Stjärnans åker – Santiago de Compostela. Kristenhetens heli-
gaste plats i denna bemärkelse låg också taktiskt placerad där man an-
såg att Världens ände var. 
En pilgrimsplats är ”öppen” för alla till skillnad från ”stängda” im-
periestäder och orter. Därför är egentligen inte Mekka en pilgrimsort 
på detta sätt, ty den är inte till för allas sökande. Men exempelvis Vara-
nasi som ligger där Ganges gör en ovanlig krök är öppen för alla som 
vill ta sig dit. 
Vilka är ”the principles for location”? Har man funnit några sådana? 
Victor Turner föreslog att ”pilgrimage sites occur at locations around 
the periphery of the pilgrim population”,13 men detta har inte kunnat 
bevisas, även om man har kunnat se att kullar, berg och vattendrag ofta 
finns vid en pilgrimsplats. 
En pilgrimsvandring avslutas ofta med en cirkelvandring runt den 
heliga platsen, som exempelvis i Indien benämns som en tirtha. Cirkel-
vandringen, circumbulationen, utförs av alla oavsett om man är katolik 
i Rom eller japan i Japan eller hindu i Varanasi. Vandringen får inte 
vara planlös.
Aimless wandering does not lead to pilgrimage; nor does trekking 
through an alien, albeit dramatic landscape such as adventure 
tourism.14
På en plats för pilgrimer finns mat, gemenskap, skydd, minnen, även-
tyr och mirakelberättelser. Alla ovan nämnda platser är idag också 
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turistplatser. En turism har fötts, en där tid är pengar och där estetik 
kan krocka med fysikalitet. Där det finns guidehäften till salu i varje 
”pilgrimshotell”. 
Även en konfessionslös människa (en turist som enbart reser enligt 
den rutt som Lonely Planet stakar ut) kan erfara något som kanske kan 
benämnas heligt, andligt, övernaturligt. Såsom konstnären som söker 
sig till ikonografiska platser – författaren till caféernas Paris, målaren 
till Firenze, arkitekten till Venedig eller New York – för att få kraft och 
inspiration, låta sig besköljas av lärofädernas skaparförmåga. Och en 
konfessionslös människa kan mycket väl ”köpa” med sig pilgrimens 
ting hem till det ”sekulära” hemmet – en korg, en figurin, en staty, en 
gudabild, en karta, en rökelseflaska etc. Pilgrimandet blir turism.
Även sekulära platser kan bli pilgrimsmål. I Amerika (”the United 
States is a nation with the soul of a church”)15 kan man besöka seku-
lära platser, som då har erhållit en religiös pilgrimsstatus. Mängder av 
landmärken i USA har en helig aura, en pilgrimens status och beskrivs 
ofta som tempel, helgedomar och heliga platser. ”Americans have crea-
ted sacred spaces, the most obvious example being Washington D C”.16 
Alla stora ritualer som sker i Washington är familjära för amerikaner-
na. Capitolium blir ett tempel som pilgrimen/turisten/vandraren samlas 
kring och går runt i en cirkelrörelse från A till B till C och tillbaka. 
Avslutning
Something hidden. Go and find it, Go and look behind the Ranges. 
Lost and waiting for you. Go!17 
Jag inledde den här texten med att säga att den skulle handla om pil-
grimen, turisten, resenären, landet Indien och Lonely Planet. Idén som 
framförs genom en vindlande argumentering är att Lonely Planets kö-
pare är turister som vill vara lite mer, nämligen pilgrimer och vandrare. 
Även de som formger Lonely Planet är resenärer och skriver som om 
det vore en stor skillnad på charterturister och backpackers. Men alla 
besöker samma tempel och ruinstäder, samma ”heliga” floder och sam-
ma restauranger. För peruanen som säljer inca-konst, bilder på lama-
djur och shamanism och för indiern som säljer uråldrig visdom, healing 
och yoga spelar det föga roll om främlingen är en trekker, en charter-
turist eller en utländsk pilgrim. Skillnaden hos aktören ligger inte i de 
yttre attributen utan i den nyfikenhet som främlingen visar gentemot 
den miljö han eller hon hamnar i. Både turisten, resenären, sökaren fin-
ner en väg, går längs vägen, ankommer till ett mål och återvänder. His-
toriskt är det ingen skillnad på en pilgrim och en turist. Rollspelet som 
189
existerar turistgrupperna emellan handlar om status, om individualism, 
om identitet. Det handlar mindre om målet, platserna. 
Lonely Planet var en modern guidebok som fångade upp en hel gene-
ration av resenärer. Lonely Planet är idag en postmodern produkt som 
fångar upp nya generationer, och nu med ett språkbruk som passar den 
hyperindividualiserade världen vars anspråk på andlighet, individuellt 
växande, och intryck är större än någonsin i turismens historia. 
”Religionens återkomst” på ett individuellt plan kan till viss del för-
klaras med utbud, tillgång. Inte minst internet erbjuder transnationella 
organisationsformer och ett informationsutbud som tillåter ett mång-
kulturellt axplock. ”Valet” att vara en mer andlig resenär uppmärksam-
mas idag av media och debatter i allmänhet. Att vara en pilgrimsresenär 
sticker ut från omgivningens normer. Det är ett exempel på att med-
vetenheten kring religion har ökat, en medvetenhet som Lonely Pla-
net idag både formar och göder. Turisten blir en pilgrim. Turisten är 
en icke-rörlig person, pilgrimen är i rörelse. Vi vill alla vara i rörelse. 
”What follows is the great principle of Life. Everything is moving”.18 
Och vad som finns på berget, i öknen eller i den religiösa byggnaden är 
upp till resenären att finna. 
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This contribution deals with localism as a feature of Hinduism. My 
starting point is the notion that Human knowledge and understand-
ing develop locally and thereby are dependent on the locally pertaining 
conditions in the knowledge communities in question.1 After a short 
discussion of the heterogeneous nature of Hinduism as a tradition of 
thought, I describe and discuss examples of localism in Hinduism.2 
Next, after an introduction of the French Hindu convert Alain Danié-
lou (1907–1994), as an extended illustration of localism in Hinduism, I 
describe his rendering of the Hindu caste system. Finally, some features 
of Daniélou’s rendering of the cast system are briefly related to some 
conclusions in cognitive psychology and the social sciences about ef-
fects of localism. By localism is meant tendencies to stress, assume, or, 
to be “captured” by the importance of the local and local conditions in 
one’s thinking and action.
The nature of Hinduism as  
a religious tradition
David Smith described Hinduism as “a sponge, a forest, precisely be-
cause, like Topsy, it just growed [sic!]. There was no overall authority, 
no inquisition, no Synod to rule and regulate what men thought; prac-
tice was regulated and behaviour was governed by caste councils.”3 The 
extent to which Hinduism should be seen as a unitary phenomenon 
is a controversial issue.4-5 The opponents to the idea of Hinduism as a 
unitary phenomenon argue that the differences between forms of Hin-
Carl Martin Allwood
Localism in Hinduism
Alain Daniélou’s description of the caste system  
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duism as practiced in different geographical locations and in different 
segments of society are too large for it to be meaningfully captured un-
der one label.6-7 However, concerned stakeholders may obviously have 
an interest in arguing for the unitary identity of Hinduism. Thus, Lip-
ner pointed out the interest of Hindu rightwing elements to maintain 
an understanding of Hinduism as having a stable unchanging nature.8 
Those who see Hinduism as a unitary phenomenon usually point at 
the Vedas as the unifying core, although Halbfass noted that “While 
proclaiming the sanctity of the Veda, the Hindu tradition seems to be 
turning away from the Vedic ways of thought and life”.9 
At the end of the day, the perspective taken by Smith that Hindu-
ism and other religions should best be seen as having competing voices 
“each with varying notions about what is orthodox and who is ‘in’ and 
who is ‘out’”, and that religions are “neither monolithic entities nor 
[…] unchanging over time, despite the claims often made for them by 
their theologians”10 appears realistic and in line with current thinking 
about culture in the social sciences and the humanities.11 In brief, a rea-
sonable approach to what Hinduism is may be to see it as the sum of 
competing voices.12 In the words of Atran et al., written in support of 
their concept of culture, this means “to treat variability as signal rather 
than noise.”13 
Localism in Hinduism
Localism in Hindu thought can be found clearly with respect to space 
but not as clearly with respect to time. For example, with respect to 
time, the revelation of the teachings regarded as central may not to the 
same extent be seen as limited to a specific period in time by most Hin-
dus compared to how it is seen by most followers of Islam. To illustrate, 
the possibility that the Vedas are the final revelatory statement does 
not seem to be emphasized in Hinduism to the same extent as for the 
Qur’an in Islam. For example, Daniélou, describing Shaiva philosophy, 
argues that in this philosophy “The nature of knowledge is to evolve 
[…] it knows periods of progress and decline. […] The sacred book 
valid for all time and people is a fiction.”14 Here an ongoing historical 
developmental process is recognized. 
Furthermore, in contrast to at least Islam, Hindu tradition seems 
to have less of a tendency to recognize specific individuals as prima-
ry founders, although as noted above the Veda scriptures are often, 
or commonly, taken as a common denominator. Again, and in con-
trast to the delivery of the Qur’an, the Vedas are not seen as clearly 
delivered from God directly but is conveyed via rishis (seers) whose 
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historical status is contested.15-16 Local anchoring of the development 
of understanding is exemplified in the idea that some rishis may have 
been drinking a hallucinogenic drink, soma,17 in order get better vision 
and to come closer to the gods,18 but this seems to be an indication of 
 spatial localism.
Localism in space
The importance of the local in Hinduism is clearly evident with respect 
to space. First of all, geographical space is divided into the sacred (with 
degrees) and the non-sacred. This means that India, the homeland of 
Hinduism, is sacred and the rest of the world is, not just not sacred but 
also, disallowed for “correctly believing” Hindus. This is implied in the 
doctrine of Kala pani (black water), valid for some of the denomina-
tions in Hinduism. This doctrine says that it is an offence for Hindus to 
leave India by sea. As described by Gopalakrishnan “The Baudhayana 
Sutra, one of the Hindu Dharma Shastras, says that ‘making voyages by 
sea’ (II.1.2.2) is an offense which will cause pataniya, loss of caste. It 
offers a rather difficult penance: ‘They shall eat every fourth mealtime a 
little food, bathe at the time of the three libations (morning, noon and 
evening), passing the day standing and the night sitting. After the lapse 
of three years, they throw off their guilt.’”19
India is in this context called Bharat which stands for its people be-
ing subject to the dharma (sacred law or teaching, including duties). 
Knott characterizes Bharat as “the realm of dharma, the Hindu uni-
verse”, and continues “bharat, the land ritually purified by the Brahmin 
and surrounded by kala pani, the black waters.”20 Thus, leaving India 
implied leaving the world of Hinduism.
Some reasons given for why leaving Bharat was not acceptable are 
very practical. For example, abroad or on a ship it would be impossible 
to carry out one’s daily religious observances and one would be cut off 
from access to the holy Ganga water. In addition one would meet mlec-
chas (foreigners, in the pejorative sense of barbarians, savages). 
To illustrate, at the end of the 19th century Swami Vivekanada, after 
having visited the United States, went to the Dakshineshwar Kali tem-
ple near Kolkata where he had often visited his guru Sri Ramakrishna. 
However, although he could not be refused to enter the temple, an extra 
evening worship was done later, after his visit, to purify the temple.21 
That the kala pani is still an active doctrine in India today is evidenced 
by the case of Vishnunarayanan Namboothiri, a Hindu priest, who at 
the end of the 1990’s, after having visited a conference in England, was 
not allowed to enter his temple (the very orthodox Sreevallabha Temple 
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in Thiruvall, a town in Kerala) unless he recited the ‘Gyatri mantra’ 
1008 times. This he refused, but in the end he was allowed to enter 
after he had purified himself by sprinkling holy water.22
The sacred nature of Bharat and the local character of Hinduism 
is also illustrated by what Eck described as “what one might call the 
‘locative’ strand of Hindu piety” and further “the place itself is the pri-
mary locus of devotion” […] In the wider Hindu tradition, these places, 
particularly those associated with waters, are often called tirthas, and 
pilgrimage to these tirthas is one of the oldest and still one of the most 
prominent features of Indian religious life. A tirtha is a ‘crossing place,’ 
a ‘ford,’ where one may cross over to the far shore of a river or to the 
far shore of the worlds of heaven.”23
Hindu localism also shows in that it is a very decentralized tradi-
tion within India, to some extent without any centralized organiza-
tion. As expressed by Kinsley “Hindus also have acknowledged that 
differences exist among the regional areas of the Indian subcontinent, 
and the Hindu Law Books accept regional customs and peculiarities 
as authoritative.”24 Similarly, traditionally casts and subcasts had their 
own councils following their own regulations,25 indicating recognition 
of local conditions as a precondition for understanding. 
Alain Daniélou 
In the context of this chapter Alain Daniélou is a person of interest 
in his own right. He claimed to be the first (of two) Western persons 
ritually initiated into Hinduism. In this sense his voice can be seen as 
one of the many voices of Hinduism. Daniélou may have held a slightly 
idiosyncratic form of Hinduism as he, for example, did not seem to 
have believed in reincarnation.26 His relation to Hinduism also illus-
trates how Hinduism can handle the non-local, in the form of a mlecca 
with a deep interest in the teaching.
Daniélou was born 1907 into an upper-class, cultural family in 
Neuilly-sur-Seine, close to Paris.27 His father, fairly absent in the home, 
was a politician who held many national ministerial posts. His mother, 
from Norman nobility and a Catholic, founded a religious order named 
“Order of Sainte-Marie”. The young Alain quarreled with his mother 
and spent his time improving himself in singing and dancing. In the 
early 1930’s he made many adventurous trips, among others to Afghan-
istan. He came to India in 1932, already knowing for example Udai 
Shankar, dancer and brother of Ravi Shankar. After only a short time 
in India he acquainted Rabindranath Tagore, poet and literature Nobel 
Prize winner (1913). For more than 15 years he studied Hindu music, 
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Sanskrit, Indian philosophy and Hindu religion at the Banaras Hindu 
University. From 1949 to 1953 he was research professor at this univer-
sity. In Varanasi he rented a maharadjah mansion on the Ganges where 
he lived for many years with his partner Raymond Burnier. 
Through his friendship with Vijayanand Tripathi, a “great scholar 
of Benares”, and his son Brahmanand who was studying to become a 
Brahmin priest, he came into contact with Swami Karpatri, who later 
“ordered Brahmanand to perform my initiation rites, as well as Ray-
mond’s.”28 Danielou’s Hindu name after the initiation was Shiva Sharan 
(“the protégé of Shiva”). Before this event Brahmanand had taught 
Daniélou “Hindu rites, customs, and proprieties: the ritual baths in the 
Ganges at sunrise, the dietary restrictions, the puja ceremonies, the acts 
of purification, the days of fasting.”29 This teaching also included “very 
arcane [secret] details of tantric rites”.30 It seems that before his initia-
tion Daniélou also received teaching from Swami Karpatri, which met 
some practical difficulties since Daniélou was at that point considered a 
“mleccha, a barbarian who is assimilated with the lowest castes of arti-
sans; he can never touch a Brahman, or enter his house nor can he recite 
the Veda.”31 Daniélou claims, as noted above, that he and Burnier “it 
seems, are the only foreigners who were ever initiated and incorporated 
into orthodox Hinduism.”32 However, later at least one further Western-
er, Baba Rampuri from California, was initiated into the Naga sannyasa 
(an ekadandi section) in 1970, one year after  arriving in India.33 
Swami Karpatri (1907–1982) was a monk in the Hindu Shaive 
dashanami ‘single-staff renunciation’ (ekadandi sannyasi) monas-
tic tradition, generally associated with the Advaita Vedanta tradition 
(where Atman and Brahman are seen as one, a nonduality). Wikipedia 
notes that: “Any Hindu, irrespective of class, caste, age or gender can 
seek sannya¯sa as an E¯kadan
˙
d
˙
i renunciate in the Dasana¯mi tradition.”34 
Somewhat similarly, Daniélou wrote “Shaiva initiation is open to every-
one, without distinction of caste or sex. A Shudra can thus become the 
Guru of a Brahman”.35 This might help understanding why Daniélou 
could be initiated into orthodox Hinduism. Karpatri later “created a 
political movement, the Jana Sangh (people’s assembly).”36 This party, 
also called Ram Raiya Parishad, was founded in 1948, and Daniélou 
notes that he acted as an advisor to this party for example on matters 
relating to how people in the West reacted to modernist versions of 
Hinduism by e.g., Sri Aurobino, Vivekanada and Gandhi, “which to 
them seemed unbelievably elementary and puerile.”37 
In his autobiography The way to the labyrinth, Daniélou also de-
scribed how he and Burnier seem to have been cast out from Hindu-
ism. The reason was that Burnier had married an Indian girl from a 
196
 Brahman family which was a breach of a promise they had made at 
their initiation into Hinduism “never to marry outside of our case 
[…] Suddenly we were strangers again, men without faith or law who 
should normally have become outcasts, rejected by the two communi-
ties the couple belonged to.”38 He also noted that “marriage is a social 
contract, and a union between two different races is strictly forbid-
den”39. Possibly because Daniélou had been identified in the circles 
of the Jana Sangh party, Karpatri later advised Daniélou to return to 
 Europe which he did in 1960. After a very successful career as a musi-
cologist in Europe, Alain Daniélou died 1994.
The caste system according to  
Alain Daniélou
In one of his books Daniélou describes the caste system and how it is 
justified according to the form of Hinduism he adhered to.40 A funda-
mental bolt in this context is the concept of “race”, although Daniélou 
is unclear about what he means with “race”. He writes that “the four 
successive ages gave rise to the four creations or races of man, which 
are therefore at different stages of development corresponding to the 
four ages of life.”41 The older the race, the more advanced (of the color 
white of course!). The four race colors are “not directly equated with 
Caucasian, Oriental or Negro but are related only in a wide analogi-
cal manner.”42 Each race has specific characteristics which make them 
good at some things and poor at others and thus “these characteristics 
will enhance a functional activity in both biological as well as social 
organization.”43 However, he stresses that the races are of equal value, 
on this he even quotes the Mahabaratha Shanti Parva 188 “There is no 
superior caste. […] The beings created by him were only divided into 
casts according to their aptitude.”44 In other places he seems to equate, 
or at least do not distinguish, “ethnic elements” and race.45 
Daniélou further asserts that “the Hindu law makers” claimed that 
it is necessary to keep the casts (races) apart in order for each person 
to attain his fulfillment. And he notes that the “caste corresponds es-
sentially to a function, a profession reserved for a corresponding type 
of individual. Once the relationship is established between the group 
and the function, it is maintained by racial selection, together with spe-
cial forms of education, eating habits, costumes, and ethics, which differ 
from group to group, so as to favor the individual’s specialization.”46 
Moreover, starting training of the individual early in a setting that is 
already specialized for the profession will allow “the individual to at-
tain a perfection of his type.”47 Moreover, each person is seen as “a link 
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in the endless chain of humanity. He is the result of the characteristics 
accumulated by his ancestors. He himself must perfect the link he rep-
resents in order to pass it on to the next, and this is why, to the Hindu, 
he must observe all the rules that assure the continuation of his type, 
his race, of what he received as a gift at birth.”48 In While the Gods play 
Daniélou says “The progress of the human species rests on the increas-
ing usefulness of each of its elements and varieties.”49 In the larger per-
spective, each caste specializing in its own professions means that “The 
qualities and abilities of each improve over the generations so as to 
form an efficient, harmonious society that is capable of carrying out the 
role assigned to the human species in the plan of creation.”50 He also 
stated that the aim of the caste system is “the harmonious coexistence 
of the various races and different sorts of human beings”51 and that the 
Hindu social system “is the only system that has ever been able to es-
tablish a tolerant multiracial, multicultural society, which Moslems and 
Christians have vainly sought to destroy.”52 I next relate the caste sys-
tem as rendered by Daniélou to some concepts in research in cognitive 
psychology on problem solving that support some parts of Daniélou’s 
reasoning and I then note other aspects of caste contradicted by mod-
ern social science. 
The caste system á la Daniélou related to  
conceptions of the local in cognitive 
psychology and the social sciences
The concepts of weak methods and strong methods derive from some-
what different research literatures in cognitive psychology. Both con-
cepts refer to ways of solving tasks or problems.53 Weak methods are 
usable in many contexts but due to this they at the same time don’t 
accomplish very much. A prototypical weak method is the trial and 
 error method, that is, to simply do something and then to learn from 
the outcome of this action. Another example is always doing something 
that decreases the distance between the present situation and one’s goal 
state. Weak methods can be used in many situations because they only 
use information that occurs in most situations. This also, in contrast 
to strong methods, is what makes them fairly ineffective since they 
often utilize very little of the information available in the situation 
(only that part of the information that will tend to reoccur in many 
other situations).
Strong methods on the other hand, are very effective when they can 
be used because they utilize a large part of the information in the situa-
tion. At the same time, as a large part of the information they use tends 
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to be more or less unique to the situation, they are often not possible 
to use in other situations. Research has shown that over time, when 
people practice a skill, they utilize more of the information in the situa-
tion they train in and thus tend to use strong methods more. However, 
this is only the case as long as the situation they are in is fairly stable. If 
it changes, the person has to rely on more weak methods that are less 
effective but that utilize information common to many situations. 
The parallel to Daniélou’s rendering of the caste system is easy to 
see. When people practice for generation after generation in the same 
circumstances they are likely to develop very effective strong methods. 
Diamond mentions fine-graded ecological specialization among “multi-
ple casts of fishermen fishing by different types of methods in different 
types of waters”54 as an example of “prudent resource management by 
ecologically specialized Indian castes”.55 Given this for all professional 
groups, over generations the society as a whole can become increas-
ingly effective. However, it should be noted that this thinking assumes a 
stable environment, but societies live in a world with changing circum-
stances. In fact, for better or worse, modern societies tend to be built on 
the premises of change. 
Seen from the standpoint of much of current social science, including 
its current common implicit moral views, it is also clear that the caste 
system has many other deficiencies. For example, apart from the immo-
rality of forcing individuals to have professions they might not like to 
have, Daniélou described the Hindu perspective view of the individual 
as seen as “but a transitory moment of the species, which is a perma-
nent reality. It is the species that represents one aspect of the divine 
game […] of creation.”56 In contrast, modern society and current social 
science tend to see individuals as of value in themselves. 
Moreover, as suggested by history, too much occupation with, and 
veneration of, the local may give rise to unfortunate violent ideologies 
such as Nazism.57 For example, Meera Nanda argued in the Indian 
context that “there is a substantial overlap between the metaphysics of 
Hindu nationalism and Nazism.”58
Finally, the caste system may be seen as a waste of resources since 
individuals are hindered to work in the profession where they are gifted 
and motivated to work. In addition, research on creativity has clearly 
shown that a manifold of interactive different perspectives, each allow-
ing access to somewhat new information, is important for creative and 
innovative thinking;59 something that may be needed for a society to 
survive in the world today. For this reason the localism inherent in the 
caste system might lead to stagnation. 
In brief, given its decentralized development, it may not be surprising 
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that the feature of localism in Hinduism shows many types of effects, 
both positive and negative. For example, a tolerance of diversity in 
Hinduism co-exists with, what is likely to be less constructive, tenden-
cies towards violent nationalism and the like. 
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Sociological enquiry of religion is premised on a master theory of re-
ligious decline in modern times.1 There has been a long list of social 
scientists from Weber, Marx, and Freud to Berger and Mills who have 
held that religion will gradually fade and cease to be important with 
the advent of industrial society. The death of religion was the conven-
tional wisdom in the social sciences during most of the nineteenth and 
twentieth century.2 Religious decline or the desacralization thesis com-
monly found among sociologists has its origin in Europe. When it was 
first used about the end of the Thirty Years’ War in Europe in 1648, 
it referred to the transfer of properties from the church to local kings 
and royal houses. Similar transfer of church properties to the state also 
formed a part of the achievements of the French Revolution. Later in 
England, George Holyoake used the term “secularism” to refer to the 
rationalist movement of protest which he led in 1851. In its pursuit 
of the project of Enlightenment and Progress through the replacement 
of the mythical and religious view of the world with the scientific and 
technological-industrial one, Europe brought about a differentiation or 
separation of the political sphere from the religious one. This process 
by which sectors of society and culture are removed from the domina-
tion of religious institutions and symbols came to be variously referred 
to as the secularization or desacralization of the world.3 Thus “secu-
lar” not only means a state-religion separation but also includes among 
other things a) the diminution of the role of religion, b) this-worldly 
orientation rather than orientation towards the supernatural, c) the re-
placement of the “sacred” or “mystical” conception of the world with 
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the view that the world or society is something that can be rationally 
manipulated and socially engineered, and d) a view of religious beliefs 
and institutions as human constructions and responsibilities rather 
than as divinely ordained mysteries. Secularism since then has domi-
nated the thinking of nineteenth and twentieth century social scientists. 
Increasing secularization came to be taken for granted with industri-
alisation and modernisation of societies and nations. Jeffrey Hadden 
summarized thus the secularization paradigm:
Once the world was filled with the sacred – in thought, practice, 
and institutional form. After the Reformation and the Renaissance, 
the forces of modernization swept across the globe and seculariza-
tion, a corollary historical process, loosened the dominance of the 
sacred. In due course, the sacred shall disappear altogether except, 
possibly, in the private realm.4
In a nearly similar vein it is argued that religion, as an arbitrary be-
lief system that is based on faith and emotion rather than reasoned 
 weighting of the evidence, is predicted to decline in countries in which 
the average intelligence of the population is high, and to rise or remain 
at a high level in countries in which the average intelligence of the 
population is low. Other attributes of advanced societies that might be 
responsible for religious decline include rising prosperity and consum-
erism, advances in the educational system, reduced government regula-
tion of the religious economy, or decreased societal dysfunction.5 
These positions have been attacked by many in contemporary times. 
The world today has witnessed a rapid religious ascendancy. Contrary 
to the enlightenment prognosis of a decline in the religious commitment 
of people as they become more and more modern, we now find them 
turning more to traditional sources of existential meaning in their mod-
ern everyday life. There is now a mushrooming of sects, cults, Gods and 
Goddesses; people follow these competing religions in ever increasing 
numbers, express them openly, volunteer to take up values, attitudes, 
ethics, work, consumption etc. which are avowedly religious in con-
tent. Gods have suddenly become bankable. More modern and urbane 
Indians flock to sacred shrines and follow wise saints. Cultic religion 
comprising several godheads believed to be living on earth in human 
form (incarnations or “avatars”) as godmen and gunwomen – which is 
presumably unique to India and undoubtedly India’s bane and shame 
– has been a booming industry in India and through India in other 
countries, especially in the global context.6 The Vaishnodevi temple in 
Jammu & Kashmir had 700 000 visitors in 2015. There is a threefold 
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increase in the number of devotees of Shirdi Saibaba.7 Godmen (wise, 
miraculous and religious men) are doing brisk business. Added to this 
already complex plural religious scenario are the numerous new age 
spiritualities and the customised personal practices outside the main 
organised religions of the world. In short, more people want to be be-
lievers. Queues in temples are getting longer day by day. There is no 
truth in the proposition that religion will decrease with the increase in 
modernity. In the global context there is surely an upsurge in most of 
the traditional religions such as the Orthodox Church, Evangelicalism, 
Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism and religiously inspired revival movements 
in smaller communities such as Shintoism in Japan and Sikhism in In-
dia. Hindu popular ritual finds today echoes in distant shores through 
the efforts at internationalisation of ISKCON. The Islamic resurgence 
from North Africa to South East Asia is not only bringing about a res-
toration of orthodox Islamic believes but also is (re)populating ways 
of living and thinking which run opposed to many modern ideas of 
everyday morality, the role of women, the State, health, abortion etc. 
The revival across different countries is also far from uniform, com-
pounding the problem of a generalization. The pro-democratic revival 
movement Nudhat-ul-ulama in Indonesia is different from the Islamic 
revolution in Iran. An equally competing religious movement of Evan-
gelical Protestantism – including also Pentecostalism – has seen a sharp 
increase in its number of converts in South-East Asia, South Korea, the 
Philippines, the South Pacific, throughout sub-Saharan Africa and Latin 
America. All this points to the truth that the world today is experienc-
ing a reversal of secularization, if not an outright denial: “The world 
today is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some places more so 
than ever … Modernisation has led to some kind of secularisation but 
it has also provoked powerful movements of counter secularisation”.8 
Berger even refutes the very process of secularization. He points to the 
fact that the world we live in has always been a religious world. The 
pointers are strong enough to suggest that it is time to bury the secu-
larization thesis. After nearly three centuries of utterly failed prophesies 
and misrepresentations of both present and past, it seems time to carry 
the secularization doctrine to the graveyard of failed theories.9 
There is however no consensus among the proponents who oppose 
the secularization thesis. Is the present day religious resurgence a mere 
loss of secularity or is itself a reaction to secularist imposition? To put it 
in other words: is this desecularization or counter-secularism or secure 
secularism? These questions are far from settled. While Berger seems 
to suggest counter-secularization, Norris and Inglehart propose that 
societal modernization, human development, and economic inequal-
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ity drive up the levels of religious belief and activity. They argue that 
feelings of vulnerability to physical, societal, and personal risks are a 
key factor driving up the level of religiosity, and that the process of 
secularization – a systematic erosion of religious practices, values, and 
beliefs – has occurred most clearly among the most prosperous social 
classes living in affluent and secure post-industrial nations. They believe 
though that the importance of religiosity persists most strongly among 
vulnerable populations, especially those living in poorer nations, facing 
personal, survival-threatening risks.10 
Roger Finke, Rodney Stark, R. Stephen Warner and others provide a 
religious market theory to explain religious resurgence. Religious mar-
ket theory postulates a link between levels of religious competition and 
levels of religious observance. It draws causal linkages between the pat-
terns of religious supply (the number of denominations competing for 
adherents and kinds of state regulation) and religious demand (strength 
of belief and practice). Dissimilar levels of spiritual behaviour evident 
in various countries are believed to result less from “bottom up” de-
mand than from variance in “top down” religious supply. Religious 
groups compete for congregations with different degrees of vigour. 
Established churches are thought to be complacent monopolies taking 
their congregations for granted, with a fixed market share due to state 
regulation and subsidy for one particular faith that enjoys special status 
and privileges. By contrast, where a free religious marketplace exists, 
energetic competition between churches expands the supply of religious 
“products”, thereby mobilizing religious activism among the public.11 
Change in religious culture is also being explained by a mechanism of 
generational replacement. This hypothesis predicts that in countries in 
which young people are far less religious than the old, religiosity is like-
ly to decline; and in countries in which young people are more religious 
than the old, religion is likely to rise. Similarly social learning theories 
that emphasize the emulation of successful individuals predict that the 
religious beliefs of the social elite give direction to ongoing trends.12 
Religion is expected to rise in countries in which educated and high-
status individuals tend to be more religious than low-status individuals 
and to decline in countries in which high-status individuals have below-
average religiosity. Another school of thought proposes that religiosity 
is a familial trait and is transmitted by family environment and shared 
genes.13 Therefore religion is predicted to rise in countries in which re-
ligious people have more children than the less religious, and decline in 
countries in which religious people have below-average fertility. 
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Secularity in South Asia 
Secularism assumes a different meaning in South Asia compared to 
Western Europe. In South Asia, given the immense importance of reli-
gion in everyday life, secularism has always meant religious tolerance. 
A secular state implies neither a non-religious nor an antireligious state. 
Rather, it means a state that affirms its national religiosity in no un-
certain terms. Politics in South Asia, unlike in first world countries in 
Europe and North America that tend to reject anything religious as non-
modern at least in theory, acknowledge the equality of religion because 
it cannot afford to ignore its overarching importance in the life of their 
constituencies. The state-religion separation is incomplete, if there is 
any pretence of separation at all. The Western antonym of “secular” is 
“religious”. In South Asia and particularly in India by contrast the an-
tonym of “secular” is “communal”.14 Critics of secularism maintain that 
because secularism denies the importance of religion in the lives of the 
 people of South Asia, it is an impossible credo in this region.15 Others 
like Ashis Nandy contend that the idea of separation between state and 
religion in search for modernist secularism entails essentially an imposi-
tion in the South Asian context. Nandy calls it the tyranny of the modern 
secular State and advocates for an ethno-politically appropriate alterna-
tive consisting of a non-modern, pre-secular concept of religion that will 
have the potential for stimulating pluralist tolerance. Religion in non-
secular South Asia has never been the same through various periods of 
time. Peter Van Der Veer draws our attention to the relevance of colonial 
history, various post-colonial transformations of the public sphere, reli-
gious movements and the South Asian diaspora in understanding South 
Asian religiosity. He points out that a pluralistic Hindu tradition – in this 
sense similar to other South Asian religions such as Sikhism, Buddh ism 
and Islam – has been moulded as a monotheistic and text-based religion 
through orientalist and indigenous constructs.16 In a similar vein Hefner 
also points to a modularised Hinduism in post-colonial India modelled 
on a reformist version of Islam and Christianity.17 In any case, the resur-
gence of religion along with the process of globalization has entered the 
sphere of higher education too. Debates exploring religion as possessing 
an integrating social value in the world of consumer markets can offer a 
paradigm shift away from the secular legacy.18 
The South Asian theatre presents a varied picture for the explora-
tion of religion as a conflicting issue. India is virtually alone among the 
postcolonial states in Asia to have adopted religious neutrality as a key 
feature of its constitution and as a cornerstone in its strategy for na-
tion-building. The Nehruvian scientific-modernist legacy, which always 
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viewed religion as vestiges of tradition destined to obliteration through 
the operation of the inexorable laws of history and the presence of a 
sizable non-Hindu population in the country, probably warranted the 
choice of secularism as a guarantee for equal religious freedom to all. 
Though secularism was included in the Preamble late in 1976, consti-
tutional guarantees of freedom of religion, non-discrimination on the 
basis of religion for employment, education etc., state neutrality in mat-
ters of religious choices were existing from the very beginning. Indian 
secularism has always been problematic. Lately, a secular disenchant-
ment is visible in the form of increasing communalisation and the rise 
of Hindu nationalist parties in the country. Another South Asian state, 
Bangladesh, is a moderate Islamic democracy. The Majority of its popu-
lation (90 %) are Sunni Muslims. There are also Shias and Ahmadiyyas. 
Approximately 10 % of the population in Bangladesh are Hindus. Secu-
larism has always informed Bangla nationalism, which has its centre 
in culture and language. Bangladeshi Hindus and Muslims joined the 
Bangladesh Liberation Army, which fought for the country’s independ-
ence. Secularism was part of the preamble to the 1972 Constitution of 
Bangladesh along with nationalism, socialism and democracy. How-
ever, the subsequent military regimes led by Ziaur Rahman supported 
by right wing political parties such as the Bangladesh Nationalist Par-
ties replaced secularism with Islamic Bangladeshi Nationalism in 1977. 
Finally, in 1988 the country’s second military ruler Hussain Muham-
mad Ershad declared Islam the state religion of Bangladesh. Since then 
there has been a flip-flop between religion and politics. With the Awami 
League in power led by Seikh Hasina secularism is back into the politi-
cal agenda. Sri Lanka has the longest continuous history of Buddhism 
of any Buddhist country. Around 200 BC, Buddhism became the official 
religion of Sri Lanka. Nearly 70 % of its population follow Theravada 
Buddhism. Besides Buddhism, Hinduism is also found among 16 % of 
the population mostly concentrated among the Tamils of the North East 
provinces. Other religions found in Sri Lanka are Christianity (7 %) 
and Islam (7 %). Like Sri Lanka, Bhutan has a predominantly Buddhist 
way of life. Buddhism was the state religion until the introduction of 
the Constitution of Bhutan in 2008. Even after the introduction of secu-
larism under constitutional democracy Buddhism remains the source 
of meaning, literature, philosophy and politics in Bhutan. The state has 
also a small number of Hindus mainly among immigrants in the south-
ern part of the country. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan was founded 
in 1947 as a Muslim state. However it continued to be accommodative 
of Hindu, Sikh, Christian, Ahmadiyya minorities till the assassination of 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1979. During the military regime of Zia ul Haq, 
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the islamisation of Pakistan was nearly complete through the introduc-
tion of the Blasphemy and Sharia Law. Another desecularising force in 
operation has been that of Jamaat-e-Islami. The Himalayan Kingdom of 
Nepal is a country with religious, social and cultural diversity. There are 
several religious and ethnic groups. The 2001 Census classified the pop-
ulation of Nepal into six broad religious categories: Hindu,  Buddhist, 
Muslim, Christian, Kirat, and others. Hindus accounted for 80.62 per 
cent, followed by Buddhists (10.74 per cent), Muslims (4.2 per cent), 
Kirat (3.6 per cent), Christians (0.45 per cent) and others (0.4 per cent). 
Religion has a long history of inseparability from the politics of the 
country. The constitution of 1990 recognised Hinduism as a state reli-
gion. The Interim Constitution of Nepal (2007) seeked to define Nepal 
as secular, inclusive and fully democratic albeit large scale resistance has 
emerged across different sections of Nepalese society.19 
Religion in South Asia and secular claims present a complex picture 
characterised by religious resurgence and its study contributes im-
mensely to the understanding of the process of desecularization. These 
South Asian complexities increase manifolds as the region gets drawn 
into the vortex of globalization. Globalization spells mobility for man 
in the fields of technology, capital, values and religions. Most religions 
have been expansionist throughout their histories. However, the spread 
of religion through missionaries was qualitatively different from what 
we see today. While former times saw the chasing of territories and 
places, today’s missionaries look for constituencies and adherents. The 
study of place has nonetheless given rise to new fields of study such as 
sacred geography or the spatial practices of sacred space.20 
This opens up for many questions such as: how to understand the 
rise of religion in a presumed modern non-religious world? Why is 
secularism losing ground? How to explain the conditions that produce 
these religious swings? Can we make predictions about the forms this 
rise will take in democratic states? How will religion develop in a glob-
al era? How does religious revival works within the frame of already 
existing social divides? Does religion magnifies the divisions or mutates 
them? Is radicalization a precondition to religious resurgence? Does the 
process of desecularization hasten fundamentalism? How does it affect 
the politics of identity? 
The Case of Varanasi 
The intention here is not to claim to provide definite answers to the 
above questions, considering their complexity. However, the present 
effort is expected to add to our ability to find an answer. The present 
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chapter explores religious resurgence with Varanasi as a backdrop. 
Varanasi has been one of the oldest seats of spirituality and religious 
salvation. Kashi – known as the City of Lights – or modern Varanasi is 
an ancient city known for learning and knowledge. It is mentioned in 
the Mahabharata, the Puranas, the Vedas and the Upanishads. It is said 
to be more than 4 000 years old. Historians tell of a living city from the 
600 AD. It has hosted almost all religious movements of India. Maharsi 
Vyasa,  Kabir, Tulsidas and more, all belong to Varanasi. There are more 
than 300 maths and 1 500 temples in Varanasi today. The present study 
contends that with no concomitant variance in degrees of spirituality 
a new middle class religiosity is on the rise. More Jagatgurus find their 
place in this sacred landscape. More new rich and young are devotees, 
always ready to offer more daan (charity) they are always in need of 
more punya (merits). Religion has gone global in ambition and reach. 
Benares wants to attain a leadership position in civilizational spiritual-
ity. Recruiting international devotees, flaunting celebrity clients, estab-
lishing chains of posh member-recruitment offices is the order of the day.
Religion is found in every society. Small, big, primitive or post- 
modern, most peoples have a sense of some unseen power, worshipped 
and woven around a complex set of beliefs and practices. This is truer 
now than it was earlier. In the words of Peter Berger: “the world today 
is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some places more so than 
ever … Modernisation has led to some kind of secularisation but it has 
also provoked powerful movements of counter secularisation”.21
Theorizations of religion by the social sciences are few and far be-
tween barring the period following WWII. While religion is presumed 
to be based on experience beyond the empirical, sociology has posed it-
self as an empirical science at the expense of the study of religion. Early 
anthropological engagements with religion are found in Max Müller 
and Edward B. Tylor, who represent the naturalistic and the animis-
tic school respectively.22 Robert Lowie’s thesis of religion as “awe and 
mystery” is also an important contribution.23 Sociological treatments of 
religion can be found in Durkheim’s totem, Weber’s Protestant ethics 
and the spirit of capitalism, Simmel’s forms of social relationship, Guy 
Swanson’s “organised cluster of purposes” and social patterns (1960), 
Robert N. Bellah’s ritual roots, Peter Berger’s desecularization of the 
world (1999), Norris and Inglehart’s secure secularization (2004), and 
Meera Nanda’s God market (2011).24 Added to this are piles of secular-
ism literature by Madan, Vanaik, Nandy, etc.25 
While religion as a source and consequence of social change has been 
the theme of most of these studies, very few have focused on society as a 
source of religious change. The present study thus explores such trends 
211
of change in Varanasi. The study is ethnographic in nature. It covers 
six selected Hindu temples and Maths (or mutts, i.e. “ashrams”). The 
choice of Hindu places is motivated by the fact that they are the most 
exposed to secularization compared to other more isolated and insu-
lated religious communities. The six temples and mutts are Sidhpeeth 
Kabirchaura Math, Jangamvadi Mutt, Guru Ravidasji Temple, Kring 
Kund Kinaram Baba, Kashi Vishwanathji, and Sankat Mochan Temple.
Field Notes
1. Sidhpeeth Kabirchaura Math
Sant Vivek Dasji is a famous and popular temple in Varanasi. 100 ka-
birpanthis (followers of saint Kabir) on average visit the temple  every 
day. The visits soar to 5 000 to 7 000 on Kabir Jayanti (celebration) or 
Kabir’s Guru Puja. 80 % of the visitors are kabirpanthis, the rest are 
foreigners and VIPs. Pilgrims come from Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, 
Bihar, Chhattisgarh. The mutt lacks any kind of missionary  material 
and structure. It is now struck by decline and nearby competition. 
 People come here in search of happiness and to resist the onslaught of 
caste injustice.
2. Jangamvadi Mutt
The mutt is more than 1 000 years old and propagates knowledge 
about the school of Shivadvaita. It owns a large property that includes 
cinema halls that have been built through donations from Aurangzeb, 
Kashi Naresh and others. People donate in the name of family members 
and others. Translocal devotees often come from Andhra Pradesh and 
Maharashtra. The facility can receive 400 people at the time. The mutt 
has a number of literatures, a website with online booking, etc.
3. Guru Ravidasji Temple
The full name of the temple is Shree Guru Ravidas Charitable Trust 
Janmasthan Mandir. Sant Niranjan Dasji Maharaj from Punjab is 
presently the head of the temple. 2 500 000 devotees visit the temple 
on Ravidas Jayanti, mainly from Punjab and Haryana. 3 000 to 4 000 
devotees visit the temple every day. Highly placed bureaucrats, poli-
ticians, judges, NRIs (non-resident Indians living abroad) are among 
the devotees. Devotees come for puja and tourism. Ravidasji stands for 
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the ideology of “man cannot live without religion”. The temple owns a 
hostel, the Sant Sarvan Dasji Yatri Niwas with sixty beds and various 
hotels. It has websites and tour operators. CD and DVDs as well as 
literature that presents the temple.
4. Kring Kund Kinaram Baba
The place of the ashrama is known as Aghori Peeth Baba Kinaram 
Sthal. 3 000 to 4 000 devotees visit the ashram on Tuesdays and Sun-
days. 70 000 to 100 000 devotees gather on February 10 (Nirvan  Diwas) 
every year. Most devotees are from Uttar Pradesh. Devotees from Bihar 
and South India also visit the ashram. Astha (a humanitarian trust), 
problems such as childlessness and trouble in marriage are some of the 
reasons that bring people here for relief. The Kundsnan (bathing place) 
in the Ashram is a major attraction. There is a continuous expansion of 
the infrastructure funded by donations. The devotees are mostly urban, 
literate people. Young couples in particular frequent the temple. Website 
and literature are available.
5. Kashi Viswanathji
Kashi is considered a sacred city for auspicious death and liberation, 
the place where Shiva reveals himself as a Jyotirlinga, and where 330 
million Gods reside (this is stated in the Preta Khanda of Garuda Pu-
rana). The Kashi Viswanathji temple is run by a Government trust. It 
is one of the richest temple in India. 100 000 devotees come each day 
to the temple and 400 000 to 500 000 visit it in the month of Sawan. 
Translocal devotees from South India and from lower castes or classes 
compose the majority of the devotees. Young and educated urban devo-
tees are also found in large numbers. Salvation, peace, good wishes and 
blessings are the prime motivations for the visitors worshipping in the 
facility. Instruments for dissemination include a website for online do-
nations, CD/DVDs, sponsored programmes, etc.
6. Sankat Mochan Temple
25 000 devotees visit the temple each day but 50 000 on Tuesdays and 
Saturdays. Devotees mainly consist of young urbanites and tourists. 
Devotees come for receiving good wishes and blessings, out of personal 
faith, or due to the auspicious value of seeing and be seen by the deity 
(darshan). The temple is run by a trust headed by Birbhadra Mishra. 
Hanuman Jayanti attracts large crowds.
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Discussion 
The six cases explored here present a varied picture. In one case re-
ligious change (or even a u-turn) is caused by Hindu truth claims, in 
another case it is for the magic of fulfilling cherished wishes, and in 
yet another it consists of social resistance. No clear picture emerges, 
of course. A common thread is the return of the religious. Crowds in 
the future will continue to swell due to the risk society brought about 
by modernity. Insecurity, individualism, personal desires will continue 
to be the prime motivators for being religious. These motivations are 
though non-spiritual in nature. They are personal (marriage, child etc.), 
professional (job, income, business, etc.) or political (identity, resist-
ance, competition, etc.). On the supply side there is also evidence of 
increasing digitalization and the use of other modern technology. Spir-
ituality comes as a package convenience that includes lodging, food, 
sightseeing and much more. Religious bodies are constantly upgrading 
and customizing themselves in a competitive religious market. During 
interactions with different groups of devotees at different points in time 
and place it was also found that religion is regarded as one tool among 
others for gaining material success. The religious market reacts to new 
trends but does not control the flow of change and globalization. Glo-
balization causes a sort of “time-space vacuum”, cutting across class 
distinctions. Religion has now become more instrumental in content, 
or in the words of Clifford Geertz a “Rationalised Religion”. It is nei-
ther a failure of systemic secularism nor an end of pristine religion. It 
is now more of a cycle of dialectical tension between the two. At the 
same time, religion provides meaning in the realm of contemporary 
“manufactured uncertainties”. Thus in the current sense, it is both a 
resource and a source of identity that collides with its super-structural 
formations.
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